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1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“Friede in Sicht! Im dreißigjährigen Schulkrieg zeichnen sich Lösungen ab” 1  
(Spiewak, 2008, 39).  
 
Ideological discussions about the design of Germany’s education system have shaped 
the public debate about education since the implementation of the first comprehensive 
schools in the early 1970s. However, Spiewak (2008) notes a widespread perception 
that these discussions are currently losing strength. As international assessments of 
student performance, such as the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) become popular throughout the industrialised world, the education policies of 
Germany’s leading political parties appear to converge, becoming more evidence-based. 
The broadly discussed PISA results increase transparency and accountability of 
education systems around the world; cross-country comparisons have revealed their 
effectiveness and efficiency. At the same time, education and the creation of human 
capital are increasingly considered of crucial importance for securing high living 
standards. The German education system, strongly dominated by the public sector, faces 
tight public budgets and pronounced demographic shifts. Taken together, these factors 
increase the pressure on public authorities to improve the current education system, 
while at the same time diminishing the ideological debate.  
 
Against this background, I take a closer look at the German education system. I first 
examine several historical issues – the ideological conflicts in the West German 
education system – and issues that already reflect the future challenges of public 
education – by analysing the effects of the strong demographic changes on public 
education in the East German Länder. Education policy at the primary, secondary and 
higher education levels is also considered.  
 
In particular, I analyse the effects of strong demographic shifts by considering how the 
East German Länder responded to the rather dramatic decline in the number of students 
in primary schools (Chapter 3). The demographic shock is a consequence of collapsing 
birth rates after German Reunification. Previous results from the literature, which rely 
                                                
1 “Peace in sight! A solution to the Thirty Year’s School-War is near”. 
2 
on data from rather stable demographic periods, suggest that public resources are 
incompletely adjusted to shrinking cohort size such that large reductions in the student 
population translate into important increases in spending per student and not in 
significant reductions of public resources allocated to education. My empirical analysis 
suggests, however, that resource adjustments have been considerable, especially in the 
years when student cohorts were actually decreasing. Adjustments have been less tight 
in the period when student numbers stagnated such that the 50% decrease in cohort size 
has translated into a 25% increase in the teacher/student-ratio.  
 
A major topic in German lower secondary education is tracking students according to 
their ability. Thus, Chapter 4 tests whether partisan theory can help to explain the 
practise of ability-tracking in West Germany over the last three decades. The analysis 
starts from the empirical observation that in the German education system – where 
tracking is practised very early compared to other OECD countries – the correlation of 
parent’s education or income with their children’s track choices is very strong. In short, 
students whose parents have a high-education background have significantly higher 
probabilities of attending a high-ability track. Partisan theory states that political parties 
– when in office – pursue the interests of their members and electoral constituencies. 
Political parties representing highly educated households should therefore support the 
practise of ability-tracking and advocate higher education spending on the tracks for 
good students. My findings suggest that German political parties support tracking if 
they represent high-education households and oppose tracking if they represent lower 
educated households. The results for the distribution of public resources across tracks 
are weaker but still support partisan theory. 
 
Research-oriented higher education in Germany is almost exclusively provided by the 
public sector, which highlights the importance of measuring university cost efficiency, 
because market exit and entry – which ensure efficient resource use in the private sector 
– virtually do not exist (see e.g., Hanushek, 2002, 2068). Chapter 5 provides evidence 
about the factors that benefit efficient resource use in the German higher education 
landscape. I analyse whether relatively liberal university regulation improves the cost 
efficiency of public universities as suggested in the literature (see Aghion et al., 2008). 
The results show that liberal university regulation indeed contributes to more efficient 
use of resources. Moreover, I find that there are cost-reducing effects from a prosperous 
3 
private economic environment. In particular, high regional GDP per capita seems to 
reduce university costs.  
 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides background on the German 
education and political systems. Chapter 3 analyses how the East German Länder 
responded to strongly decreasing student cohort size. Chapter 4 tests whether the 
practise of ability-tracking in the West German Länder may be explained using partisan 
theory and Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the determinants of German university cost 
structures and cost efficiency. Chapter 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
4 
2 GERMANY’S EDUCATION AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS: 
AN OVERVIEW 
 
This chapter gives a brief overview of the institutional settings and stylised facts of 
Germany’s education and political systems necessary for understanding the ensuing 
chapters. In particular, Section 2.1 provides evidence on (1) the involvement of the 
public sector in education in Germany, (2) the division of tasks between the federal 
(Bund), state (Länder) and local (Gemeinden) governments in education and (3) some 
details of student curricula and the ability-tracking system. Section 2.2 reports evidence 
of the link between students’ track choice and parental background while Section 2.3 
outlines the demographics of student cohorts. Section 2.4 describes the various political 
parties, the socioeconomic characteristics of their party members and electoral 
constituencies as well as what the party manifestos tell us about education policy. 
 
2.1 The German education system 
 
As in most OECD countries, the German education system is dominated by the public 
sector. In primary, lower secondary and upper secondary education about 97%, 92% 
and 91% of students attend public schools, respectively (see Table 2.1). The German 
Constitution (Art. 7 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) guarantees the 
right to establish and operate private schools, most of which are affiliated with a 
religion. Private schools operate, however, under Länder regulation and receive 
subsidies from Länder governments, which amount to about 90% of spending on 
teachers (Leschinsky and Cortina, 2003 and Leschinksy, 2003). Thus, private education 
cannot be looked upon as “independent”, but rather should be considered as 
government-dependent private education (see also OECD, 2008a, 346). Higher 
education, type A, which is defined as “largely theory-based” and providing “sufficient 
qualifications for entry to advanced research programmes” (OECD, 2008b) denotes the 
classical universities in Germany. Here, the public sector assumes a significant role. The 
few private universities often concentrate on specific interests, e.g., medical schools, 
business schools, etc. Higher education, type B, denotes the universities of applied 
science (Fachhochschulen), which provide “practical, technical or occupational skills 
for direct entry into the labour market, although some theoretical foundations may be 
5 
covered in the respective programmes” (OECD, 2008c). Due to the applied character of 
type B universities, the private sector plays a more important role than in the research-
oriented higher education. Note that the German division between public and private 
institutions is not so different from the OECD mean, albeit the public sector is 
somewhat more important on average (see Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1 Share of students enroled in public institutions (OECD countries, 2006)  
 Primary 
education 
Lower 
secondary 
education 
Upper 
secondary 
education 
Higher 
education 
(Type B)  
Higher 
education 
(Type A) 
Germany 96.7 92.1 91.4 62.6 95.9 
France 85.0 78.6 69.6 72.1 87.1 
UK 94.7 93.7 52.2 - - 
Sweden 93.5 92.4 91.2 61.7 93.8 
EU19 mean 89.9 87.4 83.3 68.3 81.5 
Norway 97.7 97.2 91.4 56.4 86.7 
USA 90.2 91.6 92.0 84.3 71.9 
Japan 99.0 93.3 69.2 7.1 24.1 
OECD mean 91.1 87.4 83.3 65.5 78.5 
Data source: OECD (2008a). In the UK, 100% of institutions in higher education (Types A and B) are 
classified as “government-dependent private”. Type A higher education denotes programmes that are 
“largely theory-based and are designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry to advanced research 
programmes…” (OECD, 2008b). Type B higher education denotes programmes that are “typically shorter 
than those of tertiary-type A and focus on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry into 
the labour market, although some theoretical foundations may be covered in the respective programmes” 
(OECD, 2008c). 
 
Education is a major responsibility of the Länder governments as fixed in the German 
Constitution (Art. 30 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland). Thus, some 
background information on political federalism in Germany and especially on the role 
of the Länder in the education system is useful.  
 
The former West Germany consisted of 11 Länder. After reunification, the Federal 
Republic of Germany now consists of 16 Länder (see Table 2.2). Berlin was divided, 
and has thus been part of West and East Germany. It is helpful to distinguish between 
“city states” (Stadtstaaten) and “non-city states” (Flächenländer). City states consist of 
one large city or metropolitan area (Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen) and Flächenländer 
are area-based, comprising many local governments (Gemeinden), which have an 
independent status but receive considerable funding from the Länder governments. City 
states also assume the responsibilities of the local governments because there are no 
independent local governments. Table 2.2 shows that the Länder are quite 
6 
heterogeneous with respect to their population size. The largest Land, North-Rhine 
Westphalia, has about 18 bn. inhabitants, while Bremen, the smallest Land, has about 
660 000 inhabitants. 
 
Table 2.2 The German Länder (2007) 
Abbrev. Land West/East City/ 
Area 
Population  
(bn.) 
BW Baden-Württemberg West Area 10.7 
BY Bavaria West Area 12.5 
HB Bremen West City 0.7 
HH Hamburg West City 1.8 
HE Hesse West Area 6.1 
NI Lower Saxony West Area 8.0 
NW North-Rhine Westphalia West Area 18.0 
RP Rhineland-Palatinate West Area 4.0 
SL Saarland West Area 1.0 
SH Schleswig-Holstein West Area 2.8 
BE Berlin East & West City 3.4 
BB Brandenburg East Area 2.5 
MV Mecklenburg-Vorpomerania East Area 1.7 
SN Saxony East Area 4.2 
ST Saxony-Anhalt East Area 2.4 
TH Thuringia East Area 2.3 
Data source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany. Population size as of December 31, 2007.  
 
In primary and secondary education, Länder governments share responsibility with the 
local level. About 80% of primary and secondary education expenditures accrue to the 
Länder and 20% are borne by the local governments.2 Länder are also in charge of 
teaching staff, but the local governments provide school infrastructure and pay for non-
teaching staff (see also Leschinsky, 2003, 174).3 This represents a significant 
component of total public expenditure, both at the Länder and local level. On average, 
primary and secondary education spending make up 36% of the total wage bill at the 
Länder level (excluding city states) and 14% of total capital spending at the local level.4 
Figure 2.1 shows that in the East German Länder the majority of teachers are employed 
as regular public sector employees, whereas in the West German Länder most teachers 
receive the status of civil servants (more attractive for teachers in terms of net wage, job 
                                                
2 Although local governments are involved in providing primary and secondary education, the Länder 
assume the general power of decision. 
3 In some (larger) Bavarian cities, teachers are employed by local governments. 
4 However, local governments receive a considerable amount of grants from the Länder to finance school 
expenditures. Expenditure data refers to 2004. 
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protection and pension plans). However, there are marked differences across the East 
German Länder. In particular, Brandenburg and Thuringia offer a significant amount of 
civil servant positions. For the abbreviations of Länder names see Table 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.1 Share of teachers employed as regular public sector employees (and not as 
public servants) (16 German Länder, 2004) 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
BW BY HB HH HE NI NW RP SL SH BE BB MV SN ST TH
 
Data source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
  
The Länder are also responsible for higher education where they finance current 
spending on universities, which accounts for about 8% of total expenditures at the 
Länder level. The Länder share the responsibility for new construction of university 
buildings with the federal government (50%). The federal government also finances 
financial aid for students (Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz). Furthermore, since 
1976 the federal government sets the Framework Act for Higher Education 
(Hochschulrahmengesetz), which originally defined university tasks and regulated 
university structure and organisation (Leschinsky, 2003). The Framework Act has been 
liberalised via several amendments since 1985. Currently, the German Parliament is 
considering outright abolishment. Education policies are coordinated across the Länder 
within the Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers 
(Kultusministerkonferenz, KMK) while the Joint Science Conference (Gemeinsame 
Wissenschaftskonferenz, GWK) is the forum for co-operation between the federal 
government and the Länder.5 
 
                                                
5 Until the end of 2007, the federal government and the Länder cooperated within the Bund-Länder 
Commission for Educational Planning and Research Promotion (Bund-Länder Kommission für 
Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung, BLK). 
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Länder responsibility results in marked differences in education institutions across the 
16 Länder. Nevertheless, there are several common features (see also Leschinky and 
Cortina, 2003 and Federal Ministry for Education and Research, 2007a). Students enter 
primary schools at the age of six and leave the joint primary education after the fourth 
grade (at the age of ten).6 In lower secondary education, students are grouped into three 
types of schools according to their ability (“ability-tracking”). High-performing students 
attend “Gymnasium” (comparable to grammar school in the UK and high school in the 
U.S.), medium-performing students attend “Realschule” (intermediate school) and 
lower-performing students attend “Hauptschule” (secondary general school).7 Teachers 
give a recommendation regarding student’s track choice at the end of primary school. 
Generally, about 75% of track choices match the teacher recommendations (Cortina and 
Trommer, 2003, 357). However, depending on Länder, if the student’s parents disagree 
with the teacher recommendation, the final decision may either be made by the parents 
or by the school administration: in 11 out of 16 Länder the parents make the final 
decision.8 Mobility between educational tracks is possible and actually increased in the 
past fifty years. At the end of the 1960s, the (cumulative) share of pupils in one cohort 
who changed tracks was far below 10% (Blossfeld, 1990), but by 2000 the share 
increased to about 14%. However, about 75% was downward mobility (Cortina and 
Trommer, 2003, 375; Bellenberg, 2005 and the literature cited therein).9 
 
In 2006, about 36% of all students in lower secondary education attended a Gymnasium 
with some variation across the Länder (see Figure 2.2). Since 1981, the percentage 
increased from about 30%. Due to several key differences in Länder education systems 
(described below), information on the relative importance of the other two types of 
                                                
6 Students stay in primary schools for six years in Berlin and Brandenburg. Consequently, in these two 
Länder, students are tracked after the sixth grade. Currently, Hamburg is implementing six-year primary 
education as of summer 2010. 
7 Some schools in a minority of Länder have a so-called orientation stage for two years 
(“Orientierungsstufe”) following primary school. Students are then tracked after the sixth grade. 
8 As an example, in North-Rhine Westphalia, the largest Land, the decision concerning the choice of 
school track is usually assumed by the parents provided they roughly follow the primary school teacher’s 
advice. If parents’ request and teacher’s advice is not even roughly in accord, then the decision is made 
by the school administration after test lectures (Schulgesetz für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, §11 and 
Ausbildungsordnung Grundschule, §8). For an extensive overview of the transition regulation from 
primary schools to lower secondary schools in all German Länder see Standing Conference of German 
Education Ministers (2006a). 
9 From an international perspective, ability-tracking in Germany starts very early. Across OECD countries 
only Austria tracks students as early as Germany (OECD, 2005). The present system has a long history 
and its origins date to the 19th century. Directly after the WWII tracking was replaced by a 
comprehensive system by the Allied occupation. In the postwar period, however, tracking was 
reestablished again (Baumert, Cortina and Leschinsky, 2003, 54). 
9 
schools is not easy to find, e.g., the share of students enroled in Hauptschule was 
reported to be about 20% at the end of the 1990s (Solga and Wagner, 2000, 2). 
 
Figure 2.2 Share of students enroled in comprehensive schools, joint schooling and 
Gymnasium (16 German Länder, 2006) 
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Data source: Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers. 
 
Some Länder provide comprehensive schools (“integrierte Gesamtschulen”), which 
generally comprise all three tracks in lower secondary education. Students are educated 
in one organisational unit and share common instruction for all performance levels in 
some subjects, whereas in other subjects students are grouped according to their ability. 
This is also a common practise in the U.S. (“streaming of students”). Mobility between 
these “streams” is much higher in the comprehensive schools than in the traditional 
system. As Köller (2003, 458) points out, the model of the comprehensive school, 
introduced for the first time in 1968 in West-Berlin and from the early 1970s in other 
Länder, and accompanied by unprecedented ideological, political and pedagogical 
discussion, originally was designed to replace the tracked education system, not as a 
complement. This leaves today’s comprehensive schools at a strategic disadvantage in 
the competition for gifted students. Thus, the composition of students in comprehensive 
schools is biased towards middle and low-performance students (Köller, 2003, 468). 
Compared with the total population students in comprehensive schools less than 
proportionately graduate with Abitur (A-level) degrees, which permit unrestricted 
access to higher education (Köller, 2003, 479). 
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Some Länder also provide a school type that consolidates the two lower educational 
tracks, Haupt- and Realschule, into one school (“Schulen mit mehreren 
Bildungsgängen”, Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers, 2006b, 
7). In these schools, there is joint and tracked education in varying proportions across 
the Länder. Furthermore, some Länder also provide the school type 
“Orientierungsstufe” (orientation stage), which is only available to students in grades 5 
and 6, and which offers instruction similar to comprehensive schools. The basic concept 
is to allow for higher mobility between tracks during grades 5 and 6, the two first years 
of tracking. 
 
Aggregating the students enroled in (1) comprehensive schools, (2) Schulen mit 
mehreren Bildungsgängen and (3) Orientierungsstufe gives us the total number of 
students who are educated in some type of cooperative education, labelled as students 
enroled in joint schooling in the following. Both the share of students enroled in 
comprehensive schools and the share enroled in joint schooling may be interpreted as 
measures of the degree of comprehensive schooling in lower secondary education. 
Figure 2.2 reports the share in lower secondary education enroled in 
comprehensive/joint schools across the Länder in 2006. It is obvious that there is 
considerable variation in the adoption of comprehensive education. While some Länder 
offer virtually no comprehensive education (Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg) others 
provide significant fractions of lower secondary education in the form of comprehensive 
instruction (Saarland, Hamburg), such that up to 60% of students in lower secondary 
education are educated in schools which comprise at least two tracks (see Köller, 2003, 
465). 
 
Compulsory education ends at the end of lower secondary education, after the ninth or 
tenth grade. Students then opt for additional higher secondary education, which may be 
some type of vocational training (in-company training in combination with part-time 
vocational schooling is the most important type), or two additional years in Gymnasium 
if the student has been educated in Gymnasium, or in Realschule (under certain 
conditions) in lower secondary education. Students generally leave the education system 
after 12 years of schooling at the age of 18-19 with a vocational degree or with the 
Abitur degree (A-level-examinations, high school diploma). 
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Länder responsibility tends to complicate the availability of data. For instance, 
comparable expenditure data or appropriate test score data for primary and secondary 
education is simply not available.10 However, the Standing Conference of German 
Länder Education Ministers annually publishes data on physical resource indicators, i.e. 
number of teachers, classes and teaching hours, which are comparable across Länder. 
Such data is used extensively in the following chapters (see e.g., the current issue: 
Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers, 2007). Note that the 
number of teachers is reported in full-time equivalents (fte), which takes into account 
that some teachers only work part-time. Thus, the number of full-time equivalent 
teachers is a calculative number and may differ from the number of (physical) teachers 
employed in a Land. Physical resource indicators are used in Chapters 3 and 4. In 
particular, the teacher/student-ratio (T/St) is considered an excellent resource indicator 
(Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers, 2002, 96). For higher 
education, comparable expenditure data at the level of universities is published by the 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany, which is used in Chapter 5. 
 
 
                                                
10 At the end of the 1990s, the Federal Statistical Office started to publish expenditures per student for 
single levels of schooling such as primary education. However, a change in the accounting design makes 
it impossible to compare pre- and post-2002 years. 
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2.2 Relevant facts on the link between parental background and 
track choice 
 
In Germany, even more than in most other OECD countries, there is a strong correlation 
between parents’ educational background, income and profession and the educational 
achievements of their offspring. This applies to students’ educational achievements in 
general (see e.g., Wößmann, 2004) but more importantly for this study, also to track 
choice in the transition from primary school to lower secondary school (Cortina and 
Trommer, 2003, 358). Baumert and Schümer (2001, 462) report that the share of 
students from a blue-collar parental background in Hauptschule and Schulen mit 
mehreren Bildungsgängen is about 63%, about 51% in comprehensive schools, 43% in 
Realschule and 22% in Gymnasium. The share of students from households with 
university degree varies from 62% in Gymnasium to 13% in Hauptschule. There is also 
evidence for important differences in the probability of attending a Gymnasium between 
blue-collar parents’ offspring and those of civil servants, the self-employed and white-
collar workers (Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung, 2002, 20). Across all 
Länder, the latter three have a three times higher probability of sending their children to 
a Gymnasium compared to blue-collar workers.11 In some Länder (Bavaria, Schleswig-
Holstein), this differential is even six-fold. Interestingly, the socioeconomic status of 
students in comprehensive schools as measured by father’s profession is considerably 
below that of students enroled in Gymnasium (Köller, 2003, 481; Baumert and 
Schümer, 2001). Corroborating these results, Schimpl-Neimanns (2000), Schnabel et al. 
(2002) and Dustmann (2004) consistently report that the correlation is still significant, 
although the correlation of parental background with track choice and educational 
achievement has somewhat weakened over the last 50 years. The link holds for parental 
background in terms of education, profession and income. Evidence from Contini, 
Scagni and Riehl (2007) suggests that the correlation of parental background with track 
choice is more important in Germany than in other countries, such as the Netherlands or 
Italy.  
 
Moreover, evidence presented by Schnepf (2002) suggests that parental socioeconomic 
background also dominates the negative effect of being an immigrant. Her finding is 
                                                
11 Similar correlations also hold for the transition from lower secondary to higher secondary education 
(see Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2007b) and with respect to the question whether 
children obtain higher education or not (see OECD, 2007, 116). 
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confirmed by a recent study which analyses the socioeconomic background of students 
who participated in a scholarship programme that was intended to grant scholarships to 
gifted students with a migrant parental background (“START” programme financed by 
the Hertie foundation, see Bommes, Grünheid and Wilmes, 2008). The results suggest 
that educated parents (1) impart to their children a positive attitude towards education 
and knowledge, and (2) can give their children guidance on choosing school/track, and 
(3) can advise their children to apply for scholarships in the first place – virtually 
irrespective of whether they are natives or migrants and whether the parents’ 
educational degrees were formally approved within the German education system. 
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2.3 Demographics of the school- and university-relevant 
populations 
 
This chapter presents the variations in student cohort size, which is of special 
importance in Chapter 3. Figure 2.3 shows the birth rate for East and West Germany as 
the most important determinant of the size of student cohorts. As a matter of course, 
immigration and outmigration also have some importance for the demographics of 
student cohorts, which is accounted for in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, which present student 
numbers or cohort sizes of the school- and university-relevant populations (including 
immigrants).  
 
Figure 2.3 Birth rate in East and West Germany (1952-2006) 
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Data source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany. Note: Total fertility rate, births per woman.  
 
In Figure 2.3 we observe that the general trend in the birth rate in East and West 
Germany has not greatly differed. However, there are two marked differences. In East 
Germany there was a significant rise in the birth rate starting at the end of the 1970s 
(“Honecker-Buckel”). Over several years, there was a 0.5-child differential in the births 
per woman between East and West Germany. This differential decreased steadily in the 
1980s and resulted in a collapsing birth rate after German Reunification. The East 
German birth rate decreased from 1.5 in 1990 to about 0.77 in 1993 and recovered 
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slowly over the following years.12 Consequently, student enrolment in East German 
primary schools decreased by about 60% from 1993 to 2002 (see Figure 2.4). Although 
the number of pupils began to pick up in 2003 and increased slightly until 2007, in the 
long-run, student cohorts in primary schools will reach about 50% of the 1993 level. In 
contrast, student enrolment in West German primary schools will stay fairly constant 
and is forecasted to decrease smoothly to about 90% until 2020. The demographic 
shock in East Germany is explored in Chapter 3, which studies the response of the 
public sector to changes in the size of the student cohorts. 
 
Figure 2.4 Student enrolment in primary schools in East and West Germany (1993-
2020). Normalised time series (1993=100) 
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Data source: Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers. Note: Historical data from 
1993 through 2006. Forecast from 2007 through 2020 taken from Standing Conference of German Länder 
Education Ministers (2005). 
 
Figure 2.5 plots the size of the school- and university-relevant age cohorts for primary 
schools (6-10), lower secondary schools (10-16), upper secondary schools and for 
higher education (19-28) in West Germany from 1967 to 2007, relative to the respective 
cohort size in 2007. The figure shows that the large cohorts of the baby boomers 
finished primary schools and entered lower secondary schools at the end of 1960/early 
1970s. The large cohorts stayed in lower secondary education until the mid-1980s, 
                                                
12 In addition, due to the poor economic performance of the East German economy there are rather strong 
east-west migration flows. Hence, the East German population declined by 8% from 1991 to 2005 
whereas the population size in West Germany increased by approximately 5% in the same period 
(excluding Berlin). 
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suggesting that it may be of some importance to control for student cohort size when 
analysing education spending in West Germany over the 1979-2006 period (see Chapter 
4). Figure 2.5 also suggests that demographic variation of the university-relevant 
population (19-28 years) is limited in the rather short time period, 1998-2003, used in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 2.5 Size of school- and university-relevant age cohorts (West Germany, 1967-
2007). Normalised time series (2007=100) 
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Data source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
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2.4 Political parties, platforms and manifestos 
 
In Germany, traditionally, two parties predominate. The Social Democrats (SPD) and 
the Christian Democrats/Conservative Party (CDU) have always formed the 
governments both at the federal and Länder levels – alone or in coalition governments 
with smaller parties. The most important smaller parties are the Liberal Democrats 
(FDP) and an environmentalist party, the Green Party. Typically, the Green Party has 
formed coalition governments with the SPD, and the FDP has formed coalition 
governments with both the SPD and the CDU. Recently, a fifth party has achieved some 
notice, the Socialist party, “Die Linke”. This party arose out of the Socialist Unity Party 
in the former German Democratic Republic. Although it has achieved some government 
participation in the East German Länder, so far it has lacked importance in the West 
German Länder over the sample period, and therefore is omitted from this dissertation. 
 
In analysing the electoral manifestos of CDU, SPD, FDP and the Green Party that were 
valid in the 1990s, Stern (2000) finds a range of priorities for education. While the CDU 
manifesto explicitly mentions maintaining the tracked education system (Gymnasium, 
Realschule, Hauptschule) and promoting gifted students, the SPD prioritises 
comprehensive schools, which should also provide full-time instruction and a closer 
connection of the country’s education system to working life. The FDP does not take a 
clear position, but instead prefers “diversity” in the provision of public schools and 
advocates promoting gifted students. The Green Party manifesto focuses on providing 
comprehensive schools in lower secondary education (up to class 10). 
 
The following data on the composition of German political parties’ members and 
electoral constituencies by profession, social status and educational degree is especially 
relevant for Chapter 4. Figure 2.6 shows that SPD and CDU party members do not 
differ much in terms of university education, although CDU members hold somewhat 
more university degrees. However, a significant difference appears at the lower end of 
education. While about 40% of SPD members do not hold an educational degree higher 
than Hauptschule, the figure is less than 30% for CDU party members.13 Another 
difference is between party members of CDU/SPD, the liberal FDP and the Green Party. 
Generally, FDP and more so, Green Party members, have a higher probability of 
                                                
13 Note, however, that party members of the Bavarian CDU, “CSU”, have a structure similar to the SPD. 
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holding a university degree and a lower probability of having completed only 
Hauptschule. 
 
Figure 2.6 Political party members’ education in Germany (2002) 
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Data source: Heinrich, Lübker and Biehl (2002) 
 
We can observe a similar pattern in survey data for the 2005 federal election. Generally, 
the FDP and especially the Green Party are overrepresented among voters holding a 
university degree or Abitur (see Table 2.3). Differences between the SPD and 
CDU/CSU voters are less pronounced. Both parties are underrepresented among highly 
educated voters, although the CDU/CSU shows a somewhat better result among 
university graduates. The differences between SPD and CDU/CSU are stronger for the 
professional status of the electorates (Table 2.4 and Appendix A.2.4). While blue-collar 
workers seem to vote more frequently for the SPD, support for the CDU/CSU is more 
pronounced among the self-employed and farmers (and civil servants). Note that SPD 
election results among blue-collar workers have been much better in past decades and 
that the 2005 election result marks a particularly weak result compared to previous 
decades (see Mertens, 2009) Self-employed and civil servants are highly 
overrepresented in the electorates of the Green Party and FDP. 
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Table 2.3 Electorates of the political parties with respect to their education in the 2005 
federal election 
 SPD CDU/CSU Green Party FDP Die Linke 
Hauptschule 
(secondary general 
school) 
38% 38% 5% 8% 7% 
Realschule 
(intermediate school) 
33%    35%   7%     10%     10%   
Abitur (A-levels, high 
school diploma) 
34%  31% 13% 11% 9%   
University degree 29% 33%  15%   12%    10% 
ELECTION 34.2% 35.2% 8.1% 9.8% 8.7% 
Data source: Neu (2006) 
 
Table 2.4 Electorates of the political parties with respect to their profession in the 2005 
federal election 
 SPD CDU/CSU Green Party FDP Die Linke 
Blue-collar 
worker 
37% 32%   5%   8%   12%   
White-collar 
worker 
35 %   35%   9%    9%   9%   
Civil servants 33%   38%   11%   10% 5%   
Farmer 13%   65%   2%   9%   6%   
Self-
employed 
22%   41%   10%   20%   5%   
ELECTION 34.2% 35.2% 8.1% 9.8% 8.7% 
Data source: Neu (2006) 
 
A useful complement to these rather mechanical measures of party positions is the self-
assessment of party members, who were asked to identify their social class as perceived 
by themselves (see Figure 2.7; Heinrich, Lübker and Biehl, 2002, 10f.). We observe that 
the self-perceptions clearly differ across the two largest political parties, SPD and CDU. 
CDU members identify more frequently as upper middle class, whereas SPD members 
see themselves more frequently as working class, reaffirming the findings presented 
above. 
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Figure 2.7 Political party members self-assessment by social class in Germany 
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Data source: Heinrich, Lübker and Biehl (2002) 
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3 PRIMARY EDUCATION: ADJUSTMENT TO 
DEMOGRAPHIC SHOCKS IN THE EAST GERMAN 
LÄNDER 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
It is a well known fact that many industrialised nations will face unprecedented 
demographic shifts in the course of the 21st century. This applies especially to Japan 
and the European countries while the U.S. will undergo a somewhat less intense ageing 
process. A broad literature has examined the consequences of these demographic 
changes for public finances and labour markets – both theoretically and empirically (see 
for example Creedy and Disney, 1989; Verbon, 1990; Zimmermann, 1991; Cutler, 
Elmendorf and Zeckhauser, 1993; von Weizsäcker, 1995; Gruber and Wise, 2001 or 
Disney, 2007). Historically, the pension systems and public health insurance have been 
at the heart of economic research on the impact of ageing on public finances, but recent 
theoretical and empirical work has begun to consider the effects of demographic shifts 
on the provision of public education (see for example Gradstein and Kaganovich, 2004 
for a theoretical paper, and Poterba, 1997 or Boldrin and Montes, 2009 for empirical 
research). 
 
A fundamental problem encountered in the empirical work, however, is that the data 
does not yet reflect the magnitude and the rapidity of the upcoming demographic 
changes. Interpretations and (implicit) projections of future public expenditures, tax 
rates or public deficits have therefore always been subject to the assumption that the 
public choice of fiscal decisions during severe demographic shifts does not differ 
substantially from demographically stable periods. Regarding public education, there is 
evidence for several countries that (total) education spending is virtually independent of 
the size of their student cohorts (see e.g., Poterba, 1997 for the U.S. or Baum and Seitz, 
2003 for West Germany). However, as argued above, these studies examined data sets 
with rather modest demographic changes. The question arises whether these results also 
hold under conditions of rapid demographic change. Poterba (1997, 59) puts it more 
generally and urges: “further analysis of the link between cohort size and per-pupil 
spending, perhaps using changes in enrollment that result from exogenous shocks…”. 
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This chapter uses East Germany to study the impact of strong demographic shifts on 
education spending. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, German Reunification in 1990 induced a demographic shock 
in East Germany: the fertility rate hit an all-time low of 0.77 children per woman in the 
early 1990s. At the end of the decade, East Germany still had the lowest fertility rate in 
the EU-15 along with the northern regions of Spain and northern Italy. In addition, a 
significant share of families with school-age children migrated to the western part of the 
nation. As a consequence, student enrolment in East German primary schools decreased 
sharply in the middle of the 1990s and by 2002 the number of pupils was below 50% of 
the 1993 level. Recent population forecasts suggest that this is not a transitory situation. 
Student enrolment in primary education in the East German Länder will stay fairly 
constant at about 50% of the 1993 level. East Germany is therefore ideally suited to be 
used as a natural laboratory to study the impact of strong and rapid demographic 
changes on the provision of education resources. 
 
Given the empirical evidence from the literature, which suggests highly inelastic 
education expenditures, one may expect rather sluggish adjustment of total education 
spending in the case of strongly decreasing student cohort size in East Germany. In fact, 
education spending per student is likely to rise during the adjustment period. What will 
additional education expenditures per student finance? Rising education expenditures 
per student could be due to smaller classes, fewer working hours per teacher, more 
teaching time per class, etc. Each of these adjustment options may have quite different 
effects on students’ learning environment. To account for the changes in students’ 
learning environment, I decompose education expenditures into physical input 
variables, such as class size or teaching time per class. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 reviews international evidence on the 
link between cohort size and public education spending, discusses the decomposition of 
education spending into physical resource inputs and evaluates these inputs from the 
viewpoint of educational effectiveness. Section 3.3 introduces the data set and reports 
summary statistics. Section 3.4 presents some descriptive empirical evidence of 
resource adjustments in East Germany, and discusses the empirical strategy and the 
results. Panel data for the five East German Länder over the 1993-2006 period suggests 
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that resource adjustments have been considerable, especially in the years when student 
cohorts actually decreased (1993-2002). In this period, resource adjustment was 
significantly different from public policy in demographically more stable periods. After 
2000-2001, adjustments have been less stringent, such that over the 1993-2006 period, 
the 50%-decrease in cohort size has translated into a 25% increase in the 
teacher/student-ratio (~27% increase in education spending per student), which is no 
longer significantly different from the elasticity obtained from West German data for 
the same period. However, due to limitations of the econometric model, it cannot be 
claimed that the estimated elasticities are net of possible common shifts in the demand 
for public education following the publication of the PISA test in autumn 2001. With 
respect to the composition of the adjustment package, increased spending per student 
most likely contains an important share of productive spending but also some 
demographic costs. 
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3.2 Background: resource adjustments and the composition of 
education spending 
 
3.2.1 Existing empirical evidence 
A substantial body of empirical work has investigated the determinants of education 
spending. Among the classics are the contributions by Denzau (1975), Ladd (1975), 
Lovell (1978) and Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1989). Although these studies are closely 
related to my work, I confine my literature review to a specific subgroup, focusing on 
the studies examining the impact of varying sizes of student cohorts on education 
expenditures. 
 
Based on panel data for the U.S. states from 1960 to 1990 Poterba (1997 and 1998) 
shows that an increasing share of school-age population leads to lower education 
expenditures per student. Precisely, his estimate of an elasticity of -1 of education 
spending per student with respect to varying sizes of the student cohort suggests that 
total education expenditures are not adjusted at all to changes in the size of student-age 
cohorts.14 This result is confirmed for the state level by several studies and is robust to 
alternative model specifications (Fernandez and Rogerson, 2001; Harris, Evans and 
Schwab, 2001; Ladd and Murray, 2001). However, studies based on county and school 
district data find elasticities that tend to be smaller than those obtained from state level 
data. Ladd and Murray (2001) investigate county level data and estimate an elasticity of 
about -0.4, which is robust over different sub-samples of their data set. Harris, Evans 
and Schwab (2001) present estimates that are within a range of -0.3 to -0.5 for the 
school district level.  
 
Interestingly, the link between the demographic structure and education resources has 
been explored to a smaller extent for Europe, although the upcoming demographic 
changes will be more intense and more rapid in Europe. An exception is the work by 
Baum and Seitz (2003). Their results from a panel of West German Länder over the 
1975-1999 period are largely consistent with the U.S. results. Alternative specifications 
of the expenditure (endogenous) variable are tested: the Länder level estimates range 
                                                
14 The polar cases of the elasticity of education spending per student to changes in student cohort size are 
-1 if total education expenditures are not adjusted and 0 if total education expenditures are adjusted 
proportionately to changes in student cohort size. 
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from -0.75 (staff expenditures) to -0.82 (other expenditures). The estimates for the local 
level in West Germany show somewhat greater variation and are often not significantly 
different from zero. However, the elasticity for current expenditures (without staff 
expenditures) is in line with the U.S. results (-0.4).15  
  
Evidence for the Swiss Cantons is presented by Grob and Wolter (2007). They derive an 
elasticity of about -0.6 of school spending per pupil in Swiss primary schools to 
variations in enrolment. Borge and Rattsø (1995) confirm these findings for Norwegian 
local governments. Although declining age groups consume less total expenditures, 
local governments’ adjustment is rather slow. This leads to increasing education 
expenditures per pupil as age cohorts decrease, which is broadly consistent with the 
results from U.S. counties, German local governments and Swiss Cantons. 
 
International evidence presented by Schultz (1988) based on a wide panel of 89 
countries from 1960 to 1980 also suggests that total education spending is not adjusted 
in response to varying sizes of student cohorts. More precisely, he finds that total 
education spending per student in primary education is reduced by 1.12% in response to 
a 1% increase in the size of the student cohort. The estimated elasticity for the 
teacher/student-ratio is -0.46. At the secondary school level, Schultz finds a rather high 
elasticity of -1.68 for total education spending per student and -0.81 for the 
teacher/student-ratio. 
 
In short, existing empirical evidence suggests that there is a strong negative relationship 
between student cohort size and education spending per student. This implies that total 
education spending is adjusted rather sluggishly to varying student numbers. This 
finding applies especially to higher levels of government like the Länder/state level. The 
negative effect of student numbers on education spending per student tends to be lower 
at the local government level. However, all empirical evidence presented in the 
literature is derived from countries with rather modest changes in the age composition 
of the population. One exception is the work by Schultz (1988), but in his broad cross-
section of countries, which includes developing countries, growing student cohorts 
prevail. The dramatic decline in the East German student cohort after the fall of the Iron 
                                                
15 Recall that at the local level the bulk of expenditures accrue to non-wage spending (see Chapter 2). 
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Curtain makes it possible to study resource adjustment in education under a quite 
unique demographic scenario. 
 
3.2.2 A decomposition of education spending 
Incomplete adjustment of total education resources implies that resources per student 
increase. From the view of educational effectiveness, there is the question about the 
allocation of increased spending per student in terms of physical education resources: 
what exactly does increased spending per student buy? This issue has not been 
addressed in the literature reviewed above because these papers focus on a pure public 
finance perspective. Higher per student expenditures can be directed to smaller classes, 
more teaching time per class or less teaching time per fte teacher (see Chapter 2 for 
details on the number of full-time equivalent teachers, fte). Thus, additional education 
expenditures per student can be due to various sources and do not necessarily benefit 
students’ learning environment.   
 
Decomposing education expenditures allows us to assess the changes in students’ 
learning environment that may occur during the (non)-adjustment of resources. 
Different types of decompositions of education spending have been conducted in the 
literature. Although often pursuing other goals compared to my work, the 
decompositions commonly used can serve as a starting point for my analysis. Schultz 
(1988) decomposes public education expenditures per capita into the enrolment ratio, 
the teacher/student-ratio, current expenditures per teacher and an index of physical 
capital intensity, in order to disentangle quantity (enrolment) and quality elements of 
school spending (e.g., teacher/student-ratio). This decomposition already allows for an 
evaluation of students’ learning conditions (e.g., teacher/student-ratio or capital 
intensity). However, the work by Schultz (1988) is tailored to an analysis of a broad 
cross-section of countries, including developing countries. The enrolment ratio, which is 
a key element in his framework, is of no relevance in the present study because 
enrolment in primary schools is virtually 100% and does not show changes over time in 
OECD countries. Hanushek and Rivkin (1997) add several elements to the analysis by 
dividing education spending components into three groups: quantity, input cost and 
intensity. By quantity, they capture changes in the enrolment rate, changes in the 
division of pupils between private and public schools as well as changes in the size of 
the age cohort. Input costs capture changes in the salaries of teachers while intensity 
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refers to the length of the school year or the teacher/student-ratio. Another approach has 
been used by Falch and Rattsø (1996, 1997 and 1999) who decompose education 
expenditures per capita into wage and non-wage spending per teacher, teacher input per 
class, (inverted) class size and the student share of the population. 
 
This paper uses an alternative spending decomposition, designed to examine responses 
to a strong decrease in the number of students, and which pays special attention to the 
use of teaching capacity. With respect to teaching capacity, Länder governments – 
explicitly or implicitly – respond by: 
• reducing the number of teachers, likewise, reducing teaching time per fte teacher 
with a corresponding reduction in teacher wage: “compulsory part-time” 
• reducing teaching time per fte teacher without reducing fte teacher wage 
• reducing class size 
• increasing teaching time per class or reducing loss of instructional time by 
increasing the availability of substitute teachers 
 
These measures can be combined to form different “adjustment bundles”. To display all 
possible government action, the spending decomposition must account for class size, 
teaching input per class and teaching time per fte teacher and the institutional settings at 
the primary education level in Germany. The enrolment ratio, as mentioned, is of no 
relevance. Since there are virtually no private primary schools in East Germany, the 
division of pupils between private and public schools can also be disregarded. 
Consequently, an adequate decomposition of education spending per student (E/ST) is 
obtained by modifying Falch and Rattsø’s approach (1997, 301):  
 
(3.1) E W NW T Tt Cl
St T T Tt Cl St
= + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
 
where E denotes total education spending, St is the number of students, W denotes the 
total wage bill of primary school teachers while NW denotes total non-wage spending 
for primary schools, T (Tt) is the number of teachers (total instructional time) and Cl 
denotes the number of classes in primary schools. Thus, W/T denotes wage spending 
per fte teacher while NW/T represents non-wage spending per fte teacher. T/Tt is the 
number of fte teachers divided by total teaching hours and expresses the fraction of an 
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fte teacher needed for the provision of one teaching hour. Tt/Cl is the teaching time per 
class and Cl/St denotes inverted class size and expresses the fragment of a class that is 
provided for one student. Non-wage spending per fte teacher (NW/T) is approximated 
by the number of school locations per fte teacher. Although this approximation is 
enforced by the lack of comparable expenditure data, it is not unrealistic in the context 
of primary education: apart from school buildings, little additional equipment is used in 
the education of 6-10 year old pupils compared to the laboratory- and computer-
intensive equipment of older students. 
 
3.2.3 Educational effectiveness 
The decomposition in Equation (3.1) identifies the forces that drive per student 
expenditures, thereby allowing for an assessment of the effects from increasing resource 
endowments per pupil on learning conditions. Based on the results of educational 
production economics, the spending elements on the right side of Equation (3.1) can be 
assessed with respect to educational effectiveness. Rather than offering a broad 
discussion of the literature, I focus here on presenting an outline of the current state of 
research. 
 
The effects of class size (St/Cl) on student performance have been intensively 
investigated in recent years (Hanushek, 1986, 1999, 2003; Card and Krueger, 1992, 
1996; Weiß, 1997; Hoxby, 2000; Krueger, 2003; Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005; 
Wößmann, 2005 or Wößmann and West, 2006). This discussion has not come to a 
generally accepted conclusion, but the prevailing opinion appears to be that smaller 
class size does not per se lead to higher student performance.  
 
Less evidence is available on the effect of teaching time per class (Tt/Cl) or per student 
on educational achievement. Yet, most existing empirical studies suggest that there is 
no simple mechanism that associates more instructional time with much higher student 
achievement (for recent surveys see Millot and Lane, 2002 or Baker et al., 2004). Millot 
and Lane (2002) argue that reorganisation of existing time input might yield more 
educational revenue than simple increases of teaching time (see also Reimers, 1993). 
Eren and Millimet (2007) find that the effects of additional teaching input on 
achievement strongly depend on individual student performance. High-performance 
students benefit from other settings than low-performance students. However, most 
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studies find at least small beneficial effects of more teaching time on educational 
outcomes (see also Kiesling, 1984). This is true especially when more teaching time is 
combined with reduced class size (Coates, 2003). Some recent papers investigate the 
effect of cancellation of instructional time and teacher absence on student achievement. 
Marcotte and Hemelt (2007) report evidence from school districts in Maryland that 
losing instructional time due to unscheduled school closings significantly and 
negatively affects student performance. The effect is greater for students in lower grades 
such as primary education. However, evidence presented by Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor 
(2007) and Miller, Murnane and Willett (2007) suggests that there is a negative effect of 
teacher absence on student achievement even when classes are covered by substitute 
teachers. 
 
Even less evidence is available on the effect of decreasing teaching time per teacher 
(Tt/T). To my knowledge, no study exists that shows a beneficial/harmful effect on 
student performance. Teaching obligations for teachers in German primary schools are 
roughly equal to the OECD country mean (about 2.6% below the OECD mean: see 
OECD, 2004, 407). Given that teaching obligations and teacher salaries in primary 
education are well within the framework given by the OECD countries, there are no a 
priori reasons to suspect a beneficial/harmful effect of decreasing teaching obligations 
per teacher.16 
 
The proxy variable of non-wage spending per teacher (NW/T), namely the number of 
school locations per teacher, closely links to school size and way to school. There is a 
considerable literature on the effects of school size on student achievement; especially 
in the U.S. there has been lengthy and controversial debate. While from the 1950s to the 
1970s opinion prevailed that school consolidation was an important element for 
improving the effectiveness of public schools, currently “small schools have become the 
next big thing in education” (Berry, 2004, 56). Kuziemko (2006), Foreman-Peck and 
Foreman-Peck (2006), as well as Jones, Toma and Zimmer (2008) consistently find that 
students in smaller schools skip school lessons less frequently and achieve higher test 
scores. However, one should bear in mind that in this chapter the number of schools is 
merely used as a proxy for non-wage spending at the Länder level. Recall that school 
                                                
16 Wages in German primary education for teachers with minimum training are from 26% to 60% above 
the OECD country mean when measured in PPP U.S. dollars (according to their years of service, OECD, 
2004, 390). 
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infrastructure in Germany is a responsibility of the local government level and this 
chapter intends to measure the Länder-level response. 
 
In summary, the literature reviewed above suggests that decreasing class size and 
additional teaching time per class can have (small) beneficial effects on student 
achievement, especially in combination with each other. Also the availability of 
substitute teachers and thus refraining from cancelling instructional time may be 
considered a (limited) investment in human capital. No such effect can be assumed for 
decreasing teaching time per teacher. 
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3.3 Data and summary statistics 
 
The data set comprises information on primary education (grades one to four) because 
primary schooling is compulsory and thus, there are no changes in participation rates 
which can influence the provision of public resources. Moreover, data on primary 
education already fully reflects the demographic shock. The data derives from two 
sources. Information about teachers (T), students (St), classes (Cl) and teaching time 
(Tt) is from the 2008 edition of annual school statistics edited by the Standing 
Conference of German Länder Education Ministers, which corrects the data for 
Brandenburg primary schools such that only grades one to four are taken into account 
(see Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers, 2002, 34). All other 
data is from various publications by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. The final 
panel data set covers yearly data (1993-2006) for the five East German Länder (BB, 
MV, SN, ST, TH). Earlier years are not included due to the transformation process in 
the East German educational system (Weiß and Weishaupt, 1999, 114). The East 
German panel thus contains 70 (5x14) observations. An identical data set is created for 
the 8 West German non-city Länder (BW, BY, HE, NI, NW, RP, SL, SH), which yields 
112 (8x14) observations. The city states Bremen and Hamburg are excluded from the 
sample to guarantee the most comparable data with the East German data set. The city 
states have different socioeconomic backgrounds and also somewhat different 
institutions regarding the tasks of the Länder (see Chapter 2). Recall that the only 
purpose for the analysis of West Germany is to compare the findings from East 
Germany.  
 
The measurement of the number of teachers (T) and teaching time (Tt) is worth a more 
detailed presentation (see Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers 
2006c). The number of teachers (T) is measured as full-time equivalents (fte). Spare 
teachers, i.e. substitute or supply teachers who are used to prevent instructional time 
from being cancelled due to illness etc., are also billed, irrespective of whether this “on-
call capacity” was actually used or not.17 As discussed in Chapter 2, the teacher/student-
ratio (T/St) is therefore considered to be an excellent resource indicator, but is less well-
                                                
17 Note that in Germany the term substitute teacher (Vertretungsreserve) denotes teachers who are on call 
for the case that another teacher cannot give classroom instruction for illness, accidents, etc. Generally, 
these teachers are employed as regular teachers within the same school and serve some part of their 
working time on call. 
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suited to describe the learning environment of students (Standing Conference of 
German Länder Education Ministers, 2002, 96). Teaching time (Tt) is measured as total 
teaching hours in a Land, whether or not the instruction is obligatory. Additional 
language courses or special interest courses, etc., are therefore also taken into account. 
Teaching that is performed by substitute teachers due to illness, etc., is not counted 
twice. Hence, Tt/Cl is an appropriate measure of the teaching input into the production 
process in primary education and can be compared across Länder. This is less so in the 
case of Tt/T, because spare teaching capacity is not billed. Fewer teaching hours per 
teacher, therefore, may also reflect a higher spare teaching capacity on call. Since the 
coefficients in this study are identified from within-Länder variation, limited cross-
Länder comparability is rather unproblematic. However, in interpreting Tt/T, some 
caution is warranted since less teaching hours per teacher may also reflect that more 
spare teaching capacity was available. 
 
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the East German and West German panel data 
sets. Generally, the teacher/student-ratio in the East German Länder is on average about 
16% higher than in West Germany. The minima for this ratio are identical while the 
standard deviation for the West German Länder is only 1/3 of the East German standard 
deviation. Examining the spending components, Table 3.1 shows that East German 
teachers teach about 6% less on average than their West German counterparts. In 
addition, the standard deviation is much higher than in the Western part of the nation. 
While the teaching load maximum is about 10% lower in the East German Länder, 
minimum teaching hours per teacher in East Germany are more than 20% below the 
West German minimum. To some extent this may indicate that more spare capacity was 
available on call in the East German Länder. Average class size is about 10% smaller in 
the East German Länder. While teaching hours per class are on average roughly equal 
across East and West German Länder, the maxima and minima suggest a higher 
variation in the East German Länder. Foreign students represent an important share of 
the student cohort in the Western part of the country (about 11% on average), whereas 
the share of non-German students is marginal in the East German Länder. Table 3.1 
shows considerable variation of student numbers in both East and West Germany. 
However, much of the variation in student numbers – and also in education resources – 
comes from cross-Länder variation, while the focus of the present study is on variation 
within Länder. 
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics (5 East and 8 West German Länder, 1993-2006) 
Variable Variable description Sample Mean S. d.  Min / Max 
T/St Fte teacher per student East 0.057 0.010 0.043 / 0.082  
  West 0.048 0.003 0.043 / 0.055 
NW/T School locations per fte teacher  East 0.124 0.020 0.088 / 0.163 
  West 0.109 0.013 0.078 / 0.154  
Tt/T Teaching hours per fte teacher East 23.806 1.728 18.525 / 27.956  
  West 25.326 1.132 23.425 / 30.961 
St/Cl Students per class East 19.954 1.553 16.968 / 22.641  
  West 22.108 1.120 19.639 / 24.550 
Tt/Cl Teaching hours per class East 26.540 1.767 22.994 / 31.108  
  West 26.676 1.540 24.260 / 29.822  
St Number of students East 100 446 47 050 39 888 / 231 189  
  West 337 773 229 701 37 350 / 828 374  
PR Real Länder public revenue per 
capita 
East 3 385 242 2 802 / 3 824  
  West 2 522 233 2 160 / 3 241  
PD Population density: inhabitants 
per km2 
East 137 59 73 / 250 
  West 280 124 161 / 531 
UR Unemployment rate East 0.186 0.021 0.142 / 0.221 
  West 0.095 0.019 0.055 / 0.136  
FS Share of foreign students East 0.015 0.009 0.002 / 0.034 
  West 0.110 0.036 0.052 / 0.173  
ES Share of population older than 
60 years 
East 0.237 0.031 0.170 / 0.290 
  West 0.232 0.017 0.194 / 0.266 
Note: Public revenue per capita is reported in 2000 Euros, with deflation across years using the deflator 
for government consumption taken from the 2007 Report of the German Council of Economic Experts. 
Fte denotes full time equivalent teacher. 
 
Figure 3.1 presents the within variation of student cohort size for the East German 
Länder (black lines) and for the West German Länder (red lines). It is evident that the 
within variation in East Germany is much stronger than in the Western Länder. The size 
of the relevant student cohort in Mecklenburg-Vorpomerania (MV) decreases by about 
65% from 1993 until 2002, whereas cohorts in Schleswig-Holstein (SH) increase by 
about 20% from 1993 until 1998. 
 
Moreover, Figure 3.1 shows that the evolutions of student numbers are almost identical 
across the East German Länder from 1993 until 2000 (see the slopes in Figure 3.1). The 
correlation coefficient of the time-series variation across the 5 East German Länder over 
the 1993-2006 period is 99.8%. The within variation across the West German Länder is 
also highly correlated, but much less compared to East Germany (81.8%). The 
underlying reason for a high correlation of student numbers in primary schools is that it 
is almost entirely driven by demographics. Primary education is not influenced by 
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varying participation rates or differences in the education systems across Länder, etc. 
The reason for the highly similar demographic variation in East Germany may be that 
German Reunification induced a sharp decrease in birth rates across all East German 
Länder in a similar fashion. Moreover, the share of immigrants is generally very low in 
East Germany. Since immigrants often have different fertility rates compared to natives, 
a divergent share of immigrants across the West German Länder may be one source of 
the higher differences in the evolution of student numbers.  
 
Figure 3.1 The number of students in primary schools across the East German Länder 
(black lines) and across the West German Länder (red lines) (1993-2006). 
Normalised time series (1993=100) 
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Data source: Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers. 
 
The highly correlated within variation in student cohort size is problematic for the 
econometric models, which will be described in the following section. Typically, the 
models that have been used to evaluate the link between cohort size and spending per 
student exploit panel data, which enables them to account for economy-wide shocks by 
including year fixed effects (FE) in the specification. Separation of the effects from 
common shocks and from changes in the size of Länder-specific student cohorts is 
impossible if the within-Länder variation of cohort size is perfectly correlated across the 
Länder. In this case, there is strong multi-collinearity of the change in student numbers 
with the year fixed effects, which has the typical consequences for the estimation (high 
standard errors, unstable estimation results, see e.g., Kennedy, 2003, 213). 
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Finally, with respect to the control variables, Table 3.1 shows that the economic and 
geographic background is considerably different in East and West Germany. The 
unemployment rate in the West is only about 50% of the East German unemployment 
rate while population density in the East German Länder is not even half as high as in 
the West German Länder. Despite the weaker economic situation in East Germany, 
public revenue per capita in the sample period is on average more than 30% higher than 
in the West German Länder, due to the strong fiscal equalisation system in Germany 
and federal grants to the East German Länder.18  
                                                
18 Federal grants to East Germany follow a declining path and will cease in 2019; for details see Seitz et 
al. (2007, Chapter 5). 
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3.4 Empirical analysis 
 
The goal of the empirical analysis is to investigate the effect of the sharp fall in the 
number of pupils on resource allocation in primary education based on panel data for 
the five East German Länder over the 1993-2006 period. The results are compared to 
similar regressions run on West German data for the same period. Section 3.4.1 presents 
some descriptive evidence on how spending components evolved over time in East and 
West Germany. The empirical strategy and the corresponding econometric models are 
described in Section 3.4.2. The results of these models are presented in Section 3.4.3.   
 
3.4.1 Descriptive evidence 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 give descriptive overviews of the time-series variation in spending 
components. Figure 3.2 directly reports the number of fte teachers (T), classes (Cl), 
teaching hours (Tt) and students (St) and Figure 3.3 maps the spending components as 
given in Equation (3.1). 
 
Figure 3.2 (a) shows that in the East German Länder there is considerable variation in 
the number of students and in the provision of teaching inputs. Most striking is the 60% 
decrease in the size of the student cohort from 1993 until 2002. In the same period there 
is a rather strong increase in the teacher/student-ratio as shown in Figure 3.3 (a). By 
2002, the East German Länder employ about 40% more teachers per student than in 
1993. After 2002, the number of students begins to pick up slightly by about 10 
percentage points, while the teacher/student-ratio decreases by about 10 percentage 
points. Furthermore, in the East German Länder the number of school locations per 
teacher peaks at 30% above the 1993 level in 2001. Class size and teaching time per fte 
teacher reach their minima in 2001 and 2002 at about 85% and 90% of the 1993 level, 
respectively. Teaching time per class increases rather steadily by about 15% from 1997 
until 2006. In West Germany there is relatively little variation in the provision of 
education resources over the 1993-2006 period. Figure 3.3 (b) shows that public 
education resources in West Germany remain virtually within a 5% band above or 
below the 1993 level while the number of students shows a somewhat higher variation 
(~ +15%; see Figure 3.2 b). 
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Figure 3.2 The number of students and physical schooling inputs (1993-2006).  
Normalised time series (1993=100) 
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Data source: Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers. 
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Figure 3.3 Key components of education spending (1993-2006).  
Normalised time series (1993=100) 
(a) East Germany. 
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Finally, the policy of resource adjustments in the East German Länder is worth 
mentioning. Länder governments and teachers’ unions have mutually agreed on 
working time reductions of teachers in primary schools accompanied with a 
proportional reduction in teachers’ wages (about 60% to 80% of a regular full-time 
teacher). In turn, Länder governments often refrain from firing teachers. These 
agreements are limited, typically ending in 2010. Working time reductions have been 
complemented by agreements on early retirement and compensation offers. 
 
3.4.2 Empirical strategy and the econometric model 
The starting point for a more formal empirical analysis is the decomposition of 
education spending (Equation 3.1). Rearranging and taking natural logarithms of 
Equation (3.1) yields: 
 
(3.2) E W NW Tt St Ttln ln ln ln ln
St T T T Cl Cl
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
 
Note that the adjustment of education expenditures to shifts in the size of the student 
cohort may affect the physical resource variables on the right side of Equation (3.2). 
Thus, potentially all spending components are functions of the number of students and 
deriving (3.2) with respect to ln(St) yields the elasticity of education spending per 
student to variations in student numbers (αE/St,St), which may be written as: 
 
(3.3) E /St,St (W NW)/ T,St Tt / T,St St / Cl,St Tt / Cl,St+α = α −α −α +α  
 
However, not every adjustment package necessarily effects all spending components. If, 
for example, teaching capacity (T) and schooling infrastructure (NW) are adjusted 
proportionately to the shifts in the size of the student cohort, all elasticities on the right 
side of Equation (3.3) will be zero as well as the overall elasticity (αE/St,St). If education 
spending is not adjusted to increasing/decreasing student cohorts, only class size (St/Cl) 
increases/decreases and the other spending components remain unchanged, i.e. only 
αSt/Cl,St takes a value different from 0, namely -1.  
 
Whereas data for the last three elasticities on the right side of Equation (3.3) is 
available, comparable information on expenditures for primary education is nonexistent 
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(see Section 2.1). Therefore, some further empirical considerations on α(NW+W)/T,St are 
necessary. First, an effect of primary education student numbers on public sector wages 
(W/T) is implausible from an institutional point of view in Germany. Primary school 
teachers earn general public sector wages, but represent only a small fraction of public 
sector employees. In the sample period, public sector wages were determined at the 
federal level in negotiations of the federal/Länder governments and public sector 
unions. Consequently, there is no theoretical foundation for the hypothesis that the 
number of students in East German primary schools has an effect on general public 
sector wages (W/T), and thus the elasticity of student numbers on teacher wages can be 
neglected in the analysis. Second, non-wage spending (NW) is not the main function of 
the Länder level, since the Länder’s major responsibility is teacher employment (see 
Chapter 2). On average about 12% of education budgets at the Länder level are 
allocated to purposes other than wage-spending. Thus, when one wants to compare the 
results from this study with the extant literature, one should not neglect non-wage 
spending completely. As discussed above, the number of school locations may be 
considered as a proxy variable for non-wage spending in primary education although it 
is certainly not perfect. 
 
Thus, we have to disentangle the elasticity of wage and non-wage spending α(W+NW)/T,St. 
This can be accomplished by weighting the separate elasticities αW/T,St and αNW/T,St with 
the respective spending shares from Länder budgets, which gives a correct 
approximation if the spending shares remain constant over the considered time period. 
This holds for the sample period (see A.3.4.2). Thus, in Equation (3.4), λ is the 
spending share of staff expenditure in the education budgets of the Länder. Over the 
1993-2006 period, λ is 0.88.19 
 
(3.4) E /St,St NW / T,St Tt / T,St St / Cl,St Tt / Cl,St(1 )α = −λ α −α −α +α  
 
Note that while Equation (3.4) allow us to study the composition of resource 
adjustments, an alternative and more precise way to measure the magnitude of resource 
adjustment is given by again considering Equation (3.1) and cancelling down 
(T/Tt)*(Tt/Cl)*(Cl/St) to (T/St), the teacher/student-ratio, which is considered to be a 
                                                
19 This share refers to general school spending, not spending on primary education since the latter is 
unavailable on a comparable basis. 
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good resource indicator (see Section 3.3). An alternative, more compact, decomposition 
is obtained:  
 
(3.5) E /St,St NW / T,St T /St,St(1 )α = −λ α +α  
 
The elasticities on the right side of Equations (3.4) and (3.5) can be estimated in a 
straightforward way by regressing the natural log of the number of students (St) and a 
set of control variables on each spending component on the right side of Equations (3.4) 
and (3.5). For Equation (3.5), this gives rise to the following set of equations: 
 
(3.6) NW NWNW / T,St it it NW i it
it
NWln ln(St) X v
T
⎛ ⎞ ′= α + Γ +η +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
TSt TSt
T /St,St it it TSt i it
it
Tln ln(St) X v
St
⎛ ⎞ ′= α + Γ +η +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
 
The elasticities of Equation (3.4) are similarly estimated: 
 
(3.7) NW NWNW / T,St it it NW i it
it
NWln ln(St) X v
T
⎛ ⎞ ′= α + Γ +η +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
TT TT
Tt / T,St it it TT i it
it
Ttln ln(St) X v
T
⎛ ⎞ ′= α + Γ +η +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
SC SC
St / Cl,St it it SC i it
it
Stln ln(St) X v
Cl
⎛ ⎞ ′= α + Γ +η +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
TC TC
Tt / Cl,St it it TC i it
it
Ttln ln(St) X v
Cl
⎛ ⎞ ′= α + Γ +η +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
 
While i denotes the Länder, t denotes the years from 1993 to 2006. The coefficients of 
interest are the student elasticities α. Each separate equation gives the student elasticity 
for a single component of education spending; the overall effect of varying student 
numbers on education spending per student (E/St) is given by the sum of the elasticities 
over the two equations (see Equation 3.5) or over the four equations (see Equation 3.4). 
Note that αNW/T,St is weighted by (1-λ). Note also that αT/St,St should prove to be 
identical to -αTt/T,St – αSt/Cl,St + αTt/Cl,St. 
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As motivated above, non-wage spending (NW) is approximated by the number of 
primary school locations. With regard to the student variable, the number of students 
(St) is preferred to the share of students in Länder populations because in the present 
study it is a more precise measure of educational demand. Recall that population size in 
the East German Länder also decreases considerably in the sample period. All students 
in primary education from first to fourth grade are taken into account. Xit denotes a 
vector of control variables. Regarding the selection of control variables I follow Baum 
and Seitz (2003). Hence the fiscal capacity of the Länder is controlled for by including 
the natural log of public revenue per capita (PR) at the Länder level. Due to the strong 
fiscal equalisation system across German Länder, public revenue is preferred to GDP, 
because it is a much more appropriate measure of the financial resources at the Länder 
level. Public revenue is deflated using the government consumption deflator taken from 
the 2007 Report of the German Council of Economic Experts. Accounting for the 
settlement pattern of the Land (natural log of population density, PD) is necessary, 
because school location density cannot decrease arbitrarily; especially in primary 
education the Länder must assure certain standards with respect to school access and the 
distance to school. Accomplishing this task is more difficult in the less densely 
populated Länder. The Länder unemployment rate (UR) is included to control for the 
overall socio-economic situation of the Länder. Additionally, we control for the share of 
foreign students (FS). It is obvious from the descriptive statistics that this is a relevant 
variable in the West German Länder, whereas in East Germany the share of foreign 
students is rather small. The equations for the East German Länder are nevertheless 
estimated including the share of foreign students to allow for comparisons with the 
West German regression results. Furthermore, following the literature, the share of 
Länder residents older than 60 years is included (o60). 60 years roughly represents real 
retirement age in Germany in the sample period. However, no a priori hypothesis 
regarding generational conflict is formulated, since primary education represents only a 
fraction of the education system at the Länder level and Baum and Seitz (2003) only 
find very weak evidence towards generational conflict when considering the total 
education sector. The number of students (St), public revenue (PR) and population 
density (PD) enter the model as natural logarithms, while the unemployment rate (UR), 
the share of foreign students (FS) and the elderly share (o60) are expressed as shares. 
This permits an elasticity-interpretation of all coefficients. 
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Länder effects ηi are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity, which is 
supposed to capture Länder-specific spending preferences in education or Länder-
specific administration of public schools. This heterogeneity can be assumed to stay 
constant over time, but it cannot be assumed to be uncorrelated with explanatory 
variables, i.e. public revenue per capita or population density. Thus, the ηi are treated as 
fixed. 
 
In the literature it is standard to include year-specific effects to account for common 
shocks/trends. These time effects are typically assumed to capture changes in 
preferences for public education spending or changes in the federal legislation that 
cause common shifts in spending. Since the considered time period is rather short, these 
effects should generally be of minor importance. I note that accounting for common 
shocks is particularly difficult in the regression for East Germany, because within-
Länder variation in student numbers highly correlates (see the evidence presented in 
Section 3.3). Thus, the response in education resources to changes in the size of the 
student cohort is captured by the year dummies; in particular, it is a problem of strong 
multi-collinearity of the year fixed effects with the variation in student cohort size (see 
also e.g., Arellano, 2003, 61 or Poterba, 1997, 54). However, it is well known that not 
accounting for confounding macro-level trends is also problematic. The regressions are 
therefore estimated with and without time dummies. Joint significance of the year 
dummies is tested using an F-test. Note, however, that the null of joint insignificance of 
these effects is likely to be rejected due to the high correlation of variation in student 
numbers across the East German Länder. 
 
The vit are assumed to be independent of the ηi. However, it is not sensible to rule out 
serial correlation. The Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data models 
(Wooldridge, 2002 and Drukker, 2003) indicates that serial correlation is present in four 
out of five equations. Wooldridge (2002, 284 and 2003, 467) suggests first-differencing 
of the equation when serial correlation in levels is present or non-stationarity becomes a 
concern.20 This applies in particular to the N<T environment. First-differencing wipes 
out the Länder-specific effects in Equations (3.6) and (3.7) and eliminates strong first-
order serial correlation. The first-differenced equation can then be estimated by simple 
                                                
20 Testing for stationarity is difficult due to the low power of unit root tests for a short time series 
dimension. 
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OLS, which is called the First Difference (FD) estimator, as introduced by Wooldridge 
(2002, 279). Standard errors are estimated robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity 
and remaining (weak) serial dependence using the correction of the autocovariance 
matrix as suggested by Newey and West (1987) (see also Arellano, 2003, 19).21 
 
3.4.3 Estimation results 
This section first presents evidence on the magnitude of resource adjustments in East 
Germany by reporting the results from the T/St and NW/T regressions and by 
comparing these results to similar evidence for the West German Länder. The structure 
of the resource adjustment is investigated in more detail by performing regressions on 
the single components of the teacher/student-ratio in Section 3.4.3.2 while Section 
3.4.3.3 is an attempt to evaluate the educational effectiveness of the adjustment package. 
Finally, Section 3.4.3.4 reports additional evidence from a reduced sample which only 
considers data from years in which student cohort size actually decreases (1993-2002).  
 
3.4.3.1 The magnitude of resource adjustments 
Table 3.2 presents the results for the East German Länder. Columns (1) and (2) report 
the results of the model for the school infrastructure per teacher (NW/T), without and 
including year fixed effects, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report the results for the 
teacher/student-ratio regression (T/St), without and including year fixed effects, 
respectively. 
 
The regressions estimated for school locations per teacher (NW/T, Columns 1 and 2) 
suggest a student elasticity of about -0.23 for the model without year-specific effects 
and -0.12 for the model including year fixed effects. The coefficient obtained from the 
model including year-specific effects is not significantly different from zero while the 
F-test confirms joint significance of the year fixed effects at the 5% level. This is not 
too surprising given that the demographic variation is highly correlated across the East 
German Länder as discussed in Section 3.3. Thus, a clean identification of the effect 
from decreasing student cohort size in the presence of year fixed effects is indeed not 
                                                
21 With regard to the estimation techniques, one issue deserves further comment. The system of equations 
shown in (3.6) and (3.7) could principally be estimated by SUR. Compared to single-equation-OLS, 
efficiency gains could be achieved if errors across equations were highly correlated and if correlation 
between the regressors over the equations were low. However, in the present study, the set of regressors is 
identical over the equations; thus SUR is equivalent to OLS. In addition, efficiency gains are arguable in 
small sample applications (Greene, 2003, 343 and 413). 
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possible. The model without time dummies is therefore the preferred model and the 
student elasticity of school infrastructure per teacher should be around -0.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Regression results (5 East German Länder, 1993-2006) 
 ∆ ln(NW/T) ∆ ln(T/St) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆ ln(St) -0.232 -0.122 -0.506 0.132 
 (0.128)* (0.554) (0.138)*** (0.458) 
∆ ln(PR) 0.088 -0.579 -0.067 0.667 
 (0.164) (0.373)+ (0.146) (0.409)+ 
∆ ln(PD) 3.636 3.015 -1.498 -1.815 
 (0.974)*** (1.240)** (0.956)+ (1.177)+ 
∆ UR 0.685 1.508 -0.759 -1.995 
 (0.376)* (1.281) (0.452)* (1.153)* 
∆ FS 6.277 8.160 -3.841 -8.052 
 (3.270)* (3.914)** (3.620) (4.133)* 
∆ o60 1.517 1.087 -1.974 1.121 
 (3.527) (6.132) (3.109) (5.228) 
Constant 0.001 0.024 -0.002 -0.025 
 (0.020) (0.033) (0.016) (0.032) 
Observations 65 65 65 65 
Year FE? No Yes No Yes 
F (Year FE) - 2.60** - 3.46*** 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.54 0.54 0.44 0.50 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987).  ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. Joint significance of the year 
fixed effects is tested using an F (12, 46) test. 
 
Column (3) reports the student elasticity of the teacher/student-ratio (T/St), which is 
about -0.5 and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This elasticity suggests 
that the long-run 50% decrease in student numbers is accompanied by a 25% increase in 
the teacher/student-ratio, which corresponds with the descriptive evidence presented in 
Figure 3.3 (a). In contrast, the model including year-specific effects (Column 4) 
suggests an insignificant student elasticity of the teacher/student-ratio. Taken at face 
value, the point estimate of about +0.13 implies that the teacher/student-ratio decreases 
with decreasing student numbers, which highly contrasts with the descriptive evidence. 
Furthermore, there is abundant anecdotal evidence from East Germany that casts 
considerable doubt on the plausibility of this coefficient: For example, the East German 
Länder education ministries explicitly report a causal relationship of decreasing student 
numbers on higher teacher/student-ratios (Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Kultus, 
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2005, 2007a and 2007c). Overall, the evidence supports the concern that the effect from 
the demographic variation may not be identified in the presence of year dummies. Thus, 
the model without year fixed effects is the preferred model, which suggests a student 
elasticity of around -0.5. 
 
Most coefficients are, however, rather robust over both specifications of the NW/T and 
T/St regressions, with the exceptions of real public revenue per capita (PR) and the 
number of students (St). Thus, besides the highly cross-Länder correlated student 
variation, the year dummies cancel out common shocks in Länder public revenue (note, 
however, that the PR-coefficients are not significantly different from zero in any 
specification). Here, it is plausible that the time effects may capture economy-wide 
business cycle effects since one important feature of the fiscal equalisation scheme over 
the German Länder is that individual Länder revenues are highly sensitive to business 
cycles affecting the overall German economy, but much less to Länder-specific tax base 
increases/decreases (Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau, 2002). In particular, for East 
Germany, the year fixed effects may also capture changes in the magnitude of the 
federal grants to the East German Länder used to finance the reconstruction of the East 
German public capital stock. Furthermore, population density is an important 
determinant of the number of school locations per teacher, which reflects that school 
density cannot decrease arbitrarily, given that primary students are not expected to 
walk/drive long distances to school in primary education. While the share of foreign 
students appears to have some effect on the provision of school infrastructure per 
teacher and on teacher/student-ratios, the Länder unemployment rate has a weakly 
significant effect on the teacher/student-ratio. 
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Table 3.3 Regression results (8 West German Länder, 1993-2006) 
 ∆ ln(NW/T) ∆ ln(T/St) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆ ln(St) -0.626 0.981 -0.542 -0.687 
 (0.255)** (1.405) (0.077)*** (0.274)** 
∆ ln(PR) 0.113 0.136 0.028 0.008 
 (0.295) (0.355) (0.027) (0.029) 
∆ ln(PD) 5.064 2.757 0.382 1.027 
 (3.878)+ (2.896) (0.376) (0.822) 
∆ UR -0.078 0.047 -0.658 -0.518 
 (0.798) (2.046) (0.223)*** (0.528) 
∆ FS 0.912 4.364 -0.079 0.272 
 (2.584) (4.509) (0.705) (0.901) 
∆ o60 3.990 -1.654 -2.309 1.523 
 (2.002)** (5.008) (0.797)*** (1.879) 
Constant -0.032 -0.085 0.011 0.004 
 (0.014)** (0.057)+ (0.003)*** (0.011) 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
Year FE? No Yes No Yes 
F (year eff.) - 0.65 - 0.81 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.07 0.07 0.55 0.53 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987).  ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. Joint significance of the year 
fixed effects is tested using an F (12, 85) test. 
 
Table 3.3 presents the results for the West German Länder. Column (1) presents the 
estimate of the student elasticity of school infrastructure per teacher as obtained from 
the model without year fixed effects (-0.63), suggesting that resource adjustment in 
West Germany is considerably lower than in the East German Länder. This result is not 
surprising, given that the variation in student numbers is quite low over the sample 
period in West Germany and given that the adjustment of school infrastructure involves 
considerable costs. The inclusion of year fixed effects yields a coefficient which is not 
significantly different from zero and which highly contrasts with the coefficient 
estimated for the model without year effects as shown in Column (2). This coefficient is 
difficult to interpret, and may even be spurious due to the limited within variation which 
makes estimation in the presence of year fixed effects problematic. However, the year 
fixed effects are not even jointly significant in the estimations for West Germany. 
Therefore, the models including year dummies are not further considered. Columns (3) 
and (4) present the estimates for the student elasticity of the teacher/student-ratio. 
Depending on whether year fixed effects are included in the model, the elasticity ranges 
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from -0.54 to -0.69, suggesting that resource adjustment in West Germany is less 
responsive to changes in the size of the student cohort, albeit the differences between 
East and West German Länder are small and not significantly different from zero.22  
 
In contrast to the findings for East Germany, the coefficients estimated for public 
revenue per capita are quite stable whether or not time effects are included. The reason 
may be that public revenue in the West German Länder is less dependent on transfers, 
such that changes to federal transfer schemes do not account for large parts of public 
budgets. 
 
Table 3.4 Overall student elasticity of education resources in East and West Germany 
Sample Estimator Student elasticities of education resources 
  αE/St,St (1-λ) αNW/T,St αT/St,St 
East FD w/o year FE -0.54 
 
-0.23* 
(0.13) 
-0.51*** 
(0.14) 
West FD w/o year FE -0.62 
 
-0.63** 
(0.26) 
-0.55*** 
(0.08) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Point estimates, standard errors and significance levels are taken 
from Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The overall elasticity is calculated according to Equation (3.5). 
  
Table 3.4 presents total student elasticities of education spending per student αE/St,St for 
East and West Germany according to the models without time effects. Although the 
point estimates suggest that there is a difference in resource adjustments between East 
and West German Länder, this difference is rather low (about 0.1). In the case of the 
T/St regression, there is considerable overlap in the confidence intervals. Here, the 
differences are not even statistically significant when the East German elasticity of -0.5 
is compared to the West German elasticity obtained from the model including year fixed 
                                                
22 When comparing the results for West Germany with the elasticities presented by Baum and Seitz 
(2003), the elasticity from the present study (-0.62) seems somehow low prima facie. The correct standard 
of comparison is the Länder level estimate from Baum and Seitz (2003) (-0.75 to -0.78). There are, 
however, several factors that can explain this difference besides the fact that the considered time period is 
different (1978-1999 vs. 1993-2006). First, the estimate of the present study could be imprecise since it is 
based on physical resource indicators. Second, Baum and Seitz (2003) focus on education spending as an 
aggregate of primary schools, lower secondary schools, higher secondary schools and vocational training. 
This difference could per se be a reason for a different elasticity but in addition to that, in Baum and Seitz 
(2003), rising participation rates, e.g. in Gymnasium, may be one of the reasons that contribute to their 
result, as long as these rising participation rates are not entirely identical across the Länder (if so, rising 
participation is captured by the year dummies). Moreover, if one considers the estimate obtained from the 
model including year fixed effects, as shown in Table 3.3, Column (4), the estimated elasticities are 
indeed virtually identical (-0.77). 
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effects (-0.69). Significant differences between East and West German Länder arise 
only in the adjustment of schooling infrastructure. 
 
Thus, compared to the evidence presented in Poterba (1997), the estimates suggest that 
resource adjustments in the East German Länder have been considerable. However, 
when comparing the East German elasticity with the results reported in Baum and Seitz 
(2003), Grob and Wolter (2007) or with the elasticities obtained from similar 
regressions on West German data, resource adjustments in East Germany appear to be 
only slightly larger and not significantly different from adjustments in the 
demographically more stable West Germany. In particular, the estimates suggest that 
the 50% decrease in the size of student cohorts in East Germany has translated into a 
25% increase of spending per student. In other words, if the East German Länder had 
adjusted education resources with the elasticity of their West German counterparts, 
education spending per student would have risen by about 30%.  
 
3.4.3.2 The composition of resource adjustments 
The teacher/student-ratio may be decomposed further to identify the sources of 
increased resource use per student. Thus, additional regressions as presented in 
Equation (3.7) are estimated for the East German Länder. Table 3.5, Columns (1), (2) 
and (3) report the estimates for the student elasticities of teaching time per teacher 
(Tt/T), class size (St/Cl) and teaching time per class (Tt/Cl), respectively. For the 
reasons discussed above, only the models without year dummies are reported. A table 
reporting the results including year fixed effects can be found in Appendix A.3.4.3.2 (a) 
along with the results for the West German Länder (A.3.4.3.2 b). 
 
The regression of teaching time per teacher on student cohort size (Column 1) suggests 
that teaching time per fte teacher is an adjustment instrument for Länder education 
policy in East Germany. The estimated elasticity is 0.25 and is significant at about 
13%.23 The result from the St/Cl regression suggests that class size is also part of the 
adjustment package. The estimated elasticity of -0.22 is significant at the 1% level.24 In 
                                                
23 Note that the effect works independently of part-time agreements made between the East German 
Länder and teacher unions during the sample period (primary school teachers in many Länder agreed to 
work about 70% of their normal working hours, meaning that they earn wages that are proportionately 
lower). The effect described above applies to fte teacher capacity and thus is at work independently of any 
working-time reduction that is accompanied by a proportionate reduction in teacher wages.  
24 The models including year effects (see A.3.4.3.2 a) suggest for both the Tt/T and St/Cl regressions 
considerably different estimates of the student-elasticities (-0.26 for the Tt/T regression and -0.06 for the 
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the Tt/Cl regression, the exogenous variables generally explain very little of the 
variation in teaching time per class. The number of students yields only quite small and 
insignificant coefficients, suggesting that teaching input per class has not been increased 
with redundant teaching capacity, or if so, only to a limited extent. This result implies 
that increased teaching input per class (see Figure 3.3 a) is independent from shrinking 
student cohorts. 
 
Table 3.5 Regression results (East German Länder, 1993-2006) 
 (1) ∆ln(Tt/T) (2) ∆ln(St/Cl) (3) ∆ln(Tt/Cl) 
∆ ln(St) 0.256 0.221 -0.029 
 (0.169)+ (0.039)*** (0.077) 
∆ ln(PR) -0.097 0.076 -0.089 
 (0.164) (0.030)** (0.128) 
∆ ln(PD) 0.776 0.576 -0.146 
 (1.011) (0.261)** (0.880) 
∆ UR 0.181 0.087 -0.491 
 (0.351) (0.119) (0.282)* 
∆ FS 4.734 0.015 0.908 
 (5.524) (1.163) (3.286) 
∆ o60 0.146 0.737 -1.091 
 (4.282) (0.688) (2.840) 
Constant 0.014 0.003 0.015 
 (0.022) (0.003) (0.018) 
Observations 65 65 65 
Year FE? No No No 
F (Year FE) - - - 
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.81 0.00 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
St/Cl regression). As discussed above, this is not surprising and can be explained by highly correlated 
student variation, which makes identification of the effect from student cohort size on education resources 
virtually impossible. Consider e.g. the St/Cl regression: taken literally, the point estimate of the 
specification including year fixed effects suggests that decreasing student numbers induce larger class 
size, but this is highly implausible given the descriptive evidence shown in Figure 3.3 (a) and anecdotal 
evidence from East German Länder education ministries (Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Kultus, 
2007b and 2007c). 
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Summarising the student elasticities for the single components of education spending 
for East and West Germany, Table 3.6 permits to compare the composition of resource 
adjustments under conditions of rapid demographic change with policy responses in 
demographically more stable periods. A first finding is that summing the student 
elasticities of the single components of education spending according to Equation (3.4) 
matches the elasticity of the teacher/student-ratio quite well (see Table 3.4).  
 
Table 3.6 Overall student elasticities of single physical resource variables in East and 
West Germany 
Sample Estimator Student elasticities of education resources 
  αE/St,St (1-λ) 
αNW/T,St 
(-) αTt/T,St (-) αSt/Cl,St αTt/Cl,St 
East FD w/o year FE -0.54 
 
-0.23* 
(0.13) 
0.26+ 
(0.17) 
0.22*** 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
West FD w/o year FE -0.62 -0.63** 
(0.16) 
0.00 
(0.12) 
0.35*** 
(0.06) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Point estimates, standard errors and significance levels are taken 
from Table 3.5 and A.3.4.3.2 b. The overall elasticity is calculated according to Equation (3.4). 
 
The general message from the decomposition is that the adjustment bundles differ 
considerably between the East and the West German Länder. First, as discussed above, 
school infrastructure per teacher has been adjusted considerably to falling student 
numbers in East Germany; note the large difference between the estimates for West and 
East Germany. Second, the adjustment of class size is significantly higher in the East 
German Länder. The point estimate obtained from East German data is about 2/3 of the 
West German estimate. Taken literally, the estimated elasticity of 0.22 implies that class 
size drops by about 10% in the course of the 50% decline of student cohorts in primary 
education, which roughly corresponds to the descriptive evidence (see Figure 3.3 a). 
Third, there is also a large difference between the student elasticities of teaching time 
per teacher in East and West Germany. In West Germany, this elasticity is virtually zero 
whereas the elasticity is estimated to be around 0.25 for the East German Länder. This 
suggests that the East German Länder use teaching hours per teacher as an adjustment 
instrument for redundant teaching capacity. Given the definition of the variables 
teaching time (Tt) and fte teachers (T) (see the discussion in Section 3.3), another 
possible interpretation is that the East German Länder increase spare capacity, i.e. more 
substitute teachers have been used to prevent cancellation of teaching time due to the 
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absence of regular teachers. Note that this effect is large: the estimated elasticities imply 
that the ratio Tt/T has been reduced by about 12% ceteris paribus. Both interpretations 
may be valid, i.e. teaching hours per fte teacher are indeed reduced and a larger spare 
capacity of substitute teachers has prevented the cancellation of instructional time. 
Anecdotal evidence from Saxony, the largest East German Land, suggests that cancelled 
teaching time in primary schools dropped almost 50% from 1995 to 1999. Moreover, 
cancelled time has been on a very low level in primary schools: in 1999, about 0.6% of 
total instructional time is cancelled, compared to 3.2% in secondary education and to 
7.5% in vocational training courses (Sächsischer Landtag, 2000). 25 Finally, as 
discussed above, the estimation results suggest that teaching time per class has not been 
increased with redundant teaching capacity in East Germany. Again, this is different in 
West Germany, where an elasticity of about -0.2 is estimated, suggesting that the West 
German Länder increase/decrease teaching time per class with variations in the size of 
the student cohort. 
 
3.4.3.3 An attempt to evaluate the educational effectiveness of resource adjustments 
The following discussion represents a rudimentary attempt to evaluate the educational 
effectiveness of the adjustment package. We observe that the elasticity of class size to 
shrinking student cohorts is considerably lower in the East German Länder, which 
accounts for an important part of the difference between East and West Germany. On 
the one hand, this is likely not too damaging for students since the results from the 
education production function literature suggest that the effect of smaller classes on 
student performance is limited. On the other hand, as stated by Coates (2003), the 
combination of smaller classes and increased teaching time per class can be an effective 
way to spend schooling resources in primary education. The estimation results strongly 
suggest that redundant teaching capacity is not used to increase teaching input per class. 
However, teaching time per class increases during the sample period (see Figure 3.3 a), 
obviously for reasons other than the declining student cohort and subsequently abundant 
teaching capacity. Thus, after all, students may indeed benefit from smaller classes due 
to the combination of moderately smaller classes with increased teaching time per class. 
 
The results for the student elasticity of teaching time per fte teacher lead to some 
ambiguity. As stated above, there are two possible interpretations which imply quite 
                                                
25 In Saxony, teaching time per teacher (Tt/T) drops by about 6% from 1993 until 1994. In 1999 (2002), 
teaching loads per teacher are about 7% (17%) below the 1993 level. 
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different conclusions from the view of educational effectiveness. On the one hand, less 
teaching time per teacher may be caused by increased spare capacity and less 
cancellation of teaching time. This interpretation is supported by descriptive evidence, 
which shows that the loss of instructional time in East German primary education in the 
early 2000s is low when compared to (i) previous years, (ii) secondary education and 
(iii) the West German Länder. Evidence presented by Marcotte and Hemelt (2007) 
suggests that reducing the cancellation of classes may be considered a comparatively 
effective way of spending resources, although Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2007) and 
Miller, Murnane and Willett (2007) indicate that gains may be limited. On the other 
hand, the student elasticity of teaching time per fte teacher is quite large, which suggests 
that a portion of the additional resources may be due to a reduction in teaching loads per 
teacher.  
 
Overall, the adjustment package in the East German Länder probably contains some 
demographic costs, i.e. increased education spending per student that cannot be 
expected to be a substantial investment in human capital formation (e.g., decreased 
teaching hours per fte teacher, reduced class size, etc.). However, there is also some 
fraction of increased spending per student, which can be assumed to translate into better 
student performance in the future (less cancellation of instructional time, a combination 
of smaller classes and increased teaching time per class, etc.). 
 
3.4.3.4 Isolating the demographic shock: evidence from the 1993-2002 period 
Figure 3.2 (a) shows that whereas the number of school locations falls throughout the 
sample period, the number of students and teachers stagnates in 2002-2003 and begins 
to rise again in 2004. This finding produces some concern that the sample period may 
be too long to yield clean estimates of education policy in the years of decreasing 
student numbers. Therefore, I re-estimate Equations (3.6) and (3.7) for the 1993-2002 
period, bearing in mind that by doing so further reduces the (already quite small) 
sample. I suggest that the results from the reduced sample are more adequately viewed 
as a complement to the estimates for the full sample period. Table 3.7 reports the results 
for all spending components in the East German Länder over the 1993-2002 period. 
 
The lesson to be learned from the estimations based on the shorter sample period is 
quite clear. Noting a significantly smaller student elasticity of the teacher/student-ratio 
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(-0.2) compared to the full sample period and compared to the West German Länder 
indicates that teaching capacity is adjusted considerably in the period of the strongest 
decrease in student numbers until 2002. Figure 3.3 (a) shows this is true especially until 
1998, when the teacher/student-ratio only increases to about 5% above the 1993-level, 
while student numbers have already decreased by about 30%. The elasticities estimated 
for teaching time per teacher (Tt/T), class size (St/Cl) and teaching time per class 
(Tt/Cl) are not significantly different from the elasticities estimated for the full sample 
period, but the point estimates tend to be smaller than the full-sample-results. In 
particular, the smaller student elasticity of teaching time per teacher (Tt/T) accounts for 
about 2/3 of the difference between the 1993-2006-estimate and the 1993-2002-
estimate. In summary, the resource adjustments are considerable in times of shrinking 
cohort size but are not carried much further in the following years.  
 
Table 3.7 Regression results (5 East German Länder, 1993-2002) 
 (1) 
∆ ln(NW/T) 
(2) 
∆ ln(T/St) 
(3) 
∆ln(Tt/T) 
(4) 
∆ln(St/Cl) 
(5) 
∆ln(Tt/Cl) 
∆ ln(St) -0.487 -0.206 0.042 0.164 0.000 
 (0.143)*** (0.121)* (0.150) (0.054)*** (0.128) 
∆ ln(PR) 0.161 -0.123 -0.114 0.091 -0.146 
 (0.155) (0.135) (0.170) (0.028)*** (0.132) 
∆ ln(PD) 3.752 -2.467 1.822 0.852 0.207 
 (0.903)*** (0.882)*** (1.256)+ (0.306)*** (0.919) 
∆ UR 0.666 -0.794 0.288 0.155 -0.351 
 (0.423)+ (0.457)* (0.287) (0.127) (0.235)+ 
∆ FS 4.377 -3.897 1.604 0.050 -2.244 
 (4.066) (4.577) (4.910) (1.473) (2.553) 
∆ o60 -6.306 8.036 -4.653 -0.063 3.321 
 (6.334) (6.280) (6.231) (2.291) (4.262) 
Constant 0.034 -0.044 0.037 0.002 -0.004 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.034) (0.011) (0.019) 
Year FE? No No No No No 
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.38 0.40 0.00 0.72 0.00 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
  
For school infrastructure, the adjustment is less strict when looking at the shorter period 
(-0.49) compared to the full sample period until 2006 (-0.23), consistent with the view 
of sluggish adjustment problems. Apparently, Länder and Gemeinden (local 
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governments) face problems of sluggish adjustment in the provision of school buildings 
and this adjustment takes more time than for teaching capacity. Consequently, the 
overall student elasticity of education spending per student for the 1993-2002 period is 
thus given by about -0.21 + λ (-0.49) = -0.27.  
 
Yet, these findings are inconsistent with the view that the East German Länder 
experience major problems in adjusting the number of fte teachers. Rather, the 
adjustment of teaching capacity begins quickly and stops early. Figure 3.2 (a) reveals 
that teaching capacity is significantly adjusted only until 2000 when student cohorts are 
still decreasing. Thereafter, teacher employment stagnates and begins to increase in 
2004. We would expect that the number of teachers should continue to decrease even 
beyond 2000 when there are major problems in adjusting teaching capacity to 
decreasing student cohort size. Consequently, a large part of the inelastic response 
estimated for the 1993-2006 period is rooted in the post-2000 period due to causes other 
than teacher employment protection. 26 27 
 
A political-economic interpretation of this result is that Länder governments have an 
easier task explaining the need to cut teacher employment in times of dramatic losses in 
the number of students. This becomes much more difficult as soon as student numbers 
stagnate or begin to increase. Specifically for the post-2001 period in Germany, 
politicians may have faced problems explaining resource cuts in public education due to 
the so-called “PISA-Schock” in 2001. The publication of the German PISA results by 
the OECD in autumn 2001 is somewhat comparable to the “Sputnik-crisis” in the U.S. 
in the late 1950s. At the time the PISA results revealed that the German education 
system was not as good as commonly believed, and created pressure on policymakers to 
improve learning conditions and maintain the same educational levels as other 
                                                
26 It is not clear whether this result easily generalises to West Germany since the structure of teacher 
employment is different between East and West Germany (see Chapter 2). Whereas in East Germany, 
most teachers are employed as regular public sector employees, in West Germany, many teachers are 
public servants who enjoy special employment protection. 
27 To check whether teacher employment protection was any problem for the Länder governments, one 
may estimate models as in Equation (3.6) and (3.7) but containing leaded student numbers in addition to 
contemporaneous student numbers. Cohort size is known with certainty about 6 years in advance. If 
Länder governments face some difficulties in cutting teaching capacity, it is rational for them to begin the 
adjustment process in advance. In such models, leaded values of student numbers yield significant 
coefficients in the regressions of the teacher/student-ratio (T/St, at the 20% significance level) and of 
class size (St/Cl, at the 5% significance level). The results show that in both models about 30% of the 
adjustment response may have been initiated one period in advance, which in turn suggests that Länder 
governments in East Germany face at least some restrictive employment protection in the adjustment 
process. 
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industrialised countries. This public opinion may have complicated the implementation 
of further resource adjustments in public education. Typically, one should try to control 
for the PISA-Schock by introducing time effects to the model, which is impossible due 
to the difficulties with the time effects described above. Thus, I cannot easily claim that 
the results are net of possible changes in public education demanded by parents, 
political factions and the like following the publication of the PISA results. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
 
Previous empirical evidence for several countries about the link between school 
spending and student cohort size suggests that total education spending is not adjusted 
proportionately to varying sizes of the student cohort. According to these results, a large 
decrease in the student cohort should translate into an important increase in education 
spending per student rather than into a significant decrease in resources allocated to 
public education. This chapter attempts to test if this result holds true under conditions 
of rapid demographic change using panel data on primary education in the five East 
German Länder (1993-2006) where the birth rates collapsed after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain in 1990. An advantage of using data on primary schools is that the estimation 
results are not biased by increasing participation rates which may distort elasticities 
estimated for higher levels of education. To evaluate what rising education expenditures 
per student actually finance, education spending per student is decomposed into 
physical resource indicators such as class size, teaching time per class, etc. 
 
I find that resource adjustment in the East German Länder appears to be particularly 
strong in times of decreasing student cohorts (1993-2002). The data for this period 
suggests a student elasticity of education spending per student of about -0.27, which is 
considerably smaller than the state level estimates from the literature, which range from 
about -0.6 to -1.0. Apparently, adjustment efforts faded in the following years when 
student numbers stagnated and began to increase later. The data for the full period 
(1993-2006) suggests a student elasticity of education spending per student of -0.54 (-
0.5 for the teacher/student-ratio). This elasticity is still smaller than most results from 
the literature, but not significantly different from the elasticity estimated for the 
demographically more stable West Germany (-0.62). My estimation results imply that 
the 50% decline in primary school students caused education spending per student in 
East Germany to increase by about 27% (teacher/student-ratio: +25%).  
 
One plausible interpretation of the fading adjustment efforts after 2000-2001 is that 
Germany’s politicians faced increased resistance from pressure groups such as teachers’ 
unions and parents in times of stagnating or increasing student cohort size. In particular, 
in 2001 when student numbers had stagnated, publication of the PISA results in the 
autumn had considerable repercussions for the public debate, and may have shifted 
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spending preferences for public education upward. Hence, it cannot be ruled out that 
fading adjustment efforts after 2001 are confounded with effects from the PISA-Schock. 
In some sense, the evidence found for the reduced sample (1993-2002) may be 
“cleaner” from confounding factors and we may conclude that there is some evidence in 
the direction of sharper resource adjustments during times of strong and rapid 
demographic change.  
 
As to the underlying adjustment mechanism, the findings from the reduced sample 
challenge the view that the East German Länder experienced major problems in 
adjusting teaching capacity due to teacher employment protection (at least with the East 
German model of teacher employment). 
 
The decomposition of spending per student identifies the channels of increased resource 
use per student. Somewhat surprisingly, an important fraction of the increase is caused 
by declining teaching load per teacher. This effect is large and has two possible sources: 
either teaching loads per teacher were reduced or the Länder increased spare teaching 
capacity to prevent teaching time from being cancelled due to unexpected absences of 
teachers. Decreasing class size contributes only moderately to rising expenditures per 
student when compared to the West German Länder, but still accounts for an important 
fraction of increased spending per student. Teaching time per class steadily increased 
over the sample period; however, the estimates suggest that this increase was 
independent from the decreasing size of the student cohorts. A short survey of relevant 
results from the literature of education production functions suggests that this 
adjustment package contains some fraction of demographic costs but also investments 
in human capital formation which may translate into improved student performance. In 
fact, there is some anecdotal evidence; in the 2006 PISA test, the East German Länder 
considerably improved their performance compared to earlier editions of the test. In 
particular in 2006 (2001), three (two) East German Länder ranked among the top five in 
mathematics (Saxony, Thuringia and Mecklenburg-Vorpomerania), three (one) in 
sciences (Saxony, Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt) and two (one) in reading (Saxony and 
Thuringia). The students who were tested in 2006 (grade 8) left primary schools in 
2002. Thus, they may have benefited from more generous resource endowments in 
primary school (and subsequently also in lower secondary education). 
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4 LOWER SECONDARY EDUCATION: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF ABILITY-TRACKING IN THE WEST 
GERMAN LÄNDER 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Ability-tracking, which is the sorting of students into different types of schools by their 
ability, is practised in many industrialised nations. While some begin tracking at the age 
of 10 (Austria and Germany), others track later (e.g., France and Japan), or have 
comprehensive systems (e.g., Sweden and the U.S.). Given that recent empirical 
evidence suggests that tracked education systems increase educational inequality and 
may also reduce mean performance (see e.g., Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006), this 
chapter discusses distributional conflicts as a possible political-economic rationale for 
the existence of tracked education systems.  
 
Germany practises pronounced ability-tracking. At the same time, recently presented 
evidence suggests that the correlation of a child’s track choice with parental background 
is comparatively strong in Germany (see Chapter 2). In short, students from a high-
education or high-income background have significantly higher probabilities of 
attending a high-ability track.28 These stylised facts coincide with the intensive 
ideological debates about education policy in West Germany, which arose with the 
implementation of comprehensive schools in the early 1970s. Ideological conflicts long 
shaped education policy in West Germany – at least until the first publication of the 
nation’s PISA results in 2001 (“PISA-Schock”). While the Conservatives have argued 
in favour of early tracking, Social Democrats have traditionally advocated 
comprehensive schools, offering joint education for all tracks (see Chapter 2 and Stern, 
2000, 29, 116, 119 and 125).   
 
Against this background, the chapter tests whether partisan theory can help to explain 
why tracking is practised in Germany. In particular, ability-tracking may facilitate the 
concentration of benefits on specific constituencies via two channels: first, the tracking 
                                                
28 This link holds also for educational achievements in general (Hanushek, 1986, 1163; Ermisch and 
Francesconi, 2001 or Wößmann, 2004). 
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of students itself can be sufficient to concentrate beneficial peer effects among high-
ability students, which are predominantly from high-income/high-education households 
(“peer group effects”).29 Second, ability-tracking permits to focus public education 
spending on those tracks in which the constituencies’ children are overrepresented. 
Political parties representing high-education households would then advocate spending 
on the high-ability tracks while politicians representing low-education households 
would tend to support higher spending on the low-ability tracks. 
 
Partisan hypotheses for German political parties are derived in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 
describes the data. The empirical analysis consists of two parts: Section 4.4 tests 
whether German political parties support/oppose the practise of ability-tracking along 
the lines that partisan theory predicts and Section 4.5 provides evidence about the 
question whether political parties increase/decrease public resources for the tracks in 
which their constituencies are overrepresented. Panel data for 10 West German Länder 
in the 1979-2006 period suggests that political parties virtually always act in the 
direction predicted by partisan theory although not always significantly different from 
zero. In particular, political parties support tracked systems if they represent high-
education households and oppose tracking if they represent low-education households. 
The results for the distribution of public resources across tracks are weaker but still 
support partisan theory.  
 
                                                
29 The practise of tracking can have important effects on student performance via the influence of 
classmates (e.g. higher level discussion in class, less disruption). There is considerable empirical evidence 
for the existence of these peer influences, from both econometric studies (e.g. Burke and Sass, 2008) and 
from experiments (e.g. Falk and Ichino, 2006). 
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4.2 Background: partisan theory in public education 
 
4.2.1 Partisan theory 
I start my investigation of the effects of party ideology on public education by referring 
to the literature on partisan theory, which dates to Hibbs (1977) and Tufte (1978). The 
former article is among the most frequently cited work in political science (Sigelman, 
2006).30 Generally, the essence of partisan theory is the assumption that political parties’ 
policies are shaped by ideology and that different political parties, when in office, 
pursue different goals and policies. In economics and political science, this assumption 
is not as commonplace as one might suspect. Very prominent strands of the literature on 
voting and electoral cycles assume that parties are only engaged in maximising votes 
and winning elections, thereby allowing no room for party ideology (Median voter 
theorem, Downs, 1957 or opportunistic political cycles, see e.g., Nordhaus, 1975 or 
Rogoff and Sibert, 1988). As opposed to these opportunistic models, partisan theory 
highlights the ideological motivation of politicians and their parties. As Alesina, 
Roubini and Cohen (1997, 45) state: “opportunistic policymakers choose policies solely 
to win elections, [whereas] partisan policymakers want to win in order to implement 
their desired policies”. Thus, different parties are assumed to represent specific 
clientele in the electorates and, when in office, mainly pursue and advocate for the 
interests of their core constituencies. The typical hypothesis is that left-wing parties 
pursue policies benefiting lower to middle class households, such as reducing 
unemployment, increasing economic growth and following less strict inflation policies. 
In contrast, right-wing governments are usually predicted to target containing inflation 
while being less concerned about unemployment. Tufte (1978) and Hibbs (1987a) 
substantiate these hypotheses with empirical evidence on the relative costs and benefits 
of inflation and unemployment for low- and high-income households and on the 
socioeconomic background of political parties’ members and their constituencies. 
Alesina (1987) formalises and modifies Hibbs’ work such that voters, workers, etc., 
form expectations rationally (rational partisan theory), which limit the governing 
parties’ possibilities to exploit the trade-offs between inflation and unemployment 
stated by the short-run Phillips-curve. Nevertheless, the qualitative predictions of 
Hibbs’ model also hold in Alesina’s framework.  
                                                
30 For a more detailed presentation of traditional and rational partisan models as well as empirical work 
testing partisan theory for macroeconomic outcomes, fiscal policy and public education see A.4.2.  
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In empirical investigations, party ideology has been tested in its impact on 
macroeconomic outcomes and has performed quite well compared to other political-
economic theories. Partisan theory has also been tested in its impact on policy 
instruments, such as monetary or fiscal policy and has performed somewhat better in 
fiscal policy (see Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997). Of course, politically motivated 
manipulations of fiscal policy may not only affect unemployment/inflation but can also 
impose more direct fiscal benefits and costs, e.g., those induced by public education.  
 
4.2.2 Partisan theory in public education 
Few studies test partisan theory in public education. Generally, most of those studies 
focus on testing the general hypothesis that left-wing governments spend more 
resources on public education than right-wing governments, thereby merely borrowing 
the original hypothesis by Hibbs and Tufte for the education sector. Studies testing this 
hypothesis for OECD countries tend to confirm the hypothesis (Castles, 1989; Boix, 
1997; Busemeyer, 2006 and 2007) whereas empirical evidence on data for the U.S., 
France and Germany is mixed (Fusarelli, 2002 and Saeki, 2005 as well as Colburn and 
Horowitz, 2003 for the U.S.; Bilek, 2005 for France and Galli and Rossi, 2002; 
Potrafke, 2006; Schmidt et al., 2006; Tepe, 2007 and Oberndorfer and Steiner, 2006 for 
Germany; see also A.4.2 for an encompassing overview of this work).31 
 
From a theoretical view, the general hypothesis that left-wing governments spend more 
public resources on education is not entirely convincing. This hypothesis bears the 
implicit assumption that low-income households are always better off demanding higher 
public expenditures on education. However, the redistributive character of public 
education and thus an individual’s net benefit from public education is a rather complex 
function of the level of public education spending, national tax system, degree of 
publicness of the education system, individual educational participation, social returns 
from education and so on. The distributional effects of increases in public education 
                                                
31 Note that there is some evidence for the influence of Socialists on public education spending for the 
Nordic countries, which use the Socialists’ share in parliament/council as a control variable (Falch and 
Rattsø, 1997 and 1999 for Norway or Heinesen, 2004 for Denmark). They usually find positive effects of 
the Socialists’ share in parliament/council on education spending. 
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spending are therefore not clear-cut and a theoretical prediction for the preferences of 
left/right-wing governments on the overall level of education spending is not trivial.32 
 
This chapter assumes a more realistic picture of the education system. Specifically, I 
incorporate the fact that education systems in many nations are characterised by systems 
of ability-tracking. Ability-tracking is generally considered questionable from an 
equality-of-opportunity perspective. Some researchers even question the practise of 
tracking on efficiency grounds (see the overview in Meier and Schütz, 2007; Hanushek 
and Wößmann, 2006). A political-economic rationale for the existence of ability-
tracking, however, can be found in its distributional effects, which can be described 
using partisan theory. The remainder of the chapter first motivates potential partisan 
influence on the system of ability-tracking (Section 4.2.2.1) and then gives some 
intuition for partisan influence on resource allocation across tracks (Section 4.2.2.2). 
 
4.2.2.1 The practise of ability-tracking 
The starting point is an education production function: 
 
(4.1) h h(a,m, r)=  
 
Students’ human capital h depends on students’ own ability a, mean ability in class m, 
and the resources spent on education r (see e.g., Meier and Schütz, 2007). If an 
education system places students with high ability in one track and students with low 
ability in another, students’ performance may be affected by two channels. Mean 
performance m, which is of course higher in the high ability track, may have a (typically 
positive) effect on student performance. Furthermore, ability-tracking of students 
permits differentiation of educational resources r such that resources are predominantly 
allocated to the high- or to the low-ability track.  
 
The distribution of public resources across tracks is the subject of Section 4.2.2.2 while 
this section deals with mean performance in class. One prominent channel by which 
mean performance in class can affect an individual’s educational achievements is the 
influence by classmates. These “peer group effects” describe spillover effects such that 
                                                
32 Deriving such a hypothesis becomes even more complex in cross-country studies, given the important 
differences in political, fiscal and education institutions (see Schmidt, 1996; Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 
1997, 247 and Franzese, 2002, 44). 
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good students strongly contribute to classroom discussions, aid students with below-
average capabilities, contribute to a high motivation in class and less frequently disturb 
classroom instruction, thereby helping to improve the learning achievements of their 
peers (see e.g., Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006).   
 
Peer effects are quite difficult to measure empirically. The problems include the 
separation of school effects and peer group effects, or the endogenous assignment of 
peers and teachers. Moreover, such studies require high-quality data sets, which allow 
researchers to identify class peers, i.e. the students who share classrooms and not 
merely the grade level. Beside these difficulties, most studies find at least small positive 
effects on students’ achievements from having high-ability peers in their class 
(McEwan, 2003; Hanushek, Kain, Markman and Rivkin, 2003; Ammermüller and 
Pischke, 2006). Thus, tracking involves redistributions of educational opportunities; 
typically low-ability students suffer from the practise of ability-tracking (see e.g., Epple, 
Newlon and Romano, 2002; Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006; Meier and Schütz, 2007). 
In a recent study, Burke and Sass (2008) exploit a very rich data set covering all Florida 
public school students in grades three to ten over a five-year period. The results suggest 
that low-ability students benefit from sharing classrooms with high-ability peers but 
also well-performing students suffer from being in a class with low-ability students.33 
Experimental studies – although having more stylised settings – basically confirm that 
students with below-average capabilities benefit from having high-ability students in 
class (see e.g., Falk and Ichino, 2006). Together, these results suggest that any school 
reform involving changes in the intensity of ability-tracking causes redistributions from 
low-ability to high-ability students and vice versa.34 
 
Thus, it follows from this discussion that tracking benefits students in the tracks for 
high-ability students, who predominantly have a “good” parental background in terms 
of education, income or profession. Chapter 2.2 showed that the link between students’ 
track choices and their parents’ education, income or profession is particularly strong in 
Germany. In turn, households whose children have a higher probability of attending a 
                                                
33 Hanushek and Wößmann (2006), however, find that both weak and strong students suffer when 
tracking is practised. Still, students in the high-ability track may gain from tracking in relation to students 
who are grouped in the low-ability track 
34 It is disputed whether the practise of grouping students according to their ability has a negative or 
positive effect on aggregate educational achievement. Meier and Schütz (2007, 24) conclude that there is 
probably no major effect from tracking on students’ mean performance while Hanushek and Wößmann 
(2006) find weak evidence that early tracking negatively affects students’ mean performance. 
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high-ability track (public servants, white-collar workers, parents with high educational 
degrees) are overrepresented among the electoral constituencies and members of 
specific political parties in Germany, as shown in Chapter 2.4. It is clear that the two 
smaller political parties – FDP and the Green Party – have party members who hold 
higher educational degrees than SPD members. With respect to their electoral 
constituencies, both of these parties are overrepresented among voters with high 
educational degrees and among self-employed and civil servants. The differences 
between the SPD and CDU are less pronounced than the differences between the SPD 
and FDP/Green Party. However, CDU party members have a somewhat higher 
probability of holding a university degree and a lower probability of holding only a 
degree from Hauptschule compared to SPD members. Differences between the SPD and 
CDU are stronger when looking at their voters’ professions. The CDU is highly 
overrepresented among civil servants whereas the SPD is somewhat overrepresented 
among blue-collar workers. Under the central partisan hypothesis, namely that political 
parties pursue the interest of their members and core constituencies, we would expect 
that the CDU, FDP and the Green Party support ability-tracking in order to maintain 
positive peer group effects among their constituencies’ offspring whereas Social 
Democrats oppose the tracking of students. 
 
Regarding the design of the German education system, the present study cannot analyse 
the establishment of ability-tracking in 19th-century Germany and its re-establishment 
in the early 1950s due to the non-availability of data. However, existing data allows 
analysing the question whether ability-tracking is supported by political parties, or 
whether parties engage in the abolishment of ability-tracking. In particular, we can 
measure the intensity of ability-tracking in a Land by looking at the share of students 
who are educated in some type of comprehensive education (StCOMPREHENSIVE / StTOTAL). 
StCOMPREHENSIVE denotes the number of students enroled in comprehensive schools and 
StTOTAL is the total number of students in lower secondary education (see Chapter 2.1). 
The partisan hypotheses can thus be written as in Table 4.1, where the partisan 
orientation of the CDU, FDP and Green Party is shown relative to SPD.  
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Table 4.1 Hypotheses for partisan influence on the structure of the education system 
(relative to SPD) 
 CDU FDP Green Party 
StCOMPREHENSIVE / StTOTAL - - - 
Note: Social Democrats (SPD) are the reference group, i.e. Länder governments under participation of the 
CDU, FDP and the Green Party are predicted to decrease the importance of comprehensive schools 
relative to Länder governments under participation of the SPD. 
 
The ideological debates accompanying the introduction of comprehensive schools in the 
early 1970s provide some anecdotal support for these hypotheses. Social Democrats 
argued in favour of comprehensive schools while the Conservatives defended ability-
tracking. These positions may be explained by conflicts concerning the distribution of 
positive peer group effects from high-performance students. High-income 
households/Conservatives are interested in keeping positive spillovers from high-
performance students within the tracks for high-performance students, given that their 
children are overrepresented in these tracks. For the CDU and FDP these predictions are 
largely consistent with their electoral manifestos and thus, not surprising. Moreover, the 
latter parties explicitly state in their electoral manifestos the goal of supporting gifted 
students. For the Green Party, however, partisan theory predicts a different education 
policy than stated in it own electoral manifestos (see Chapter 2 and Stern, 2000). 
Whereas partisan theory predicts that the Green Party supports ability-tracking, its 
manifestos explicitly demand the implementation of a comprehensive school system. 
 
4.2.2.2 Resource allocation across tracks 
In addition to the direct effect working through the concentration of peer group effects, 
ability-tracking allows focussing public education resources r (see Equation 4.1) on 
specific constituencies given the links between students’ track choices, parental 
background and voting decisions (see above). One can borrow an appropriate theoretical 
background from the literature on voting on public education, pioneered by Stiglitz 
(1974). Although this literature describes individual voting decisions, we can adapt this 
framework for partisan theory by considering the voting decisions by political parties’ 
median voters.   
 
Stiglitz (1974) assumes that households maximise utility i i iU U (G,C )=  over publicly 
provided education services, G, for the households’ children and over all other private 
consumption Ci (or after tax income). Households i only differ in their exogenously 
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given income, or what is equivalent, in parents’ education.35 Further, it is assumed that 
there is a proportional income tax rate τ for financing public education, which yields the 
public budget constraint i iG T Y= = τΣ . Progressive income tax and regressive effects 
of the consumption taxes are assumed to result in taxation proportional to income, 
which is standard in the literature. Voters are assumed to be identical to taxpayers. 
Moreover, the utility functions are assumed to be identical across individuals and 
assumed to be quasi-concave, which yields single-peaked preferences and thus, the 
existence of a majority voting equilibrium (see Mueller, 2003, 87). Finally, a uniform 
public service is assumed, i.e. participation rates do not differ between high-income and 
low-income households. 36 
 
Given that the public sector is highly dominant in lower secondary education in 
Germany (~ 92% of students are enroled in public schools), Stiglitz’ framework of a 
pure public provision of education may be considered adequate for describing the 
German education system (see Chapter 2 and Kemnitz and Weizsäcker, 2003).37 In such 
a public system, the voting outcome is straightforward, namely households vote for the 
level of public education such that the marginal rate of substitution between public 
education G and private consumption Ci equals the ratio of the household’s income, Yi, 
to average income, Ymean, i.e. the household’s tax price of public education (Stiglitz, 
1974, 354). Since a single-dimensional issue is considered, a majority voting 
equilibrium exists. Under the assumption that preferences for education G are 
monotonic in income Yi, the decisive voter is the voter with median income, Ymedian.38 
Therefore, the public education budget and the income tax rate depend on the median 
voter’s income relative to average income.  
 
Partisan theory’s core assumption, namely, that political parties differ (right-wing 
parties represent rich households and left-wing governments represent poor 
                                                
35 In this section, the terms rich households and high-education households are used in parallel (poor 
households and low-education households).  
36 It is standard in the literature on voting in public education to consider the public spending on 
education G as a proxy for the quality of schooling. Thus, discussions on the effect of resources on 
educational achievement are suppressed (see the short discussion in Section 3.2.3, or Hanushek, 1986). 
37 One may argue that the existence of one private school is sufficient for the theoretical possibility of 
opting out of the public system. However, in reality, a reasonable quantity of private schools is necessary 
for the practical availability of alternatives: spatially, with respect to contents and religious orientation, 
etc. 
38 The existence of the voting equilibrium does not depend on G being monotonic in Yi. But the 
household earning median income Ymedian will generally not be the decisive voter (Stiglitz, 1974, 355). 
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households), is easily accounted for in this framework by analysing rich and poor 
households’ voting decisions. Their voting is shaped by an income effect (relatively 
wealthier households demand more public education) and by a substitution effect, 
which works through the higher tax price for public education (due to the proportional 
tax rate, relatively wealthier households demand less public education). Which effect 
dominates is an empirical question. Evidence from U.S. survey data suggests that the 
two effects cancel each other out, i.e. high-income and low-income households do not 
differ significantly in their preferences for the level of public education (see Figure 4.1) 
(see Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Shapiro, 1982; for more evidence, see Gradstein, 
Justman and Meier, 2005, 50).39 In summary, incorporating the core partisan 
assumption in standard voting models for public education casts doubt on the validity of 
a general partisan-hypothesis that low-income households, i.e. left-wing governments, 
generally demand higher public education spending than high-income households, i.e. 
right-wing governments.40 
 
                                                
39 When there are private alternatives, high-income households can opt out of public schooling while still 
having to contribute to public education. In this case high-income households do not necessarily support 
public education (see Epple and Romano, 1996a or the presentation in Gradstein, Justman and Meier, 
2005, chapter 7). The decisive voter is then a household with income below the median income. Given 
the empirical estimates on the dominance of the substitution/income effect, this result suggests that high-
income households are the only group voting for lower public education spending whereas middle- and 
low-income groups are supporting comparable levels of public education spending. This result holds also 
for the case when private education may be added on top of public education services (Epple and 
Romano, 1996b and Gouveia, 1997). 
40 At least the discussion reveals some underlying assumptions of this hypothesis. It is either assumed that 
there is sufficient private education for high-income households to opt out of the public system or that the 
substitution effect dominates the income effect for high-income households or that the income tax rate is 
sufficiently progressive for rich households to vote against public education. 
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Figure 4.1 Predictions for spending preferences on public education of high-income 
(Yrich/Ymean), median income (Ymedian/Ymean) and low-income groups (Ypoor/Ymean). 
 
Source: Based on Stiglitz (1974) and evidence by Bergström, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1982); see text. 
 
A simple extension allows us to account for ability-tracking in the education system.41 
Ability-tracking is introduced by splitting education spending, G, into spending on 
tracks for high-performance students, GH, and low-performance students, GL, such that 
G = GH + GL. The modified utility function is:  
 
(4.2) H Li i iU U (G ,G ,C )=  
 
Given the empirical evidence, children from rich/high-education households have an 
above average participation in the track for high-performance students whereas 
educational participation of poor/low-education households’ offspring is biased towards 
the low-performance track. Specifically, it is assumed here that more than 50% of rich 
households’ offspring is enroled in the high-performance track whereas more than 50% 
of the poor households’ offspring is enroled in the low-performance track.42 Thus, an 
                                                
41 Note that the extension of the standard model developed here is highly stylised. It assumes that the size 
of the total education budget is decided separately from the distribution of public resources between two 
educational tracks. 
42 Moreover, it is assumed that public expenditures on GH and GL are both financed out of general public 
sector budgets and that the private returns to education dominate the social returns. In addition, it is 
assumed that educational participation is exogenous with respect to the level of spending in the high- and 
low-performance tracks, which is of course rather a short- to medium-run assumption. 
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average rich household derives comparatively more utility from increases in GH than 
from increases in GL: 
 
(4.3) rich richH L
U U
G G
∂ ∂>
∂ ∂
  
 
where Urich denotes utility for a high-income household. An inverse statement holds for 
the poor households. Yet, as in Stiglitz (1974), this model does not permit a theoretical 
prediction on poor and rich households’ voting decisions with respect to the level of 
public education. If, for example, GH is increased, a rich household’s utility change is: 
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It is not clear if the positive effect on utility, derived from an increase in GH, the first 
argument on the right side of (4.4), dominates the negative effect from an increase in 
taxes necessary to finance increased spending, the second argument on the right side of 
(4.4). Thus, a rich household’s utility change is unclear even if GH is increased. 
However, if overall spending on public education, G = GH + GL, is held constant (and 
thus, also the income tax rate τ), there is no increase in the tax burden, i.e. the second 
term on the right-hand side of (4.4) is equal to zero. In this case, necessarily, GL must 
decrease, given that G = GH + GL. The change in utility for a rich household is: 
 
(4.5) 
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It is reasonable to assume that the positive effect on rich households’ utility from the 
first summand on the right side of (4.5) will generally outweigh the negative effect from 
the second summand even though there may be positive social returns from a good 
quality of education services in the lower track. This is justified by the higher 
educational participation of rich households’ offspring in the high-ability track (see 
Equation 4.3) and the empirical observation that private returns to education usually 
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exceed social returns. Note that increasing GH in Equation (4.5) is equivalent to 
increasing the share of spending on GH while G is held constant. Thus, under plausible 
assumptions, one should expect that high-income households vote for relative increases 
in public spending on high-performance tracks irrespective of the total level of 
education spending. The opposite should hold for low-income households. 
 
In the framework of partisan theory, this implies that the median voter of right-wing 
parties, which are elected by high-income/high-education households, advocates that a 
higher share of public education spending is targeted towards high-performance tracks 
whereas the median voter of left-wing parties advocates the opposite. Note that only the 
focus on the composition of education spending ensures identification of the partisan 
effect because available empirical evidence on the redistributive character of the tax 
system and on the importance of social returns to education do not allow predictions on 
poor and rich households’ preferences for the overall level of education spending. 
 
When applying this discussion to Germany (see also Chapter 2.1), it is obvious that 
Gymnasium is the highest educational track in German lower secondary education and 
Hauptschule is the lowest educational track. However, as set out in Chapter 2, some 
Länder have engaged in consolidating Haupt- and Realschule into one school type 
(Schulen mit mehreren Bildungsgängen) such that only a limited number of 
Hauptschulen remain in some Länder. Accordingly, these school types have a student 
body that is biased towards low- to middle performance students (Baumert and 
Schümer, 2001). Thus, joint schooling is used as an alternative to represent the low 
ability-track for those Länder in the process of abolishing Hauptschule (e.g., Saarland). 
 
For an application to the German political system, recall the discussion on political 
parties in Chapter 2.4 and in Section 4.2.2.1. The evidence on electoral constituencies 
and on members’ educational background suggests that – relative to the SPD – the 
CDU, FDP and the Green Party when in office spend a higher share of public resources 
on Gymnasium and a lower share on Hauptschule and joint schools.43 Table 4.2 
summarises the theoretical predictions for partisan influence of German political parties 
on relative resource use in lower secondary education. Superscript GYM, TOTAL, 
HAUPT and JOINT denote Gymnasium, overall lower secondary education, 
                                                
43 Note that, technically, this prediction requires that at least 50% of high-income households’ offspring is 
enroled in the high-performance track. 
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Hauptschule and joint schools, respectively. ResourcesGYM/ResourcesTOTAL denotes for 
example resource use on Gymnasium relative to resource use in overall lower secondary 
education. Note that Social Democrats are the reference group. Thus, a plus/minus 
indicates that Länder governments under participation of the CDU, FDP or the Green 
Party are predicted to increase (decrease) spending on Gymnasium (Hautpschule, joint 
schools) relative to overall spending in lower secondary education and relative to SPD 
Länder governments. 
 
Table 4.2 Hypotheses for partisan influence on the composition of education spending 
(relative to SPD) 
Composition of education spending CDU FDP Green Party 
ResourcesGYM / ResourcesTOTAL  + + + 
ResourcesHAUPT / ResourcesTOTAL - - - 
ResourcesJOINT / ResourcesTOTAL - - - 
Note: Social Democrats (SPD) are the reference group, i.e. Länder governments under participation of 
CDU, FDP and the Green Party are predicted to increase (decrease) the share of spending on Gymnasium 
(Hauptschule and joint schooling) relative to Länder governments under participation of the SPD. 
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4.3 Data and summary statistics 
 
The data set comprises information on lower secondary education. Information about 
students and teachers derives from various editions of annual school statistics edited by 
the Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers. All other data is from 
various publications by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, the Federal 
Employment Office (unemployment rate) or from the Länder education ministry 
homepages (information on party affiliation of education ministers). A panel data set of 
all West German Länder (without Berlin), i.e. 10 Länder, over the 1979-2006 period is 
constructed, which contains BW, BY, HB, HH, HE, NI, NW, RP, SL and SH. The East 
German Länder are not included, because the ideological discussions about the 
education system have essentially been a West German phenomenon (see also the 
discussions in Chapters 1 and 2). For relative resource endowments in lower secondary 
education (Section 4.5), the panel begins in 1981 because earlier years are unavailable. 
Thus, the panel contains 280 (10x28) or 260 (10x26) observations, respectively. 
 
Table 4.3 reports summary statistics. If first differences are used in the estimation, they 
are reported here. Two definitions of comprehensive schooling will be tested in the 
following section: As described in Chapter 2, Comprehensive schools (Gesamtschulen) 
offer the most integrated type of schooling that is currently provided in Germany. Joint 
schooling denotes a broader definition of comprehensive education. It includes the 
students who are enroled in comprehensive schools, Schulen mit mehreren 
Bildungsgängen and Orientierungsstufe. Table 4.3, Panel (a) presents the summary 
statistics for the share of students enroled in comprehensive schools and joint schools, 
which show that both experience rising importance over the sample period (+0.3% per 
year, respectively). Note that the standard deviation is larger for joint schooling, which 
may be explained by the fact that joint schooling is an aggregate of different school 
types. Educational policy, which changes any of the school types that are included in 
the definition of joint schooling, contributes to the variance. For more detailed 
descriptive evidence see also Figure 4.2. For example, the minimum of -31% in the 
change of the importance of joint schooling reflects the abolishment of 
Orientierungsstufe in Lower Saxony in 2004. 
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Table 4.3 Summary statistics (10 West German Länder, 1979-2006) 
Variable Variable description Mean S.d. Min / Max 
(a) Intensity of ability tracking 
∆ (StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) 1st diff of share of students in lower 
sec. edu. enroled in a 
comprehensive school 
(Gesamtschule) 
0.003 0.006 -0.005 / 0.038 
∆ (StJOINT/StTOTAL) 1st diff of share of students in lower 
sec. edu. enroled in Gesamtschulen, 
Schulen mit mehreren 
Bildungsgängen and in 
Orientierungsstufe 
0.003 0.023 -0.311 / 0.069 
(b) Resource variables   
∆ (TStGYM/TStTOTAL) 1st diff of teacher/student-ratio in 
Gymnasium relative to all lower 
sec. edu. 
-0.003 0.019 -0.128 / 0.065 
∆ (TStHAUPT/TStTOTAL) 1st diff of teacher/student-ratio in 
Hauptschule relative to all lower 
sec. edu. 
0.005 0.038 -0.313 / 0.319 
∆ (TStJOINT/TStTOTAL) 1st diff of teacher/student-ratio in 
joint education relative to all lower 
sec. edu. 
-0.003 0.039 -0.133 / 0.280 
(c) Control variables   
∆ ln (StTOTAL) Growth rate of the number of  
Students in lower secondary edu. 
-0.012 0.037 -0.111 / 0.040 
∆ (StGYM/StTOTAL) 1st diff of share of students in lower 
sec. edu. enroled in Gymnasium 
0.003 0.011 -0.012 / 0.130 
∆ (StHAUPT/StTOTAL) 1st diff of share of students in lower 
sec.  edu. enroled in Hauptschule 
-0.006 0.009 
 
-0.042 / 0.058 
 
∆ (StJOINT/StTOTAL) 1st diff of share of students in lower 
sec. edu. enroled in joint education 
0.003 0.024 -0.020 / 0.069 
∆ ln (PR) Growth rate of public revenue p.c. 0.003 0.043 -0.157 / 0.222 
∆ ln (PD) Growth rate of population density 0.003 0.006 -0.022 / 0.021 
∆ UR 1st diff of Länder unemployment 
rate 
0.003 0.010 -0.028 / 0.039 
∆ o60 1st diff of share of Länder 
population over 60 years old 
0.002 0.002 -0.004 / 0.007 
(d) POLITICAL   
SPD SPD participation in Länder 
government = 1, otherwise = 0 
0.57 
 
0.50 
 
0 / 1 
 
CDU CDU participation in Länder 
government = 1, otherwise = 0 
0.49 
 
0.50 
 
0 / 1 
 
FDP FDP participation in Länder 
government = 1, otherwise = 0 
0.24 
 
0.43 
 
0 / 1 
 
Green Party Green Party participation in Länder 
government = 1, otherwise = 0 
0.15 
 
0.35 
 
0 / 1 
 
Other Participation in Länder government 
by any other party = 1, otherwise = 
0 
0.02 
 
0.15 
 
0 / 1 
 
COALSIZE Coalition size (number of political 
parties) 
1.48 
 
0.54 
 
1 / 3 
 
ELECTION Year with Länder election = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
0.25 0.43 0 / 1 
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Table 4.3 continued 
(e) alternative definition of POLITICAL 
SPD SPD single-party government = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
0.26 0.44 0 / 1 
SPD-FDP SPD-FDP coalition = 1, otherwise 
= 0 
0.09 0.28 0 / 1 
SPD-Green SPD-Green coalition = 1, otherwise 
= 0 
0.14 0.34 0 / 1 
SPD-FDP-Green SPD-FDP-Green coalition =1, 
otherwise = 0 
0.01 0.10 0 / 1 
SPD-Other SPD-Other coalition = 1, otherwise 
= 0 
0.01 0.12 0 / 1 
CDU CDU single-party government = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
0.28 0.45 0 / 1 
CDU-FDP CDU-FDP coalition = 1, otherwise 
= 0 
0.14 0.35 0 / 1 
CDU-FDP-Other CDU-FDP-Other coalition = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
0.01 0.08 0 / 1 
GRANDCOAL SPD-CDU or CDU-SPD coalition = 
1, otherwise = 0 
0.06 0.25 0 / 1 
(f) Political couleur of Länder education minister 
KultSPD SPD education minister = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
0.56 0.50 0 / 1 
KultCDU CDU education minister = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
0.44 0.50 0 / 1 
KultFDP FDP education minister = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
0.01 0.08 0 / 1 
Note: Public revenue per capita is reported in 2000 Euros, with deflation across years using the deflator 
for government consumption taken from the 2007 Report of the German Council of Economic Experts. 
The sample contains 10 West German Länder (excluding Berlin), over the 1979-2006 period (except 
resource indicators in Panel b and the student demand control variables in Panel c, which cover only the 
1981-2006 period). 
 
Panel (b) of Table 4.3 presents summary statistics of the variables that are used to test 
the hypotheses on relative resource use per student: Teacher/student-ratios in specific 
ability-tracks are considered relative to teacher/student-ratios in total lower secondary 
education.44 For example, to test the hypotheses on relative resource use in Gymnasium, 
the teacher/student-ratio in Gymnasium (TStGYM) is considered relative to 
teacher/student-ratios in all lower secondary eduation (TStTOTAL), i.e. TStGYM/TStTOTAL. 
The latter ratio decreases over the sample period by 0.3% per year. When looking at 
relative teacher/student-ratios in Hauptschulen, we observe increasing resource use per 
student (+0.5%). In joint schools, relative teacher endowments per student decreases (-
0.3% per year). These summary statistics reveal that resource endowments per student 
exhibit more or less pronounced trends, which highlights the importance of year fixed 
effects and gives an intuition for the results of the unit root tests in Section 4.4.2 and 
4.5.2. There are some pronounced increases/decreases in relative teacher/student-ratios, 
which can be seen from the maxima/minima in Panel (b). For example, in joint schools 
                                                
44 The number of teachers is reported in full-time equivalents (fte); see Chapter 2. 
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in Lower Saxony there is a strong increase in relative teacher/student-ratios (+28%), due 
to the abolishment of Orientierungsstufe and Schulen mit mehreren Bildungsgängen. In 
the latter school types, resource use per student is typically lower than in 
Gesamtschulen, such that the abolishment of these school types, results in a positive 
change. Another example is the strong decrease in relative teacher/student-ratios in 
Saarland in 2000-2001. In the process of abolishment of Hauptschulen in this Land 
(consolidated with Realschulen), the number of teachers drops more sharply than 
student enrolment. In Hesse, the variation in teacher/student-ratios is generally higher 
than in other Länder (see also the evidence presented in Section 4.5.1).   
 
The share of students enroled in Gymnasium (StGYM/StTOTAL) and joint schools 
(StJOINT/StTOTAL) increases by 0.3% per year, respectively, whereas relative enrolment in 
Hauptschule decreases by an annual average of about 0.5% over the sample period (see 
Table 4.3, Panel c). This suggests that part of the trend in relative teacher/student-ratios 
may be explained by sluggish resource adjustment or cohort size effects, as discussed in 
Poterba (1997), Baum and Seitz (2003), or Chapter 3. The size of the student cohort in 
lower secondary education (StTOTAL) decreases by about 1% per year (Panel c) (see also 
Figure 2.5). Cohort size decreases considerably in the early 1980s. Länder public 
revenue per capita and population density increase moderately over the sample period 
(0.3% per year). Some Länder experience pronounced increases and decreases in public 
revenue per capita. The maxima of more than 20% reflect the onset of federal bailout 
transfers to the Länder Saarland and Bremen in 1994. The minimum reflects a 
pronounced decrease in public revenue in Hamburg in 1979-1980 during the second 
global oil crisis. The slightly positive trends of the unemployment rate and the elderly 
share (+0.25% and +0.2% per year, respectively) reflect the increasing structural 
unemployment and an ageing society in Germany across the sample period. Note the 
comparatively smooth development of the elderly share in comparison with the higher 
standard deviation of the growth of public revenue or of the change of the 
unemployment rate, which are also driven by business cycles. 
 
POLITICAL is a set of dummy variables capturing political parties’ time in office in the 
German Länder (SPD, CDU, FDP Green Party, Other) (see Table 4.3, Panel d). These 
dummy variables take the value of 1 if the political party participates in a Länder 
government and 0 if it does not. When the election occurs during the first six months of 
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the year, government participation of this party is – admittedly simplified – coded for 
the full year. When the election occurs during the last six months of the year, 
government participation is assumed to begin in January of the next year. As an 
additional control, coalition size COALSIZE captures the number of political parties 
forming the Länder government. Note that the four most important political parties form 
98% of the governing parties in the sample. Other parties (Other) have almost no 
importance (only in Hamburg: Statt-Partei 1994-1997 and Schill-Partei/Partei 
Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive 2002-2003). We observe, too, that the Social Democrats 
participate in almost 60% of Länder governments while the Christian Democrats 
participate in almost 50% of Länder governments. The two smaller political parties 
form part of Länder governments less frequently (FDP 24%; Green Party 15%). 
Average coalition size is 1.5 over the sample period, which highlights the importance of 
coalition governments in the proportional political system in Germany. Table 4.4 
presents bivariate correlation coefficients among the political dummies. The correlations 
reveal the predominant coalition patterns: SPD-Green Party and CDU-FDP. Note the 
strong negative correlation of SPD with CDU. 
 
Table 4.4 Correlations among political parties’ years in office (10 West German Länder, 
1977-2006) 
 SPD CDU FDP Green P. Other 
SPD 1 -0.886* -0.163* 0.353* 0.031 
CDU  1 0.092 -0.398* -0.048 
FDP   1 -0.165* 0.026 
Green Party    1 -0.057 
Other     1 
 Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
An alternative set of political dummy variables directly accounts for every coalition 
combination by a separate dummy variable. Table 4.3, Panel (e) reveals that CDU and 
SPD single-party governments are the most frequent type of government (28% and 26% 
of years in government in the sample, respectively). SPD-Green, CDU-FDP and SPD-
FDP are the second most-frequent coalition combinations, with 14%, 14% and 9% of 
the years in government, respectively. Coalitions formed by SPD-CDU or CDU-SPD 
govern about 6% of the years in government, and other coalition combinations are of 
marginal importance. Table 4.3, Panel (f) shows the Länder education minister is a SPD 
(CDU) party member in 56% (44%) of the years. Additionally, there are two FDP 
education ministers in Hamburg in very short time periods. 
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4.4 Empirical analysis I: political influence on the education 
system and the practise of ability-tracking 
 
The goal of this section is to provide empirical evidence about whether German political 
parties support or oppose the system of ability-tracking along the lines that partisan 
theory predicts (see Table 4.1). In particular: Do CDU, FDP and the Green Party 
decrease the importance of comprehensive schooling relative to Social Democrats in the 
West German Länder over the 1979-2006 period? 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive evidence 
4.4.1.1 Some charts 
My first approach to analyse the question of whether political parties exert the predicted 
influence on the education systems is to provide graphs of individual Länder time series 
of political parties’ time in office and the share of students enroled in some type of 
comprehensive schooling (out of the total number of students in lower secondary 
education). As explained above, two different definitions are tested: comprehensive 
schools offer the most integrated type of schooling that is currently provided in 
Germany; joint schools offer comprehensive education in a broader sense. Figure 4.2 
shows 10 Länder-specific graphs, each of which displays time series of the share of 
students enroled in comprehensive or joint schools (left scale) from 1979 to 2006. 
Political parties’ time in office over this period is depicted on the right scale. The time 
in office is coded as a dummy variable, i.e. a value of 1 denotes participation of a 
political party in the Länder government, while a 0 indicates that this political party has 
not participated in the Länder government in the respective year. 
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Figure 4.2 Government participation and the intensity of ability-tracking (1979-2006) 
(a) Baden-Württemberg
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(b) Bavaria
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(c) Bremen
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(d) Hamburg
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(e) Hesse
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(f) Lower Saxony
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(g) North-Rhine Westphalia
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(h) Rhineland-Palatinate
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(i) Saarland
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(j) Schleswig-Holstein
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Note: The share of students enroled in comprehensive and joint schools is depicted on the left scale. 
Länder government participation is depicted on the right scale (see text). Data sources: Standing 
Conference of German Länder Education Ministers (% Comprehensive and % Joint) and Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany (Länder government participation of the political parties).  
 
In the considered time period, the Conservatives (CDU/CSU) strongly dominate the 
Länder governments in Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. Figures 4.2 (a) and (b) show 
that in these Länder the share of students enroled in comprehensive or joint schooling is 
marginal, below 2%, and quite stable, showing little variation.  
 
On the contrary, the Länder governments of Bremen, Hamburg and North-Rhine 
Westphalia are dominated by the SPD (see Figures 4.2 c, d and g). Comprehensive/joint 
schooling was already of considerable importance in the early 1980s in Bremen and 
Hamburg. In North-Rhine Westphalia, comprehensive schooling increases considerably 
in the sample period. Note that in Hamburg, increasing importance of comprehensive 
schooling is pronounced during times of single-party SPD governments and somewhat 
attenuated during times of coalition governments. Since the late 1990s, the importance 
of comprehensive/joint schooling stagnates at around 40% under SPD-Green and CDU 
governments. In Bremen, however, comprehensive schooling gains importance under 
the SPD-CDU coalition. In joint schooling, there are two contrasting developments in 
the early 2000s: while Orientierungsstufe is abolished, Schulen mit mehreren 
Bildungsgängen are newly founded under the SPD-CDU coalition.  
 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein experience strong increases of 
the share of students in comprehensive/joint schooling, starting with the takeover of 
SPD-dominated governments in the mid 1980s/early 1990s (see Figures 4.2 h, i and j). 
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Note the increase is more pronounced under the single-party SPD government in 
Saarland than under a SPD-FDP coalition in Rhineland-Palatinate. Note, too, that in 
Schleswig-Holstein, the importance of comprehensive schooling is even slightly 
reinforced under the CDU-dominated grand coalition (CDU-SPD) elected in 2005. 
 
In Hesse and Lower Saxony, both of which can be characterised as swing states, there is 
no major trend in the importance of joint or comprehensive schooling (see Figures 4.2 e 
and f). There is, however, some small-scale variation. The share of students enroled in 
comprehensive/joint schools mostly increases under SPD-led governments and 
decreases after a change of government towards the CDU. Note that the brusque drop in 
the importance of joint schooling in Lower Saxony after the takeover of a CDU 
government in 2003 can be attributed to the abolishment of the Orientierungsstufe (joint 
education of students in grades 5 and 6; see Chapter 2). 
 
Overall, the graphs show that in Länder with no significant government participation of 
the Social Democrats, comprehensive/joint schooling appears to have scant importance 
(Bayern, Baden-Württemberg). Moreover, the graphs suggest that Länder governments 
under participation of the CDU generally do not reduce the provision of 
comprehensive/joint schools at large scale after their implementation by the previous 
SPD-dominated governments (North-Rhine Westphalia, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein), 
with two exceptions: Lower Saxony, where the Conservative government abolished 
Orientierungsstufe in 2004, and to a lesser degree, Hesse from 1999 to 2006. 
 
There is some interesting evidence beyond the sample period of this study. Recall that 
comprehensive schools are first implemented in 1968 in West-Berlin and from the early 
1970s in the other Länder. In all Länder governed by CDU dominated governments 
(CDU or CDU-FDP) in the 1974-1978 period (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein), less than 2% of students are 
enroled in comprehensive schools in 1979, but in the Länder with SPD-dominated 
governments (SPD or SPD-FDP) in the 1974-1978 period joint schooling is already 
quite important (i.e. Bremen: 40%, Hamburg: 15% and Hesse: 30%). Lower Saxony is 
governed by SPD as well as by CDU in the pre-1979 period. The exception is North-
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Rhine Westphalia, which is dominated by Social Democrats, but the share of students 
enroled in comprehensive schools is quite low in 1979.45  
 
4.4.1.2 Some correlations 
To begin with a more formal analysis of the link between political parties and the 
intensity of ability-tracking, Table 4.5 reports the bivariate correlations of political 
parties’ time in office with the share of students enroled in comprehensive 
(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) and joint schooling (StJOINT/StTOTAL). 
 
Table 4.5 Correlations of political parties’ years in office with the share of students 
enroled in comprehensive/joint schooling (10 West German Länder, 1979-2006) 
 SPD CDU FDP Green P. Other 
StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL   0.365* -0.322* -0.064 0.265* 0.369* 
StJOINT/StTOTAL 0.308* -0.216* -0.075 0.139* 0.130* 
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
The correlations of the SPD, CDU and FDP agree with the hypotheses (Table 4.1). 
SPD-dominated Länder governments are significantly and positively correlated with the 
share of students enroled in comprehensive/joint schools while CDU-dominated Länder 
governments are negatively correlated with this share. Länder governments under 
participation of the FDP are negatively but insignificantly correlated with the share of 
students enroled in comprehensive schools. Länder governments under participation of 
the Green Party are positively correlated with comprehensive schooling, which is not in 
line with the hypothesis. However, note that due to the coalition patterns in the sample 
period (SPD-Green Party), correlations of the share of students enroled in 
comprehensive/joint schools with the Green Party’s time in office are somewhat 
predetermined by the close relation to Social Democrats (because the Länder dominated 
by SPD have a higher share of comprehensively educated students on average). 
 
Table 4.6 presents correlation coefficients of the differenced share of pupils enroled in 
comprehensive schooling with political parties’ time in office. Differencing wipes out 
the information on the shares itself, such that there is some “control” for the political 
                                                
45 North-Rhine Westphalia deserves some special attention. There were SPD and SPD-FDP governments 
in the 1970s. The SPD-FDP coalition (Ministerpräsident Heinz Kühn, SPD) was preparing a school 
system, which would provide lower secondary education exclusively in the form of comprehensive 
schools. However, the implementation of this reform was stopped by a petition for a referendum with 
unprecedented success (voter participation of about 30%) in 1978. The referendum was supported by 
teacher unions, Christian churches, associations of parents and the CDU. 
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history of the Länder. In fact, these correlations show that when the Green Party’s times 
in office are separated out from the SPD-dominated political history of the Länder, the 
correlation coefficient for the Green Party turns negative, which contrasts with the 
Green Party’s electoral manifestos (see Chapter 2 and Stern, 2000). The correlation 
coefficients for SPD, CDU and FDP are more robust and retain their signs and 
significance level, because their coalition patterns are more diversified. Note that the 
most important difference still arises between SPD and CDU governments.  
 
Table 4.6 Correlations of political parties’ years in office with the first difference of the 
share of students enroled in comprehensive/joint schooling (10 West German Länder, 
1979-2006) 
 SPD CDU FDP Green P. Other 
∆ (StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL)   0.362* -0.238* -0.109 -0.129* 0.064 
∆ (StJOINT/StTOTAL)   0.190* -0.224* -0.097 -0.029 0.036 
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
4.4.2 Stationarity 
As is well known, panel data is also subject to the problem of spurious regressions 
(Granger and Newbold, 1974) (see e.g., the survey in Baltagi, 2005). This is particularly 
true for a long and narrow panel structure, i.e. this data set (N=10 and T=28). Entorf 
(1997, pp. 291) shows that t-ratios based on the estimation of fixed effects models with 
I(1) panels can be highly misleading.46 To ensure that the FE estimator does not merely 
capture spurious relationships, the panel data set is tested for the existence of a unit root. 
 
A battery of tests can be used to check for the existence of a unit root in panel data. 
Some of these tests assume a common unit root for the 10 Länder (Levin, Lin and Chu 
test, Breitung test and Hadri test) while others allow for the possibility that unit root 
processes differ across the Länder (Im, Pesaran and Shin test, ADF – Fisher test and PP 
– Fisher test). Generally, unit root tests are considered to have quite low power in 
detecting unit roots (Baltagi, 2005, 238). However, as a whole, the test results shed 
some light on stationarity/nonstationarity of the panels in this study.  
                                                
46 Entorf (1997) also shows that this problem can arise with short (N>T) panels in the case of random 
walks with drift. 
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Table 4.7 Panel unit root tests on (StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) (10 West German Länder, 
1979-2006) 
Test Statistic I p-value Unit root? Statistic II p-value Unit root? 
(1) Levin, Lin and Chu -2.484 0.007  no -6.416 0.000 no 
(2) Breitung - -  -1.416 0.078 yes 
(3) Im, Pesaran and Shin 2.457 0.993  yes -3.583 0.000 no 
(4) ADF – Fisher 12.755 0.888  yes 63.722 0.000 no 
(5) PP – Fisher 7.582 0.994  yes 4.727 0.998 yes 
(6) Hadri 9.539 0.000  yes 6.473 0.000 yes 
Note: Unit root/No unit root is based on p<0.05. Statistic I includes individual Länder effects; statistic II 
includes individual Länder effects and individual linear time trends. Tests (1) – (5) are based on the null 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. Test (6) is based on the null hypothesis of no unit root. Tests 
(1), (2) and (6) assume a common unit root process for all 10 Länder time series; tests (3) – (5) allow for 
the possibility of individual unit roots in the 10 Länder time series. Lag length is selected based on 
Schwartz Information Criterion. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
 
Table 4.8 Panel unit root tests on (StJOINT/StTOTAL) (10 West German Länder, 1979-
2006) 
Test Statistic I p-value Unit root? Statistic II p-value Unit root? 
Levin, Lin & Chu -3.041 0.001 no -6.470 0.000 no 
Breitung - -  -0.798 0.213 yes 
Im, Pesaran & Shin 1.050 0.853 yes -1.318 0.094 yes 
ADF – Fisher 17.353 0.630 yes 50.076 0.000 no 
PP – Fisher 7.169 0.996 yes 2.973 1.000 yes 
Hadri 8.900 0.000 yes 6.267 0.000 yes 
Note: Unit root/No unit root is based on p<0.05. Statistic I includes individual Länder effects; statistic II 
includes individual Länder effects and individual linear time trends. Tests (1) – (5) are based on the null 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. Test (6) is based on the null hypothesis of no unit root. Tests 
(1), (2) and (6) assume a common unit root process for all 10 Länder time series; tests (3) – (5) allow for 
the possibility of individual unit roots in the 10 Länder time series. Lag length is selected based on 
Schwartz Information Criterion. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
 
Table 4.7 presents the results of the unit root tests on the share of students enroled in 
comprehensive schools and Table 4.8 reports the results for the share of students 
enroled in joint schools. In both tables, Statistic I is a unit root test that allows for 
individual Länder effects and Statistic II is a unit root test that incorporates individual 
Länder effects and Länder-specific time trends. Some caution is necessary when 
interpreting the results of the Hadri test (6), because it works with the reverse null 
hypothesis of no unit root while all other tests assume the existence of a unit root under 
the null hypothesis. 
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The unit root tests that include only individual Länder effects (and no individual time 
trends) indicate that the panels for comprehensive schools and joint schools are not 
stationary (Statistic I in Tables 4.7 and 4.8). The evidence is quite clear. For both 
shares, four out of five tests indicate that the panel is I(1). The evidence is less clear 
when individual time trends are included. For the share of students enroled in 
comprehensive schools, three tests indicate a nonstationary panel while three others 
suggest that this is not the case (Statistic II in Tables 4.7). In the case of joint schooling, 
four tests indicate that the panel is I(1) while two tests suggest a stationary panel. 
Moreover, it is not clear whether individual linear time trends may alleviate 
nonstationarity because there is no bright line between the results of tests assuming 
common or individual unit root processes.  
 
Breitung (2000) presents evidence suggesting that the unit root tests by Levin, Lin and 
Chu as well as Im, Pesaran and Chin suffer from very low power when individual time 
trends are included (see Statistic II, Baltagi, 2005, 243). Indeed, the Levin, Lin and Chu 
test indicates a stationary panel for both variables while the Breitung test cannot reject 
the null of the existence of a unit root at the 10% confidence level. Thus, in summary, it 
is ambiguous whether the panels including individual time trends contain a unit root, 
although the evidence weakly suggests that there is indeed still a unit root.  
 
We can try to deal with the nonstationarity of the panel by including time fixed effects, 
which may somewhat mitigate the problem. When the panel is indeed I(1), first-
differencing the data is a valid approach to obtain a stationary panel. To check the 
stationarity of the first-differenced panels, similar unit root tests are conducted for the 
differenced share of students enroled in comprehensive/joint schooling (see Appendix 
A.4.4.2 for these results). For the share of students enroled in comprehensive schools 
the tests clearly show that first-differencing yields stationary panels. For the share in 
joint schools, the evidence is less clear when individual time trends are included. Thus, 
panel data regressions are run on first-differenced data of the share of students enroled 
in comprehensive schools, which can be considered a robust benchmark. As a 
robustness check, we can also run the regressions using joint schools as a measure for 
the adoption of comprehensive education (Section 4.4.4.1) and using the shares of 
students enroled in comprehensive schools itself (and not on the first differences of the 
shares, see Section 4.4.4.4). 
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4.4.3 Baseline model 
The goal of this section is to provide econometric evidence about whether German 
political parties exert the predicted influence on the intensity of ability-tracking over the 
1979-2006 period in West Germany. A properly specified econometric analysis is 
useful for distinguishing the influence from the different political parties in coalition 
governments, and for distinguishing political influence from other confounding factors 
such as the abundance of public resources, or the settlement structure of the Länder. 
 
The endogenous variable is the intensity of ability-tracking, measured as the first 
difference of the share of students enroled in comprehensive schools, 
∆(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL). The key exogenous variable is political parties’ time in 
office, which is captured by a vector of dummy variables, POLITICAL, for government 
participation of the CDU, FDP, the Green Party, and other political parties (Other). The 
Social Democrats, SPD, are the reference category. These dummy variables take the 
value of 1 if the political party participates in a Länder government and 0 if it does not 
(see Section 4.3). As an additional control, coalition size COALSIZE captures the 
number of political parties that form the Länder government. The political variables are 
not differenced to allow for identification of the parties’ time in office. The following 
equation is estimated for 10 West German Länder i over the 1979-2006 period t: 
 
(4.6) i it
COMPREHENSIVE
it
it tTOTAL
it
St POLITICAL v
St
′∆ = β+ η + θ +  
 
Länder effects ηi are included to control for Länder-specific and time-invariant 
preferences regarding the design of the education system. This unobserved 
heterogeneity, however, cannot be assumed uncorrelated with the political couleur of 
the Länder governments. Thus, the ηi are treated as fixed. Fixed year effects θt are 
included to account for common shifts/shocks in preferences for the design of the 
education system (like the publication of the PISA tests), which are potentially quite 
important, because the considered time period is lengthy, including German 
Reunification. This econometric setup implies that the coefficients are identified from 
variations within the Länder that are not explained by country-wide shocks/shifts.47  
                                                
47 Note that equation (4.6) corresponds to a level-specification, which controls for Länder fixed effects, 
year fixed effects and linear Länder-specific time trends. Thus, the model presented in equation (4.6) 
implicitly also controls for Länder-specific trends. 
89 
 
Finally, vit denotes a classical, zero mean, constant variance, error term. Although the 
data is differenced, we cannot rule out weak serial correlation and heteroskedasticitiy. 
As suggested by Arellano (2003, 19) for the structure of the data set at hand, standard 
errors are estimated robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
(up to 3 lags) using the method presented by Newey and West (1987). 
 
Table 4.9 Political parties’ influence on the share of students enroled in comprehensive 
schools (10 West German Länder, 1979-2006) 
 ∆(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) 
CDU -0.002 
 (0.001)*** 
FDP -0.006 
 (0.004)* 
Green Party -0.009 
 (0.003)** 
Other -0.007 
 (0.003)** 
COALSIZE 0.006 
 (0.004)* 
Länder FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Observations 270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
The results of the econometric model (Equation 4.6) appear in Table 4.9. The 
coefficients estimated for the CDU, FDP and the Green Party show the predicted signs. 
Länder governments under participation of these political parties decrease the share of 
students enroled in comprehensive schools. The coefficients of CDU and Green Party 
are significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively whereas the FDP coefficient is only 
marginally significant at the 10% level.  
  
One may, however, argue that the structure of the education system is driven by other 
Länder-specific but time-varying factors, as for example available public resources at 
the Länder level or the overall economic situation of the Länder. To ensure that the 
coefficients of the political variables do not merely capture other omitted variables, 
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Equation (4.6) is augmented by (the first difference of) a standard demand model for 
public education, X: 
 
(4.7) i it
COMPREHENSIVE
it
it it tTOTAL
it
St POLITICAL X v
St
′ ′∆ = β+ ∆ γ +η + θ +  
 
Specifically, X incorporates the natural logarithm of cohort size, i.e. the number of 
students in lower secondary education, ln(StTOTAL). X also contains the natural log of 
real Länder public revenue per capita, PR, to account for the Länder financial resources. 
Due to the strong fiscal equalisation across the Länder, public revenue per capita is a 
more useful resource proxy compared to Länder-level GDP per capita. PR is deflated 
using the government consumption deflator supplied by the German Council of 
Economic Experts (2007). The Länder unemployment rate, UR, is used as a proxy for 
the overall socioeconomic situation. The natural log of population density, PD, is 
important because the provision of comprehensive schooling may be more attractive in 
times of less population density. The share of foreign students is not included in the 
vector of control variables because this variable does not yield a single significant 
coefficient in the regressions on West German data (Table 3.3), even at the 20% level 
and there is a considerable amount of controls for unobservable heterogeneity (see 
footnote 47).  Furthermore, o60 accounts for the share of Länder populations over 60 
years of age to control for possible generational conflict. However, we expect this 
variable to be of little importance (see also Baum and Seitz, 2003). Note that St, PR and 
PD enter the model as natural logarithms while UR and o60 are defined as ratios. Recall 
that the demand model for public education, X, is differenced. The first difference of the 
logs and ratios in X permits the interpretation of all coefficients as elasticities, with the 
exception of POLITICAL. 
 
Table 4.10 presents the modified regression results. The inclusion of the control 
variables does not result in important changes of the coefficients estimated for the 
political variables. Indeed, the point estimates are virtually unchanged, whereas the 
significance levels of the coefficients estimated for FDP, Other and coalition size falls 
below the 10%-level. The CDU and Green Party dummy coefficients remain almost 
unchanged. 
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Table 4.10 Political parties’ influence on the share of students enroled in comprehensive 
schools, including control variables (10 West German Länder, 1979-2006) 
 ∆(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) 
CDU -0.002 
 (0.001)** 
FDP -0.005 
 (0.003)+ 
Green Party -0.008 
 (0.003)** 
Other -0.005 
 (0.003)+ 
COALSIZE 0.005 
 (0.003)+ 
∆ ln (StTOTAL) 0.017 
 (0.051) 
∆ ln (PR) -0.018 
 (0.015) 
∆ ln (PD) 0.059 
 (0.113) 
∆ UR -0.055 
 (0.136) 
∆ o60 0.386 
 (0.492) 
Länder FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Observations 270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
The significant effects estimated for CDU and Green Party government participation are 
considerable in magnitude. CDU participation in a Länder government almost 
eliminates the upward trend of enrolment in comprehensive schools (see the sample 
mean in Table 4.3: +0.3%-0.2% = 0.1%). Green Party participation in a Länder 
government reduces the growth of enrolment in comprehensive schools by 1.5 standard 
deviations, which implies that the upward trend in enrolment in comprehensive schools 
is reversed by the Green Party (+0.3%-0.8% = -0.5%). However, for real policy 
outcomes, note that the Green Party has only participated in Länder governments in 
coalitions with the SPD, which exerts moderating effects. The moderating effect from 
coalition governments is also confirmed by the coefficient of COALSIZE, which is 
positive but not significantly different from zero in Table 4.8, suggesting that 
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educational policy by coalition governments is more moderate than educational policy 
by single-party governments. 48 
 
The coefficients estimated for the control variables indicate that the share of students 
enroled in comprehensive schools is a characteristic of the Länder education system that 
is strongly influenced by public policy. Obviously, other factors are of negligible 
importance. In particular, cohort size and population density do not have significant 
effects on the intensity of ability-tracking. Note, however, that population density is a 
slowly moving variable, the impact of which is hardly identified in an FE environment 
because much of its variation is between Länder. Public revenue per capita does not 
affect the share of students either even though some comprehensive schools are 
associated with rather cost-intensive full-time schooling.  
 
4.4.4 Robustness checks 
This section tests whether the main conclusions of the baseline model are robust against 
a series of modifications of the econometric setup and different definitions of the 
endogenous and exogenous variables. 49 
 
4.4.4.1 An alternative measure for comprehensive schooling 
This robustness check analyses whether the baseline results hold when using a different 
definition of the endogenous variable. Recall that the baseline results are obtained by 
estimating the effect of the political variables on the share of students enroled in 
comprehensive schools. Here, Equations (4.6) and (4.7) are re-estimated using the share 
of students enroled in joint schools as the endogenous variable. Table 4.11, Column (1) 
presents the results for the model without control variables and Column (2) shows the 
results for the model including control variables.  
 
                                                
48 This finding is in accordance with the literature on partisan theory, which highlights the moderating 
effect of proportional political systems (see e.g. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997, 7). 
49 A considerable number of robustness checks are provided in this section. One may, of course, conduct 
more tests. Some tests have been performed but are not considered interesting enough to be reported: 
different variables capturing the age of Länder governments were tested as political variables (linear, 
quadratic) but yielded very insignificant coefficients. COALSIZE was tested as a binary variable, which 
did not yield different results. 
93 
Table 4.11 Political parties’ influence on the share of students enroled in joint schools 
(10 West German Länder, 1979-2006) 
 (1) (2) 
 ∆(StJOINT/StTOTAL) ∆(StJOINT/StTOTAL) 
CDU -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.003)** (0.004)** 
FDP -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
Green Party -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Other 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
COALSIZE -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
∆ ln (StTOTAL)  -0.181 
  (0.198) 
∆ ln (PR)  0.005 
  (0.034) 
∆ ln (PD)  -0.010 
  (0.302) 
∆ UR  -0.566 
  (0.408)+ 
∆ o60  1.457 
  (1.819) 
Länder FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 270 270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.16 0.16 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
Again, the results confirm the hypotheses. The signs estimated for CDU, FDP and the 
Green Party are in line with the hypotheses in Table 4.1. However, only the estimated 
effect for CDU is significantly different from zero at the 5% level (both, in the model 
with and in the model without control variables). The coefficients estimated for FDP 
and the Green Party are not significantly different from zero. The coefficient estimated 
for the CDU dummy suggests that the effect is larger for joint schools than for 
comprehensive schools. A change in government from SPD to CDU reverses the 
upward trend in enrolment in joint schooling (+0.3% - 0.8% = -0.5%), which is a larger 
effect than in the baseline model (+0.3% - 0.2% = 0.1%). However, in terms of the 
standard deviation, the effect is comparable (about 1/3 s.d.). Note that the relation 
among the coefficients estimated for CDU, FDP and the Green Party is reversed. 
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Obviously, governments under participation of CDU oppose joint schooling more 
strongly than the other two parties whereas this relation is different for comprehensive 
schools. In summary, the regressions using joint schooling as the endogenous variable 
confirm the hypotheses from Section 4.2 but the results are somewhat weaker than those 
estimated for comprehensive schools. 
 
The coefficients estimated for the control variables are not significantly different from 
zero as suggested by the baseline model. Note that the R2s suggest that Equations (4.6) 
and (4.7) explain more of the variation in the share of students enroled in 
comprehensive schools than in joint schools, which may be because joint schooling is 
an aggregate of three different school types. 
 
4.4.4.2 An alternative measure for POLITICAL: the coalition pattern 
In this section we test a different definition of the key exogenous variables. Recall that 
POLITICAL is a set of dummy variables which accounts for separate political parties. 
This allows us to sort out the influence of political parties on the education system and 
directly matches the hypotheses from Section 4.2. This definition of POLITICAL is, 
however, somewhat artificial since it gives “clean” ceteris paribus effects for the parties, 
holding constant all other parties’ government participation. An alternative is to account 
for each coalition combination with a dummy variable. This definition may analytically 
be less interesting because it does not report ceteris paribus coefficients of the political 
parties. It is, however, closer to the real world. Thus, every coalition combination 
formed by the political parties is represented by a separate dummy variable: SPD single-
party governments are the base category. The historical SPD coalition governments are 
the SDP-Green Party, SPD-FDP, SPD-FDP-Green Party and SPD-Other. One dummy 
variable captures CDU single-party governments and two others capture CDU-FDP and 
CDU-FDP-Other coalitions. A final dummy variable captures grand coalitions 
comprising SPD-CDU coalitions, irrespective of whether the Länder prime minister 
represents the SPD or the CDU. Generally, the problem with this definition of the 
political parties is that for some dummies there is only a very limited number of 
observations for some dummies. Some coalitions form only once in our sample (SPD-
FDP-Green Party, SPD-Other, CDU-FDP-Other). Table 4.12 depicts the results for 
regressions as shown in equation (4.6) and (4.7) but with the modified definition of the 
vector POLITICAL. 
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Table 4.12 Political parties’ influence on the share of students enroled in comprehensive 
schools, Coalition patterns (10 West German Länder, 1979-2006) 
 (1) (2) 
 ∆(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) ∆(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) 
SPD-FDP -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
SPD-Green Party -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
SPD-FDP-Green Party 0.001 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
SPD-Other -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
CDU -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)** 
CDU-FDP -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** 
CDU-FDP-Other -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)* 
Grand Coalition 0.004 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
∆ ln (StTOTAL)  0.016 
  (0.053) 
∆ ln (PR)  -0.020 
  (0.015)+ 
∆ ln (PD)  0.101 
  (0.111) 
∆ UR  -0.050 
  (0.134) 
∆ o60  0.217 
  (0.555) 
Länder FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 270 270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.34 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
The estimates for the alternative definition of the political variables accord well with the 
definition of single parties (compare Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11). Recall that here the 
base category is the single-party SPD government. The estimation results suggest that 
SPD-Green Party, CDU-FDP coalitions and single-party CDU governments pursue a 
significantly different education policy compared to single-party SPD governments and 
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that they are associated with a lower share of students enroled in comprehensive 
schools. The magnitude of the effects are also well in line with the results from the 
baseline models. While the effect estimated for the CDU is -0.2% per year in the 
baseline model (Tables 4.9 and 4.10), Table 4.12 suggests that the coefficient for CDU 
single-party governments is -0.3%. Thus, according to the results in Table 4.12, the 
CDU truly eliminates the upward trend in comprehensive schooling. Due to the 
formulation as coalition governments in Table 4.12, the other coefficients are less 
comparable, but generally match the baseline estimates quite well.  
 
Two results are not in line with the baseline model: first, grand coalitions do not appear 
to pursue an education policy that is significantly different from single-party SPD 
governments. This may be due to the fact that a SPD-dominated grand coalition 
(Bremen 1995-2006) is mixed with CDU-dominated grand coalitions (Baden-
Württemberg 1992-1995; Schleswig-Holstein 2005-2006). Splitting up these coalitions 
results in very few observations per dummy and is therefore avoided. Second, coalitions 
made up of SPD, FDP and the Green Party obviously, though not significantly different 
from zero, advocate more comprehensive schooling than single-party SPD 
governments, which is not in line with the hypotheses formulated in Section 4.2. 
Partisan theory would suggest that the FDP and the Green Party engage in weakening 
SPD’s bias towards comprehensive schooling. Recall, however, that there is only one 
SPD-FDP-Green Party coalition (Bremen 1992-1994). A possible interpretation may be 
that the Social Democrats are able to dominate their small coalition partners; although 
the FDP and the Green Party accumulate a considerable share of votes: 9.5% and 
11.4%, respectively. 
 
4.4.4.3 Another measure for POLITICAL: the Länder education ministers 
We can also argue that the political couleur of the Länder education minister is more 
important than whether or not a specific political party participates in a Länder 
government. In this case, the political influence on education policy is measured by the 
party affiliation of the education minister. In the sample period, education ministers are 
almost always members of the SPD or CDU with one exception (Hamburg, October 
2001-March 2004: Rudolf Lange/Reinhard Soltau). Thus, model (4.6) and (4.7) are re-
estimated with the vector POLITICAL capturing the political orientation of the Länder 
education minister. Again, SPD membership of the education minister is coded as the 
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base category. CDU or FDP memberships of the education minister are coded as 
dummy variables. Table 4.13 reports the results. 
 
Table 4.13 The effect of education ministers’ party affiliation on the share of students 
enroled in comprehensive schools (10 West German Länder, 1979-2006) 
 (1) (2) 
 ∆(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) ∆(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) 
Education Minister CDU -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)** 
Education Minister FDP -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.002)** (0.002)+ 
∆ ln (StTOTAL)  0.014 
  (0.053) 
∆ ln (PR)  -0.023 
  (0.016)+ 
∆ ln (PD)  0.045 
  (0.119) 
∆ UR  -0.051 
  (0.138) 
∆ o60  0.555 
  (0.526) 
Länder FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 270 270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.31 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
Not surprisingly, the results are quite similar the baseline model. If the education 
minister belongs to the CDU, fewer students enrol in comprehensive schools. The effect 
is significant at the 5% level (in the model with controls). The magnitude of the effect 
corresponds well to the coefficient obtained from the baseline model. The effect 
estimated for the FDP education minister is only significantly different from zero in the 
model without control variables and at the 20% level in the model including control 
variables. The magnitude of the coefficients corresponds to the coefficients from the 
baseline model. 
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4.4.4.4 Dynamic model on the share itself (and not on differenced data) 
The goal here is to test whether the baseline results hold if one understands the strong 
serial dependence in the data as an integral part of the econometric model instead of 
differencing the panel. The reason for the use of the differenced share of students 
enroled in comprehensive schools is that the unit root tests do not give a completely 
clear picture of whether or not the panels are stationary. The first difference of the panel 
is, however, stationary, which is clear from the unit root tests on the first-differenced 
data. Thus, standard econometric methods (designed for use with stationary data) can be 
used with the differenced series. In every case, given the results of the unit root tests, it 
is natural to worry about strong serial correlation, in which case first differencing is also 
an appropriate approach to estimate the model (Wooldridge, 2003, 410).50 Thus, the 
results from the baseline-model may be considered an excellent benchmark for other 
models.  
 
There are concerns that first-differencing the data involves loss of information and 
complicates the identification of public policy’s impact on the education system. The 
specific issues are: 
(i) The dynamics of adjustment of the education system should be explicitly 
modelled and not differenced away. Thus, one may advocate the estimation of dynamic 
models, which allow deriving short- and long-run responses. 
(ii) Less importantly, FE on the share itself implies a more efficient use of the 
available information compared to running a FE model on differenced data. However, 
due to the small cross-sectional dimension of the panel (n=10), the loss of observations 
caused by first-differencing is quite small (~ 4%). 
Additionally, one may argue that, if Länder governments change very infrequently (e.g., 
Baden-Württemberg or North-Rhine Westphalia) or do not change at all in the entire 
sample (Bavaria), first-differencing may complicate or render impossible identifying the 
impact of political parties on the education system. However, the identification problem 
does not disappear when running the FE model on the share itself because these 
coefficients are also identified from within-Länder variation and not from information 
on the shares itself. If we intend to exploit the information on the share itself, we need 
some type of between-estimation (see Section 4.4.4.5). 
                                                
50 The Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker (2003) test for serial correlation in panel data models strongly 
confirms the presence of serial correlation in the share of students enroled in comprehensive or joint 
schooling (p-value for both series < 0.000). 
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Equations (4.6) and (4.7) are re-estimated using as endogenous variable the share of 
students enroled in comprehensive schools (not differenced). Note that for this exercise 
it is a prerequisite that the data is stationary, which is contrary to what was assumed for 
the baseline model, because otherwise the coefficients may be spurious (Beck and Katz, 
2004, Entorf, 1997 or Kennedy, 2003). Thus, in this Section, we check the robustness of 
the baseline results against a dynamic specification using information on the share itself. 
The following model is estimated: 
 
(4.8) i it
COM P REHENSIVE COM PREHENSIVE
it it 1
it it tTOTAL TOTAL
it it 1
St St POLITICAL X v
St St
−
−
′ ′= φ + β+ γ + η + θ +  
 
The estimation of this model deserves explanation. It is well known that if the time 
dimension of the panel is not very large the naïve FE estimation of model (4.8) yields 
biased and inconsistent estimates of the true parameters, for both the lagged endogenous 
variable as well as for the other exogenous variables. Even though the time-invariant 
error component ηi, which is correlated with the lagged endogenous variable, is 
typically wiped out by the introduction of Länder dummies, the lagged endogenous 
variable is still correlated with the lagged error (vit-1).51 This introduces a source of 
endogeneity to the set of regressors. As shown by Nickell (1981) the consistency of the 
FE estimator in a dynamic panel data model hinges on a large T. Moreover, the FE 
estimates are biased and the bias disappears only as T -> ∞ (“Nickell-bias”, see e.g., 
Baltagi, 2005, 135). This is already true in the absence of serial correlation; however, 
the endogeneity problem becomes more important in the presence of serial dependence. 
In this case, the lagged endogenous variable is also correlated with the 
contemporaneous error (vit). Indeed, the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel 
data models (Wooldridge, 2002 and Drukker, 2003) suggests the presence of serially 
correlated errors in the dynamic model (W 2002: p<0.01).52  
 
Econometric research has experienced considerable advances in finding consistent and 
unbiased estimators for the dynamic panel data model (see e.g., Anderson and Hsiao, 
1981, or Arellano and Bond, 1991). These models, however, rely on the assumption of 
                                                
51 Alternatively, if the time-invariant error component ηi is wiped out by the within-transformation, the 
lagged endogenous variable is correlated with the time-demeaned error vit – vit-1 
52 The Durbin-Watson statistic is not reliable in the presence of endogenous regressors while Durbins’h 
statistic is not implemented in Stata for use with panel data (Wooldridge, 2003, 399). 
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N → ∞ or at least N > T, which holds for many typical micro-panels, such as the 
German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) or the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) in the U.S. (see Arellano, 2003, 84 and 129; and Nickell, 1981). For many 
macro-panels, however, the typical structure is T > N, which makes the estimation of 
dynamic panel data models less straightforward. Judson and Owen (1999), Beck and 
Katz (2004) as well as Bruno (2005) study the T > N case. They use Monte-Carlo 
simulations to quantify the biases in the estimates for the coefficients/standard errors of 
the lagged endogenous and the exogenous variables when estimated with FE. These 
studies quite unanimously conclude that for the structure of this data set (n = 10, T = 28, 
serial dependence), the bias of the “naïve” FE model does not affect the sign of the 
coefficients. In particular, the evidence presented by Judson and Owen (1999) and Beck 
and Katz (2004) suggests that even for the case of strong serial dependence the 
empirical bias of the “naïve” FE estimation should not exceed -6% for the coefficient of 
the lagged endogenous variable and +15 % for the coefficients of the other regressors. 
Moreover, the “naïve” FE model outperforms micro-econometric estimators for 
dynamic panel data such as Anderson and Hsiao (1981) or Arellano and Bond (1991) in 
terms of efficiency (see Judson and Owen, 1999 and Beck and Katz, 2004).  
 
Thus, the choice of an estimator for the model presented in equation (4.8) is not easy. A 
first option is to estimate the model by “naïve” FE and accept the Nickell-bias, given 
that it will not affect the sign of the key exogenous variables (POLITICAL). Second, 
one may consider an IV approach. Arellano (2003, pp. 129) recommends estimation by 
2SLS for the T > N case. The applicability of the IV approach depends of course on the 
availability of good instruments. All previously estimated models suggest that the 
political dummy variables have comparatively high explanatory power for the change in 
the share of students enroled in comprehensive schools. Thus, to instrument the lagged 
share of students in comprehensive schools, the lagged political dummy variables CDU 
and Green Party are used in addition to lagged population density. These variables yield 
the most significant effects in the “naïve” FE estimation (see Column 1 of Table 4.14). 
The two approaches are problematic, but the joint evidence from both may give 
information about the robustness of the baseline results for POLITICAL in light of a 
dynamic specification.53 
                                                
53 Kiviet (1995) proposes a bias correction of the static FE model. Monte-Carlo evidence presented in 
Judson and Owen (1999) and Beck and Katz (2004) suggests that this estimator performs slightly better 
than the static FE model. However, for the bias correction, this model requires an initial estimate from a 
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To sum up, the dynamic model as set out in equation (4.8) is estimated by two different 
econometric approaches. Model (1) is a classical FE model. Model (2) is an IV 
regression using the lagged political dummy variables CDU and Green Party as well as 
lagged population density as instruments, which is estimated by 2SLS. In both models, 
the standard errors are estimated robust in the presence of serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity as suggested by Newey and West (1987). The results are reported in 
Table 4.14. 
 
The results confirm that the share of students enroled in comprehensive schools is 
virtually a nonstationary variable and that the results should be interpreted with 
considerable caution. The IV estimation seems to work well since the instruments are 
reasonably correlated with the lagged share of students, as shown by the Anderson 
statistic. At the same time, the Hansen-J test for overidentifying restrictions 
(comparable to the Sargan test used in the presence of heteroskedasticity-robust 
estimation; see Bauer, Fertig and Schmidt, 2009, 333 for an overview) suggests that the 
IVs are not correlated with the error-term and thus may be considered valid instruments. 
The coefficients estimated for the lagged share of students in comprehensive schools are 
quite similar in the naïve FE and in the IV FE model; the difference may indeed be 
explained by the Nickell-bias simulated in Judson and Owen (1999), which suggested -
6%. My own estimates suggest ~ -5%.54 Note the higher standard error of the 
instrumented variable (lagged share of students in comprehensive schools) which is not 
surprising. The results for the political variables are very robust. The sign and the 
magnitude of the political variables are similar to those estimated in the baseline model 
whereas the significance level is somewhat lower than in the baseline model.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
consistent estimator (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991), which is a difficult choice for the 10x28 data 
structure. I also estimate the Kiviet (1995)-model where the initial consistent estimate is taken from 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications. The results (point 
estimates and confidence intervals) are virtually identical with the results obtained from the classical FE 
model (Model 1). 
54 When testing different sets of IVs, the range of the estimation results for φ in Model (2) is from 0.95 to 
1.05, confirming that the variable is nonstationary. 
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Table 4.14 Dynamic model of political parties’ influence on the share of students 
enroled in comprehensive schools (10 West German Länder, 1979-2006) 
 (1) (2) 
 StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL 
(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL)t-1 0.952 0.999 
 (0.023)*** (0.068)*** 
CDU -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
FDP -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003)+ (0.003)+ 
Green Party -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.003)** (0.003)** 
Other -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.004)+ (0.005)+ 
COALSIZE 0.004 0.005 
 (0.003)+ (0.003)+ 
ln (StTOTAL) 0.009 -0.005 
 (0.017) (0.025) 
ln (PR) -0.019 -0.015 
 (0.012)+ (0.012) 
ln (PD) -0.092 -0.032 
 (0.058)+ (0.095) 
UR 0.019 0.015 
 (0.051) (0.051) 
o60 -0.069 -0.025 
 (0.084) (0.110) 
IVs for lagged endogenous 
variable 
- lagged CDU 
lagged Green Party 
lagged ln(PD) 
Anderson-statistic, 
IV relevance test, 
H0: equation is under-identified 
- 22.370*** 
Hansen-J-statistic, 
Test of overidentifying 
restrictions, 
H0: IVs are valid 
- 0.178 
Länder FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 270 270 
Adjusted R-squared 1.00 1.00 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
In summary, there are three major lessons from the estimations using the share of 
students enroled in comprehensive schools (and not the first difference of this share). 
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First, the panel is indeed not stationary. The (consistent and unbiased) IV estimate 
indicates that the panel follows a random walk. Thus, one should be extremely cautious 
in interpreting the results. Second, given the first result, fortunately the level-
specifications strongly confirm the results from the baseline model since all level-
specifications give the same signs for the political influence on the education system. In 
comparison to the Social Democrats, all political parties appear to advocate a lower 
share of students in comprehensive schools. The coefficients across the two models are 
very robust: compared to the models on differenced data, the level-specifications in 
most cases even suggest almost identical magnitudes of the coefficients. The 
significance levels are somewhat lower than in the baseline specification. This is not 
surprising – at least for the IV regression. The coefficients of the control variables also 
show a quite consistent picture compared to the estimation using differenced data. 
Third, if one is willing to consider the panel as stationary, the level-specifications 
suggest that there are pronounced differences between the short- and long-run effects 
from the political parties. The long-run coefficients are considerably higher (see Beck 
and Katz, 2004 or Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). The dynamic FE model (Column 1 in 
Table 4.14) suggests that the long-run effect on the share of students in comprehensive 
schools caused by a change from SPD to CDU is about -6%. Of course, these long-run 
effects can only become effective during the lengthy incumbency of one political party, 
which may be observed in Figure 4.2 (h) and (i) for Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. 
 
If there are indeed differences between the short- and long-run effects of political 
influence on the education system, these differences should also show up in terms of 
differences between the within estimations, which have been presented up to this point 
and the results from between estimations, which may be considered long-run 
coefficients and, which will be presented next. 
 
4.4.4.5 Exploiting the variation across Länder (between estimations) 
This section tests whether the baseline results hold when exploiting the between-Länder 
variation instead of the within-Länder variation. Recall that the baseline model is an FE-
model run on first-differenced data. Both the fixed effects and the differenced data are 
very important parts of the econometric model as explained above, because they permit 
obtaining consistent and unbiased estimates. However, these characteristics of the 
baseline model involve loss of information. Specifically, the coefficients are identified 
104 
from the variation within Länder that is not explained by economy-wide shocks or 
Länder-specific trends; in particular the coefficients are not identified from the share 
itself. This raises some identification issues. Consider Bavaria (see Figure 4.2 a). In the 
sample period from 1979 through 2006, Bavaria experiences no change of government 
(CSU). Identification of CSU’s influence based on the within-Länder variation clearly 
fails. Note that this applies irrespective of whether the first-difference or the deviations-
from-Länder-means transformation is used or whether Länder dummies are introduced. 
Instead, information on the share itself (i.e. the share of students enroled in 
comprehensive schools) is needed to identify party influence in this case. Consequently, 
as a complement to the baseline model, we can exploit the cross-Länder variation of the 
sample. However, instead of the textbook between estimator, which is obtained by 
performing an OLS regression on the Länder means (see e.g., Greene, 2003), it appears 
more helpful from a political-economic view to consider the share of students enroled in 
comprehensive schools in 2006 as a result of political action taken during the sample 
period 1979-2006:  
 
(4.9) 
2006COMP 2006 2006 2006
i i i iTOTAL
1977 1977 1977i
St CDU FDP Green v
St
⎛ ⎞
= α +β + δ + δ +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑  
 
where e.g., ΣCDU is a simple variable that counts government participation by the CDU 
(years), irrespective of whether within coalition governments or as single-party 
governments. Thus, this very simple, stylised econometric model relates the share of 
students in comprehensive schools in 2006 to the accumulated years in government for 
CDU, FDP and the Green Party over the sample period 1979-2006.  
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A variant of this model corrects Equation (4.9) for the initial (1979) level of 
comprehensive schooling such that only the change in the share of students enroled in 
comprehensive/joint schooling over the 1979-2006 period is attributed to the political 
couleur of Länder governments in this period.55 
 
(4.10) 
2006 1979COMP COMP 2006 2006 2006
i i i iTOTAL TOTAL
1977 1977 1977i i
St St CDU FDP Green v
St St
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− = α +β + δ + δ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑  
 
In both models, due to the strong negative correlation of SPD- and CDU times in office 
(see Table 4.4) it is not possible to include the years in government by both parties, 
which would be a source of strong multi-collinearity.56 Note that this econometric 
model involves only 10 observations (10 West German Länder) and thus can only be 
estimated in a reduced-form, suppressing control variables and concentrating only on 
the political dummy variables. Although suppressing control variables does not seem to 
be much of a disadvantage (see e.g., Tables 4.10), it also means that we cannot even 
control for observed heterogeneity, important in cross-sectional regressions, given that 
no control for unobserved heterogeneity is possible. From an econometric view this 
implies that the estimator is not consistent since the error may still be correlated to 
exogenous variables. Thus, these models are more adequately viewed as multivariate 
correlations and cannot be viewed as fully-fledged econometric models. 
 
Table 4.15, Column (1) presents the cross-sectional regression as shown in Equation 
(4.9). Column (2) presents the results for Equation (4.10). These reduced-form 
regressions confirm the main conclusions from the baseline model. Länder with 
histories of CDU-dominated governments have education systems with a lower share of 
students enroled in comprehensive schools. This finding is significantly different from 
zero in both specifications, of course keeping in mind all of the limitations mentioned 
supra. Taken literally, the estimates suggest that one additional year of CDU 
government suppresses the share of students enroled in comprehensive schools by about 
1%. This implies that a four-year incumbency would translate into a 4% decrease in the 
share of students in these schools. FDP government participation has a smaller impact 
                                                
55 See also the discussion on the 1979 level of comprehensive schooling in Section 4.4.1.1 and Chapter 2. 
56 Note that including all political parties does not change the relation between the political parties. It 
does, however, suppress the confidence levels of the coefficients, which is not surprising, given the strong 
negative correlation between SPD and CDU years in government (see e.g. Kennedy, 2003, 212). 
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on the education system while government participation by the Green Party has a 
somewhat larger negative effect (in Column 2). The latter two effects are only 
significant when we correct for the initial (1979) share of comprehensive schooling. 
Generally, the corrected model (Equation 4.10) fits the data better than Equation (4.9). 
This is not surprising given that in some Länder with mixed political records, there is 
already a considerable degree of comprehensive schooling in 1979 (e.g., Hesse or 
Hamburg). Equation (4.10) attributes only the 2006-1979 change in the share of 
students in comprehensive schools to the political couleur of the Länder during 1979-
2006. Overall the results obtained from the between regressions support the findings 
from the within-Länder regressions. Moreover, the between models also suggest that 
there may indeed be differences between short- and long-run effects, although not as 
pronounced as implied by the model on the share itself (previous section). 
 
Table 4.15 Between Länder estimation: Political parties’ influence on the share of 
students enroled in comprehensive schools (10 West German Länder) 
 (1) (2) 
 (StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL)2006 ∆2006-1979(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) 
ΣCDU -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.004)** (0.002)*** 
ΣFDP -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.002)** 
ΣGreen Party -0.006 -0.012 
 (0.008) (0.003)** 
Constant 0.312 0.295 
 (0.092)** (0.041)*** 
Observations 10 10 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.38 0.78 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * and + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% 
level. 
 
4.4.4.6 Reverse causality: from education policy to election outcomes? 
A final, but important concern with the baseline results is reverse causality, i.e. 
educational policy can possibly exert an influence on Länder election outcomes. This 
would be a serious problem for the econometric models presented to this point, because 
it implies that the political dummy variables in POLITICAL could not be considered 
exogenous. In this case, the models would yield inconsistent and biased estimates. 
Therefore, in this section, I consider the potential endogeneity of the political variables. 
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There is no simple argument to rule out the endogeneity concern; however, the 
importance should be limited for the following reasons. First, although certainly an 
important public task at the German Länder level, education is hardly the only issue in 
Länder election campaigns. Second, note that only lower secondary education is 
considered here, i.e. only a subset out of total public education at the Länder level. 
Third, the provision of an increased number of comprehensive schools is – in the vast 
majority of the cases – solely an offer to parents/students. Enrolment in comprehensive 
schools is voluntary; parents/students can also opt to enrol in a school of the traditional 
system.57 Fourth, from an econometric view, concerns that causality runs from the 
change in the share of students in comprehensive schools to the political couleur of the 
Länder government can be discarded in about 3/4 of the observations since Länder 
governments are only elected every fourth or fifth year.  
 
In summary, although we may consider the scope of the reverse causality concern to be 
limited, to some degree it remains a valid objection against the main results. Robustness 
checks against this concern are difficult. Below, I offer two possible empirical 
strategies: (1) The use of instrumental variables and (2) a re-specification of the 
econometric model based on a separation of exogenous from potentially endogenous 
variation in POLITICAL. 
 
The first strategy requires the choice of appropriate instruments, which are obviously 
difficult to find in this case. One may think of lagged values of the political dummy 
variables. However, in most cases, these lagged values embody the same endogeneity 
concern as the contemporaneous values (if the lagged values come from the same 
incumbency). In about 1/4 of the cases, the lagged values may have nothing to do with 
the following values (if the lagged values come from the preceding incumbency). Thus, 
lagged values are inadequate instruments.58 In fact, it is virtually impossible to find 
appropriate instruments for the political dummy variables in the within estimations. 
Finding appropriate instrumental variables is easier for the between-Länder estimations, 
i.e. the share of Catholics in the Länder is a reasonably suited instrument for the years in 
office of CDU governments. The share of Catholics (average share for 2000-2006) is 
correlated with CDU years in government by about 40%, which is, however, quite low 
                                                
57 This applies only to a limited degree to joint schools as far as these replace the traditional system. 
58 Notwithstanding, such an IV model is tested using the first and second lag of the political dummy 
variables as instruments for the contemporaneous values. The model is estimated using 2SLS. The results 
are virtually identical to the baseline results.  
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and thus may be subject to the problem of weak instruments (see e.g., Bauer, Fertig and 
Schmidt, 2009, 327). Table 4.16 presents the results for 2SLS between-estimations, 
using the share of Catholics as an instrument for CDU years in government. Model (1) 
is the IV counterpart of Equation (4.9) while Model (2) is the IV counterpart of 
Equation (4.10). 
 
Table 4.16 IV Between Länder estimation: Political parties’ influence on the share of 
students enroled in comprehensive schools (10 West German Länder) 
 (1) (2) 
 (StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL)2006 ∆2006-1979(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) 
ΣCDU, instrumented by 
%Catholics 
-0.033 -0.012 
 (0.077) (0.015) 
ΣFDP -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.015) (0.003)** 
ΣGreen Party -0.032 -0.014 
 (0.092) (0.018) 
Constant 0.749 0.337 
 (1.527) (0.298) 
Observations 10 10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * and + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% 
level. 
 
The results show that the significance level of the (instrumented) CDU variable falls 
below 10% while the sign remains unchanged. The magnitude of the CDU coefficient 
increases in column (1) but remains almost unchanged in column (2). However, the 
results are very difficult to interpret given the small sample of 10 observations and the 
problems associated with the cross-sectional data mentioned supra. Thus, the 
interpretation of this result should not be pushed to the limit.  
 
The second strategy is to think about the possible endogeneity of the political dummy 
variables as a mis-specification of the model. As argued above, the endogeneity concern 
may be ruled out in about 3/4 of the observations, simply because the political couleur 
of the Länder governments only changes every fourth or fifth year and thus, can only be 
influenced in election years. The dummy variables in the non-election years are clearly 
exogenous of the contemporaneous change in the share of students enroled in 
comprehensive schools. Thus, I re-specify the econometric model such that the 
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exogenous political variation is disentangled from the potentially endogenous dummy 
variables in election years. Equation (4.11) presents such a model: 
 
(4.11) 
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Essentially, Equation (4.11) is simply a variant of Equation (4.7) that additionally 
distinguishes between election (ELECT) and non-election years (NONELECT). ELECT 
takes the value of 1 in an election year, zero otherwise. NONELECT takes the value of 
1 in a non-election year, zero otherwise. These dummies are interacted with the vector 
of political dummy variables to separate exogenous from potentially endogenous 
political dummies.59 Social Democrats in non-election years are chosen as the reference 
group to avoid the dummy variable trap. POLITICAL is interacted with both dummies, 
ELECT and NONELECT to clearly separate the potentially endogenous political 
variables. Note that only the relevant political variables CDU, FDP and Green Party are 
interacted. The dummy Other consists of few observations. In addition, Other and 
COALSIZE are merely control variables. The remainder of the model is identical to the 
baseline models discussed in Section 4.4.3. 
 
                                                
59 Note that the separation between election and non-election years is not entirely selective due to the 
assignment of incumbencies to the contemporaneous year if the election is held in the first half of the year 
and to the following year if the election is held in the second half of the year. 
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Table 4.17 Separation of exogenous and potentially endogenous political variation: 
Political parties’ influence on the share of students enroled in comprehensive schools 
(10 West German Länder, 1979-2006) 
 (1) (2) 
 ∆(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) ∆(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) 
CDU  -0.002 
  (0.001)** 
FDP  -0.005 
  (0.003)+ 
Green Party  -0.008 
  (0.003)** 
ELECT  -0.002 
  (0.001)* 
CDU*NONELECT -0.003  
 (0.001)***  
FDP*NONELECT -0.006  
 (0.004)+  
Green Party*NONELECT -0.009  
 (0.004)**  
SPD*ELECT -0.002  
 (0.001)**  
CDU*ELECT -0.004 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.001) 
FDP*ELECT -0.005 0.002 
 (0.003)+ (0.001) 
Green Party*ELECT -0.007 0.001 
 (0.003)** (0.002) 
Other -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.004)* (0.004)+ 
COALSIZE 0.006 0.005 
 (0.004)+ (0.003)+ 
∆ ln (StTOTAL) 0.009 0.012 
 (0.053) (0.052) 
∆ ln (PR) -0.016 -0.017 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
∆ ln (PD) 0.058 0.053 
 (0.112) (0.113) 
∆ UR -0.058 -0.061 
 (0.131) (0.134) 
∆ o60 0.344 0.356 
 (0.510) (0.509) 
Länder FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 270 270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 0.33 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
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The results are reported in Table 4.17. Column (1) is the model discussed above while 
the model in column (2) is a more “classic” specification, which includes the original 
vector POLITICAL plus the ELECT dummy and interactions of ELECT with CDU, 
FDP and Green Party. For interpretation, Model (1) is more convenient because it 
allows interpreting all coefficients of the political dummies relative to SPD 
governments in non-election years. Moreover, Model (1) separates exogenous from 
potentially endogenous variation in a strict fashion whereas the coefficients from Model 
(2) are identified from both election and nonelection years. Model (2) only accounts for 
potentially differing results in election years and serves to confirm that the somewhat 
nonconformist specification of Model (1) yields basically identical results compared to 
a more traditional specification. 
 
The first finding is that the main results from the baseline model are supported. The 
coefficients estimated for the interactions of NONELECT with CDU, FDP and Green 
Party dummy (the exogenous variation in these dummies) strongly confirm the results 
from the baseline model. Relative to SPD Länder governments in non-election years, 
CDU and the Green Party reduce the share of students enroled in comprehensive 
schools. 
 
The coefficients estimated using the interactions of ELECT with the political dummy 
variables (the potentially endogenous variation) show that the CDU and the Green Party 
effects are quite robust. The magnitude of the coefficients increases somewhat for CDU 
and decreases about 25% for the Green Party. The significance level is comparable to 
the baseline model. Interestingly, the results in Table 4.17 suggest that Social 
Democrats pursue different educational policies in election and non-election years, 
namely in election years, the SPD pursues an educational policy similar to that of the 
CDU. This may indicate endogeneity problems with the SPD governments, which is, 
however, difficult to imagine given that CDU and Green Party dummies have quite 
robust effects. CDU, Green Party and Social Democrat success in Länder elections is of 
course not independent. But there is an alternative interpretation for this finding. Recall 
that the share of students in comprehensive schools is increases in the sample period. 
All of the results suggest that Social Democrats are the only proponent of 
comprehensive schooling. Social Democrats are therefore the only political party that 
has to act in order to change the structure of the education system. The CDU, FDP and 
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Green Party can maintain the status quo. Thus, it is indeed plausible that Social 
Democrats need time to initiate changes in educational policy while the CDU, FDP and 
the Green Party pursue more stable educational policies, because in many cases they do 
not have to modify the education system. Model (2) implies identical information. Here, 
educational policy by SPD governments in election years can be read from the 
coefficient of the ELECTION dummy. Note, too, that the results for the control 
variables are virtually identical to those obtained from the baseline model. Thus, in 
summary, both models do not support the endogeneity concerns for POLITICAL. 
However, they can of course not entirely sweep away these concerns. 
  
4.4.5 Summary 
The presented evidence supports the partisan hypotheses for the CDU and the Green 
Party and less so for FDP. The charts, correlation coefficients and the econometric 
evidence based on the within- or between variation of the data suggest that Social 
Democrats are the strongest proponent of some type of comprehensive education. Given 
the electoral manifestos of the CDU, it is not too surprising that this party opposes 
comprehensive education. It is, however, surprising that the Green Party obviously 
pursues a similar policy – inconsistent with their electoral manifestos, but consistent 
with the prediction from partisan theory. The results for government participation of the 
FDP are often not significantly different from zero, which is surprising given that FDP 
members and FDP constituency hold higher educational degrees on average than CDU 
members. Thus, overall, the evidence supports partisan theory, but other driving forces 
may also exist.  
 
Note that the results of this section are quite robust across various types of 
specifications and ways of exploiting the available information. Moreover, note that the 
baseline model controls for a considerable degree of unobservable heterogeneity. First, 
the coefficients are net of economy-wide shocks or shifts in education spending, such as 
may have occurred due to the publication of the PISA results. Second, the coefficients 
are net of Länder-specific, but time-invariant factors, which may influence the structure 
of the education system, such as Länder-specific preferences for a specific educational 
structure. Third, implicitly, as explained in Section 4.4.3, the baseline model also 
controls for Länder-specific trends (e.g., Länder-specific trends in preferences for public 
spending on education, etc.). 
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4.5 Empirical analysis II: political influence on resource allocation 
across tracks 
 
The second part of the empirical analysis provides empirical evidence about the 
question whether political parties distribute public resources across tracks along the 
lines predicted by partisan theory (see Table 4.2). Specifically: do the CDU, FDP and 
the Green Party advocate higher teacher/student-ratios in Gymnasium relative to overall 
teacher/student-ratios and relative to SPD over the 1981-2006 period in West Germany? 
 
4.5.1 Descriptive evidence 
4.5.1.1 Some charts 
As discussed in Section 4.3, the teacher/student-ratio is used as a resource proxy for 
education spending per student; specifically, to test the partisan hypotheses on resource 
allocation across tracks, the relative teacher/student-ratio in Gymnasium is considered, 
i.e. (T/StGYM)/(T/StTOTAL). Alternatively, the hypotheses can be tested for Hauptschulen 
and joint schooling. Figure 4.3 plots the 1981-2006 change in relative resource 
endowments, ∆2006-1981((T/StGYM)/(T/StTOTAL)) against the share of years that Social 
Democrats participate in Länder governments, i.e. ΣSPD/T = ΣSPD/26.  
 
Figure 4.3 The share of Länder government participation by SPD (X-axis) and the 
change in relative resource endowments in Gymnasium over the 1981-2006 period (Y-
axis). 
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Data source: Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers. 
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Each dot represents one West German Land. There is a weak negative correlation, i.e. 
Länder with longer SPD-histories tend to have decreased relative resource endowments 
in Gymnasium relative to the other Länder. This first descriptive evidence is thus in line 
with the predictions from partisan theory. As a matter of course, Figure 4.3 is based 
only on 10 observations. Figure 4.4 is based on annual changes in relative resource 
endowments in Gymnasium, ∆((T/StGYM)/(T/StTOTAL)), and not on the 1981-2006 
change, but has the same X-axis as Figure 4.3. Thus, the Länder appear in the same 
order as described above. Of course, we observe a similar weak negative correlation of 
the SPD share in Länder governments with changes in relative resource endowments in 
Gymnasium. In addition, the variance in the change of relative resource endowments in 
Gymnasium appears to increase towards the middle of the X-axis, which suggests that 
in the Länder where different political parties share the responsibility over the 26 years, 
there is a higher variance in relative resource endowments across tracks.  
 
Figure 4.4 The share of Länder government participation by SPD over the 1981-2006 
period (X-axis) and the annual change in relative resource endowments in Gymnasium 
(Y-axis). 
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Data source: Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers. 
 
Figure 4.5 takes a closer look at the latter evidence by plotting the frequency of 
government changes against the annual change in relative resource endowments in 
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Gymnasium. A government change is defined as a change in the leading party, i.e. a 
change in the political couleur of the Länder prime minister. The presented evidence 
suggests that the variance of the change in relative resource endowments is considerably 
higher in swing states, i.e. in the Länder with a higher frequency of changes in 
governments. 
 
Figure 4.5 The frequency of changes in the leading political party over the 1981-2006 
period (X-axis) and the annual change in relative resource endowments in Gymnasium 
(Y-axis) 
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Data source: Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers. 
 
4.5.1.2 Some correlations 
Table 4.18 reports simple correlations of the time in office of the political parties with 
relative resource endowments in Gymnasium, (T/StGYM)/(T/StTOTAL). SPD and FDP 
years in office are negatively associated with the relative resource endowments of 
Gymnasium while CDU’s and the Green Party’s times in office are positively correlated 
with relative teacher/student-ratios in Gymnasium. Thus, the correlations are in 
accordance with the hypotheses derived from partisan theory with the exception of FDP 
correlations. Note, however, that the correlation coefficients are considerably lower than 
those reported for the intensity of ability-tracking, and the significance level is below 
the 5% level for virtually all correlation coefficients (Section 4.4.1).  
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Table 4.18 Correlations of relative resource allocation in Gymnasium with political 
parties’ years in office (10 West German Länder, 1981-2006) 
 SPD CDU FDP Green Other 
(T/St)GYM/(T/St)TOTAL -0.082 0.015 -0.100 0.111 -0.205* 
∆((T/St)GYM/(T/St)TOTAL) -0.033 0.001 -0.070 0.085 -0.016 
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
4.5.2 Stationarity 
Similar to Section 4.4.2, stationarity of relative resource endowments in Gymnasium, 
Hauptschule and joint schools is checked to make sure that the regression coefficients 
are not spurious. The unit root tests are similar to those described in Section 4.4.2. 
Tables 4.19(a), 4.19(b) and 4.19(c) present the tests on the relative resource 
endowments in Gymnasium, Hauptschule and joint schools, respectively. The results 
suggest quite clearly that the sample of relative teacher/student-ratios in Gymnasium 
and Hauptschule contain a unit root and have to be considered non-stationary panels. 
This applies irrespective of whether the tests contain individual linear time trends 
(Statistic II) or not (Statistic I). The evidence for teacher/student-ratios in joint schools 
is less conclusive. In particular, if Länder-specific time trends are included (Table 4.19c, 
Statistic II), the tests assuming individual unit root processes suggest that the panel is 
stationary while the tests assuming a common unit root process indicate the presence of 
a unit root. 
 
As in Section 4.4.2 this result may not be entirely intuitive, however, one can argue that 
the sample period is a period in which enrolment in Gymnasium (Hauptschule) 
increases (decreases) relative to enrolment in other tracks. If the Länder do not adjust 
the resources accordingly, this will cause the tests to indicate non-stationarity. The tests 
which are run on first-differenced data quite clearly indicate that the differenced panels 
are stationary (see A.4.5.2). Given the result that relative resource endowments in 
Gymnasium and Hauptschule are nonstationary variables, the following econometric 
models are based on differenced data. 
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Table 4.19 Panel unit root tests (10 West German Länder, 1981-2006) 
(a) ((T/St)GYM/(T/St)TOTAL) 
Test Statistic I p-value Unit root? Statistic II p-value Unit root? 
Levin, Lin and Chu 0.025 0.510 yes 0.280 0.610 yes 
Breitung - -  2.742 0.997 yes 
Im, Pesaran and Shin -0.403 0.343 yes 0.938 0.826 yes 
ADF – Fisher 22.596 0.309 yes 16.609 0.678 yes 
PP – Fisher 17.808 0.600 yes 15.276 0.760 yes 
Hadri 6.612 0.000 yes 5.325 0.000 yes 
Note: Unit root/No unit root is based on p<0.05. Statistic I includes individual Länder effects; statistic II 
includes individual Länder effects and individual linear time trends. Tests (1) – (5) are based on the null 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. Test (6) is based on the null hypothesis of no unit root. Tests 
(1), (2) and (6) assume a common unit root process for all 10 Länder time series; tests (3) – (5) allow for 
the possibility of individual unit roots in the 10 Länder time series. Lag length is selected based on 
Schwarz Information Criterion. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
 
(b) ((T/St)HAUPT/(T/St)TOTAL) 
Test Statistic I p-value Unit root? Statistic II p-value Unit root? 
Levin, Lin and Chu 3.516 0.999 yes -0.177 0.430 yes 
Breitung - -  5.399 1.000 yes 
Im, Pesaran and Shin 4.343 1.000 yes 1.594 0.945 yes 
ADF – Fisher 11.435 0.934 yes 27.689 0.117 yes 
PP – Fisher 5.819 0.999 yes 13.585 0.851 yes 
Hadri 8.738 0.000 yes 5.852 0.000 yes 
Note: Unit root/No unit root is based on p<0.05. Statistic I includes individual Länder effects; statistic II 
includes individual Länder effects and individual linear time trends. Tests (1) – (5) are based on the null 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. Test (6) is based on the null hypothesis of no unit root. Tests 
(1), (2) and (6) assume a common unit root process for all 10 Länder time series; tests (3) – (5) allow for 
the possibility of individual unit roots in the 10 Länder time series. Lag length is selected based on 
Schwarz Information Criterion. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
 
(c) ((T/St)JOINT/(T/St)TOTAL) 
Test Statistic I p-value Unit root? Statistic II p-value Unit root? 
Levin, Lin and Chu -1.778 0.038 no -0.869 0.193 yes 
Breitung - -  -0.472 0.319 yes 
Im, Pesaran and Shin -1.476 0.070 yes -2.610 0.005 no 
ADF – Fisher 34.104 0.025 no 38.808 0.007 no 
PP – Fisher 33.665 0.029 no 30.478 0.063 no 
Hadri 6.769 0.000 yes 4.779 0.000 yes 
Note: Unit root/No unit root is based on p<0.05. Statistic I includes individual Länder effects; statistic II 
includes individual Länder effects and individual linear time trends. Tests (1) – (5) are based on the null 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. Test (6) is based on the null hypothesis of no unit root. Tests 
(1), (2) and (6) assume a common unit root process for all 10 Länder time series; tests (3) – (5) allow for 
the possibility of individual unit roots in the 10 Länder time series. Lag length is selected based on 
Schwarz Information Criterion. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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4.5.3 Baseline model 
We want to provide to provide econometric evidence about whether political parties 
when in office engage in concentrating public resources on the ability track/tracks, in 
which their constituencies’ offspring is overrepresented. The corresponding 
econometric approach is quite similar to Section 4.4.3 (where a detailed discussion of 
the mode can be found). The main difference is in the endogenous variable, which here 
is the first difference of the teacher/student-ratio in a specific track relative to the 
teacher/student-ratio in all lower secondary education. For example, the hypothesis on 
relative resource endowments in Gymnasium is tested using the following: 
 
(4.12) i it
GYM
it
it tTOTAL
it
(T / St) POLITICAL v
(T / St)
⎡ ⎤ ′∆ = β+ η + θ +⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
 
 
Similar regressions are run for relative resource endowments in Hauptschule and joint 
schools. The set of exogenous variables is identical with Section 4.4.3. Specifically, the 
vector POLITICAL is the same vector of political party dummy variables described in 
Section 4.4.3. Again, Länder-effects ηi are included. Here, these effects control for 
Länder-specific spending preferences or Länder-specific administration of public 
schools, which can be assumed to stay constant over time. As in the econometric model 
in Section 4.4.3, these effects are most likely correlated with the political preferences in 
the Länder, POLITICAL. The ηi are therefore treated as fixed. Note that the Länder 
fixed effects do not become redundant by the first-differencing of the endogenous 
variable, because the vector POLITICAL is not differenced. Fixed year effects θt 
control for economy-wide shocks in education spending. Thus, the coefficients are 
identified from the variation within Länder that is not explained by country-wide 
shocks. As in Section 4.4.3, standard errors are estimated robust in the presence of serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity (Newey and West, 1987). 
 
The results are presented in Table 4.20. Column (1) reports the results for Gymnasium, 
Column (2) for Hauptschule and Column (3) for joint schools. Note that all coefficients 
show the predicted signs: relative to SPD governments, Länder governments under 
participation of the CDU, FDP or the Green Party spend more public resources on 
Gymnasium and less on Hauptschule and joint schools. However, only some 
coefficients are significantly different from zero: The Green Party spends significantly 
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more (less) resources than the Social Democrats on Gymnasium (joint schools) while 
the CDU spends significantly less on Hauptschulen, which is in line with the partisan 
hypotheses. The explanatory power of the regressions is considerably lower than in 
Section 4.4.3 (see R2), suggesting that the resource channel is obviously less important 
for political influence than the influence working through the design of the education 
system itself. 
 
Table 4.20 Political parties’ influence on resource allocation across tracks (10 West 
German Länder, 1981-2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆(TStGYM/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStHAUPT/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStJOINT/TStTOTAL) 
CDU 0.006 -0.013 -0.010 
 (0.004)+ (0.007)* (0.007) 
FDP 0.005 -0.007 -0.017 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) 
Green Party 0.019 -0.011 -0.033 
 (0.007)*** (0.012) (0.014)** 
Other 0.011 0.016 -0.047 
 (0.008)+ (0.013) (0.020)** 
COALSIZE -0.009 0.016 0.026 
 (0.007)+ (0.009) (0.013)** 
Länder FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.05 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
As in Section 4.4.3, the model is augmented with a standard demand model for public 
education: 
 
(4.13) i it
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Specifically, Equation (4.13) incorporates ∆Xit, the vector of control variables, which is 
defined similarly as in Section 4.4.3 and which contains ∆ ln(PR), ∆ ln(PD), ∆UR, and 
∆o60. Moreover, it incorporates a measure of the relative student demand for a specific 
track of education. For example, in the case of relative resource endowments in 
Gymnasium, the change in the number of students in Gymnasium relative to the number 
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of students in lower secondary education is included, ∆(StGYM/StTOTAL). Table 4.21 
presents the results. As in Table 4.20, the models in Columns (1), (2) and (3) differ in 
the endogenous variables and in the corresponding exogenous student variable. 
 
Table 4.21 Political parties’ influence on resource allocation across tracks including 
control variables (10 West German Länder, 1981-2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆(TStGYM/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStHAUPT/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStJOINT/TStTOTAL) 
CDU 0.007 -0.011 -0.019 
 (0.004)* (0.008)+ (0.006)*** 
FDP 0.003 -0.009 -0.021 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)* 
Green Party 0.016 -0.011 -0.037 
 (0.007)** (0.012) (0.012)*** 
Other 0.007 0.017 -0.045 
 (0.009) (0.012)+ (0.018)** 
COALSIZE -0.007 0.017 0.025 
 (0.007) (0.010)* (0.011)** 
∆(StGYM/StTOTAL) -0.440   
 (0.087)***   
∆(StHAUPT/StTOTAL)  -0.330  
  (0.375)  
∆(StJOINT/StTOTAL)   -0.889 
   (0.055)*** 
∆ ln (PR) 0.006 0.066 -0.021 
 (0.030) (0.058) (0.047) 
∆ ln (PD) 0.413 0.610 -0.635 
 (0.419) (0.417)+ (0.656) 
∆ UR 0.349 -0.405 0.334 
 (0.267)+ (0.612) (0.542) 
∆ o60 2.084 -1.827 -2.424 
 (1.854) (2.963) (2.834) 
Länder FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.11 0.07 0.29 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
Compared to the model without control variables (Table 4.20), all coefficients keep the 
signs, in line with the partisan hypotheses. The results suggest that Länder governments 
under participation of the CDU, FDP or the Green Party increase the growth of the 
121 
teacher/student-ratio in Gymnasium relative to other tracks (Column 1) and relative to 
SPD governments. As predicted, these parties relative to SPD also decrease the growth 
of relative teacher/student-ratios in Hauptschule or joint schools (Columns 2 and 3). The 
introduction of the control variables changes the significance level of some coefficients. 
Table 4.21 suggests that relative to SPD, Länder governments under participation of the 
CDU and the Green Party significantly decrease relative resource use in joint schools 
(significant at 1% for both political parties) while they increase relative resource 
endowments in Gymnasium (significant at 10% for the CDU and at 5% for the Green 
Party). FDP participation in Länder governments appears to have only a significant 
effect for relative resource endowments in joint schools. 
 
The magnitude of the parties’ effect on the growth of relative resource endowments 
across tracks is considerable. For example, according to the baseline model with control 
variables, a shift of government from SPD to CDU increases the growth of 
teacher/student-ratios in Gymnasium relative to overall teacher/student-ratios by 0.7%, 
which is about 1/3 standard deviation. Evaluated at the sample mean, this implies a 
change from -0.3% to +0.4% in the growth of relative teacher/student-ratios in 
Gymnasium. The effect is even stronger for joint schools. Here, the shift of government 
from SPD to CDU involves a 1.9% decrease from average -0.3% to -2.2% in the growth 
rate of relative teacher/student-ratios in joint schools, which is equivalent to about a half 
standard deviation. The effects estimated for the Green Party are more pronounced than 
for the CDU. Taken literally, the coefficients suggest that relative to SPD the Green 
Party decreases (increases) relative resource use in joint schools (Gymnasium) by -3.7% 
(+1.6%), or about one standard deviation, respectively. In the case of joint schools, this 
implies that the Green Party decreases relative teacher/student-ratios from an average -
0.3% to about -4% in one year, which appears unrealistically high. However, recall that 
the coefficients have to be interpreted ceteris paribus: in real policy outcomes, coalitions 
of SPD-Green and SPD-CDU involve important moderating forces. The estimation 
results also suggest that the frequent coalition constellation CDU-FDP has a strong 
negative impact on the change in relative resource endowments in joint schools, which 
will be checked in the next section. 
 
Regarding the control variables, the coefficients estimated for student demand (ranging 
from -0.3 to -0.9) in Columns (1) to (3) fit into estimates by previous studies (see the 
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literature survey in Section 3.2.1). The estimated coefficients suggest that there is some 
sluggishness in the adjustment of resources in a specific track in response to changing 
student numbers. Larger student cohorts suffer from lower teacher/student-ratios, at 
least in the short run. The coefficient estimated for the relative number of students is 
highly significant in Column (3): -0.9, which suggests that rising student numbers in 
joint schools (Schulen mit mehreren Bildungsgängen, Gesamtschulen and 
Orientierungsstufe) have not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in total 
resources. In Gymnasium, the number of teachers has been increased in response to 
rising enrolment to a higher degree (elasticity of about -0.5). In Hauptschule, the 
downward trend in relative enrolment has been accompanied by the most pronounced 
resource adjustment (-0.3 in the point estimate), which is not significantly different 
from zero. As in Section 4.4.3, the remaining control variables have virtually no 
influence on the allocation of resources across tracks. 
 
4.5.4 Robustness checks 
4.5.4.1 Endogenous student demand 
An immediate concern with the regressions shown in Table 4.21 is that the number of 
students in an educational track may well be determined by the resource endowments in 
this track and has therefore to be considered as a potentially endogenous regressor. 
Since an appropriate instrument is hard to find and since the number of students is not 
the key exogenous variable in this study, Table 4.20 may already be considered as a first 
check that the exclusion of the number of students leaves the key results (i.e. 
POLITICAL) unchanged. The goal of this short section is to provide another robustness 
check, which is given in Table 4.22. Here, the control variables (vector ∆Xit) are 
included in the regression but relative enrolment in the tracks has been suppressed.  
 
The exclusion of the relative student variable leaves the signs of all coefficients 
unchanged. However, whereas the significance level of the coefficients estimated for 
the Green Party are unchanged, the significance of the coefficients estimated for CDU 
in the regression of Gymnasium and joint schools drops below the 10% level (those 
effects are significant in Table 4.22 at about 12%, respectively). The reason for the 
declining significance levels are smaller point estimates. Thus, this robustness check 
may indicate that the true effects are somewhat smaller than suggested by the baseline 
model; i.e. the effect of CDU on the share of students enroled in joint schools is 1.1% in 
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Table 4.22 and not -1.9%. For the case of Hauptschule, the effect estimated for CDU 
turns significant at about 6% in Table 4.22. 
 
Table 4.22 Political parties’ influence on resource allocation across tracks absent 
student cohort size (10 West German Länder, 1981-2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆(TStGYM/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStHAUPT/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStJOINT/TStTOTAL) 
CDU 0.006 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.004)+ (0.007)* (0.007)+ 
FDP 0.006 -0.011 -0.019 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.013)+ 
Green Party 0.021 -0.015 -0.035 
 (0.007)*** (0.011)+ (0.013)*** 
Other 0.009 0.015 -0.048 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.020)** 
COALSIZE -0.011 0.019 0.029 
 (0.006)* (0.009)** (0.013)** 
∆ ln (PR) 0.006 0.074 -0.021 
 (0.030) (0.058) (0.061) 
∆ ln (PD) 0.342 0.657 -0.505 
 (0.413) (0.419)+ (0.685) 
∆ UR 0.231 -0.475 0.874 
 (0.260) (0.615) (0.789) 
∆ o60 2.314 -1.202 -3.639 
 (1.844) (3.008) (2.981) 
Länder FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.06 0.07 0.05 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
4.5.4.2 An alternative measure for POLITICAL: the coalition pattern 
Here, we want to test whether the main results hold if an alternative definition of 
POLITICAL is used (as in Section 4.4.4.2), i.e. each coalition combination is modelled 
using a separate dummy variable. Table 4.23 presents the results. Based on the evidence 
in the previous section, the student control variable has been suppressed.60 The results 
support some of the findings from the baseline model. First, the alternative definition of 
POLITICAL confirms that single-party CDU governments spend significantly more 
                                                
60 When the student variable is included, similar results are obtained (see A.4.5.4.2). 
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(less) public resources per student on Gymnasium (joint schools) than SPD 
governments. Moreover, although Table 4.23 does not include the student variable, the 
magnitude of the coefficients is similar to the baseline model, confirming the original 
effects from Table 4.21.61 Second, Table 4.23 suggests that the Green Party exerts the 
predicted influence on relative resource endowments in Gymnasium. Green Party 
coalitions with SPD and with SPD-FDP spend significantly more resources on the 
highest track. Partisan influence of the Green Party seems, however, somewhat 
restricted to the Gymnasium; Green Party coalitions do not seem to spend significantly 
less resources on joint schools or Hauptschulen. This may be one channel through 
which the moderation of coalition governments works. A second channel is the 
magnitude of the partisan effect. SPD-Green Party coalitions spend significantly more 
resources per student on Gymnasium, but this effect amounts only to about 50% of the 
coefficient estimated for the Green Party in the baseline model. Third, as suggested by 
the baseline model, coalitions with the participation of the FDP pursue an educational 
policy that is often not significantly different from SPD governments. Specifically, 
SPD-FDP coalitions and also CDU-FDP coalitions do not seem to pursue the predicted 
partisan policy. The FDP appears to spend significantly more resources on Gymnasium 
only within the SPD-FDP-Green Party-coalition. Fourth, two coalitions in Hamburg, 
the SPD-Statt (see SPD-Other in Table 4.23) and the CDU-FDP-Schill-Partei (see 
CDU-FDP-Other in Table 4.23) seem to allocate comparatively many teachers per 
student to Hauptschulen. 
 
 
                                                
61 Those magnitudes are also reproduced when the student variable is included (see A.4.5.4.2). 
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Table 4.23 Political parties’ influence on resource allocation across tracks, Coalition 
patterns (10 West German Länder, 1981-2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆(TStGYM/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStHAUPT/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStJOINT/TStTOTAL) 
SPD-FDP 0.001 0.009 -0.013 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) 
SPD-Green Party 0.008 0.008 -0.011 
 (0.004)* (0.010) (0.007)+ 
SPD-FDP-Green P. 0.021 -0.026 0.019 
 (0.010)** (0.017)+ (0.016) 
SPD-Other 0.002 0.025 -0.015 
 (0.007) (0.010)** (0.020) 
CDU 0.010 -0.014 -0.021 
 (0.005)** (0.010)+ (0.008)*** 
CDU-FDP -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
CDU-FDP-Other -0.004 0.046 -0.044 
 (0.009) (0.016)*** (0.012)*** 
Grand Coalition -0.003 0.002 0.019 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)+ 
∆ ln (PR) -0.001 0.087 -0.022 
 (0.033) (0.058)+ (0.061) 
∆ ln (PD) 0.426 0.409 -0.300 
 (0.407) (0.437) (0.627) 
∆ UR 0.231 -0.497 0.918 
 (0.261) (0.618) (0.786) 
∆ o60 3.060 -1.424 -5.795 
 (1.913)+ (3.261) (3.202)* 
Länder FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.05 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
Generally, the results of the different models are quite stable compared to the baseline 
model. Table 4.23 confirms that there is virtually no effect from the control variables 
(PR, UR, PD) on relative resource use in the ability-tracks. Also the variable capturing 
relative student demand yields similar coefficients as the baseline model (see A.4.5.4.2). 
The differenced share of the elderly population, ∆o60, shows a larger negative 
coefficient in the model estimated for joint schools compared to the baseline model, 
which results in a significant effect. However, the elderly share may capture some of the 
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variation in the (omitted) student variable because this effect disappears when the 
student variable is included (see A.4.5.4.2). 
 
4.5.4.3 Another measure for POLITICAL: the Länder education ministers 
As in Section 4.4.4.3, an alternative definition of POLITICAL, which relies on the party 
membership of the education minister, is tested in this section. For the rest, the models 
are identical to the baseline model, but suppress the relative student variable for the 
reasons discussed in Section 4.5.4.1.62 The results reported in Table 4.24 confirm the 
findings from the baseline model with respect to the differences between SPD and 
CDU; in particular, the results suggest that CDU education ministers spend significantly 
less resources per student on Hauptschulen. The coefficients for relative resource use in 
Gymnasium and joint schools also accord with the baseline model but are not 
significantly different from zero.  
 
Table 4.24 Effect of education ministers’ party affiliation on resource allocation across 
tracks (10 West German Länder, 1981-2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆(TStGYM/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStHAUPT/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStJOINT/TStTOTAL) 
Education 
Minister CDU 
0.003 -0.013 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.008)* (0.008) 
Education 
Minister FDP 
-0.007 0.036 -0.037 
 (0.008) (0.013)*** (0.011)*** 
∆ ln (PR) 0.017 0.070 -0.043 
 (0.027) (0.056) (0.058) 
∆ ln (PD) 0.415 0.551 -0.359 
 (0.416) (0.402)+ (0.699) 
∆ UR 0.234 -0.420 0.820 
 (0.262) (0.619) (0.800) 
∆ o60 1.898 -0.346 -1.870 
 (1.809) (2.789) (2.860) 
Länder FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.03 0.07 0.04 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
                                                
62 The model including the student variable is reported in A.4.5.4.3. 
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The education minister is an FDP member only in a single case (Hamburg, October 
2001 through April 2004), which coincides with the CDU-FDP-Other coalition in 
Hamburg. Thus, it is difficult to identify the source of the educational policy (FDP 
education minister or CDU-FDP-Other). The FDP education minister in the CDU-FDP-
Other coalition apparently distributes resources in accordance with the partisan 
predictions for CDU and FDP only with respect to joint schooling. The effect estimated 
for relative resource use in Hauptschule is highly significant and positive whereas 
partisan theory would predict a negative coefficient. The coefficient estimated for 
relative resource endowments in Gymnasium is – against the prediction from partisan 
theory – negative, but not significantly different from zero. However, after all, the 
findings for the FDP education minister in Table 4.24 rely on a single realisation. Note 
that the explanatory power of the regressions presented in Table 4.24 is somewhat lower 
than in the models from the previous sections. In particular, the Green Party dummy 
seems to be an important explanatory variable which is missing here.  
 
4.5.4.4 Reverse causality: from resource allocation to election outcomes? 
Similar to Section 4.4.4.6, an important objection against a causal interpretation of the 
coefficients presented to this point is that there may be reverse causality such that 
election outcomes are determined by relative resource endowments in lower secondary 
education. Thus, we discuss these concerns and provide some robustness checks.  
 
One may consider the scope of the reverse causality concern to be limited here as well 
(see Section 4.4.4.6), i.e. public education is not the only issue in Länder election 
campaigns and only lower secondary education is considered here. Moreover, note that 
the endogenous variable is relative resource endowments in Gymnasium, Hauptschule 
or joint schools, i.e. a somewhat artificial variable, which is generally not discussed in 
election campaigns. It is also true that an endogeneity concern of relative resource 
endowments on contemporaneous election outcomes can only apply to election years 
such that the strategy of disentangling exogenous from potentially endogenous variation 
in POLITICAL seems a valid approach here as well. The econometric model is 
therefore re-specified in the spirit of equation (4.11): 
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Equation (4.14) is a variant of Equation (4.13), which distinguishes between 
POLITICAL in election years (ELECT, potentially endogenous) and non-election years 
(NONELECT, considered as exogenous). See Sections 4.4.4.6 and 4.5.3 for more 
detailed discussions of the other features of the model. Table 4.25 presents the results. 
The potentially endogenous student variable is again suppressed (the results including 
the student variables are provided in A.4.5.4.4). All coefficients of the interactions of 
POLITICAL with ELECT and NONELECT must be interpreted relative to SPD in 
nonelection years. Columns (1) to (3) in Table 4.25 confirm most findings from the 
baseline model. The effects estimated for the CDU and the Green Party in non-election 
years (interpreted as exogenous variation in POLITICAL) suggest that Länder 
governments under participation of the CDU and the Green Party support higher 
resource use in Gymnasium relative to SPD in non-election years. The magnitude of the 
CDU*NONELECT and Green Party*NONELECT interactions are very close to what 
the baseline model suggests. Green Party and FDP government participations appear to 
decrease relative resource endowments per student in joint schools; again the 
magnitudes of the coefficients are very similar to the baseline model.  
 
The interactions of POLITICAL with the potentially endogenous election years suggest 
that the depressing effect of CDU governments on resource endowments in joint 
schools may indeed be subject to reverse causality, because this effect only shows up in 
election years (CDU*ELECT). The interactions between Green Party and election years 
show similar estimates compared to the interactions with non-election years. In 
summary, the interactions of POLITICAL with the potentially endogenous variation in 
election years show some differences compared to the estimates that are based on non-
election years. Thus, there may be some reverse causality in election years, especially in 
the effect of the CDU on joint schools. However, the interactions of POLITICAL with 
the (exogenous) non-election years confirm the robustness of the baseline results (see 
the limitations in footnote 59). 
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Table 4.25 Separation of exogenous and potentially endogenous political variation: 
Political parties’ influence on resource allocations across tracks (10 West German 
Länder, 1981-2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆(TStGYM/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStHAUPT/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStJOINT/TStTOTAL) 
CDU*NONELECT 0.008 -0.013 -0.010 
 (0.004)** (0.008)+ (0.007)+ 
FDP*NONELECT 0.010 -0.012 -0.028 
 (0.006)+ (0.011) (0.013)** 
Green P.*NONELECT 0.020 -0.014 -0.038 
 (0.007)*** (0.013) (0.014)*** 
SPD*ELECT 0.003 0.000 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) 
CDU*ELECT 0.002 -0.012 -0.019 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)* 
FDP*ELECT -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) 
Green P.*ELECT 0.019 -0.014 -0.029 
 (0.008)** (0.012) (0.016)* 
Other 0.008 0.016 -0.050 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.021)** 
COALSIZE -0.012 0.018 0.031 
 (0.006)* (0.010)* (0.012)** 
∆ ln (PR) 0.011 0.072 -0.017 
 (0.032) (0.058) (0.062) 
∆ ln (PD) 0.431 0.593 -0.715 
 (0.424) (0.452)+ (0.739) 
∆ UR 0.203 -0.479 0.824 
 (0.259) (0.617) (0.796) 
∆ o60 2.516 -1.317 -4.112 
 (1.898)+ (3.077) (3.075)+ 
Länder FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.05 0.05 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
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4.5.5 Summary 
The data provides some support for the partisan hypotheses described in Section 4.2.2.2. 
It is a notable result that the signs of the coefficients estimated for the CDU, FDP and 
the Green Party are in accordance with what partisan theory predicts in virtually every 
model that has been estimated. The significance levels of the coefficients are, however, 
somewhat mixed: FDP government participation seems to have only very limited 
partisan effects on resource allocation across tracks. In particular, there is only evidence 
for a significant negative effect on the growth of relative resources per student in joint 
schools. In contrast, there is rather robust evidence suggesting that CDU governments 
increase relative resource endowments in Gymnasium and decrease relative resource 
endowments in Hauptschulen. Government participation by the Green Party is found to 
have significant and positive (negative) effects on the change of relative resources per 
students in Gymnasium (joint schools). 
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4.6. Conclusions 
 
Ability-tracking is practised throughout the world in varying intensities. The traditional 
(West) German education system is widely considered to practise comparatively early 
tracking. Generally, students are grouped according to their ability from the age of 10. 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that ability-tracking increases educational inequality 
and – at least some researchers make this point – tracking may also reduce the 
efficiency of the education system. It is therefore reasonable to explain the practise of 
ability-tracking with distributional conflicts; in particular, this chapter suggests partisan 
theory as a political-economic rationale for systems of ability tracking. The partisan 
hypotheses rely on the observation that in Germany, students’ track choices are highly 
correlated with students’ parental background in terms of income, education or social 
status. Thus, political parties representing high-education households may advocate 
spending on the higher tracks while politicians representing low-education households 
may support higher spending on the low-ability tracks.  Testable hypotheses are derived 
for German political parties’ educational policy.   
 
Panel data for 10 West German Länder over the 1979-2006 period suggest that German 
political parties directly influence the education systems along the lines that partisan 
theory predicts. Social Democrats support comprehensive schools whereas the CDU and 
the Green Party oppose comprehensive schooling. While the effect estimated for the 
CDU is not surprising, the effects estimated for the Green Party contradict their 
electoral manifestos, yet are consistent with partisan theory. The effects estimated for 
FDP are often not significantly different from zero, which contradicts the partisan 
hypotheses. When in office the political parties also distribute public resources across 
tracks in accordance with the predictions from partisan theory. The estimated 
coefficients suggest that the effects from the political parties are virtually always in the 
direction predicted by partisan theory, although the estimated confidence intervals are 
somewhat large in some specifications; in particular the results are more robust for the 
CDU and the Green Party than for the FDP. 
 
The concern that there is reverse causality from education policy to election outcomes is 
valid. Some evidence from a separation of the variation between election and non-
election years, however, suggests that the main results are robust even if the coefficients 
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are only identified from non-election years. In non-election years, the political dummies 
are exogenous from any change in contemporaneous educational policy by definition. It 
is true that the political dummy variables may still depend on lags of relative resource 
endowments and that the selection between election and non-election years is not 
entirely selective. However, the robustness analysis does not provide too much support 
for this endogeneity concern since – as stated above – the main conclusions are virtually 
unchanged when the political variation is separated into election and non-election years. 
Note, moreover, that this concern is directed towards an entire literature, which does not 
address such objections. The econometric model estimated in this chapter may be 
considered less vulnerable to endogeneity concerns than comparable approaches that 
consider partisan effects on inflation, unemployment rates or on (total) public budgets.  
 
After all, to some extent, the results may explain the high persistence of the German 
system of ability-tracking. The implementation of comprehensive schooling at large 
scale would imply important redistributions of the benefits from public education and 
therefore faces resistance from a rather broad alliance of socioeconomic groups ranging 
from the middle class to the elites. An open question is to which point the empirical 
analysis can provide support to partisan theory. The findings show that we cannot easily 
reject partisan theory in the German system of public education. As a matter of course, 
the results may also accord with other theoretical explanations. For example, the simple 
ideological differences between the CDU and SPD may have little or nothing to do with 
partisan theory. The results for the Green Party do, however, suggest that there is no 
easy explanation along ideological differences. Partisan theory can explain the finding 
for the Green Party. However, the results for the FDP suggest that partisan theory may 
not be the only driving force. Given the structure of FDP party members and electoral 
constituencies, the party’s educational policy should be as partisan as the educational 
policy of the Green Party. 
 
From a welfare view, the cyclical changes in the education system and in education 
spending across tracks that are associated with the partisan effects may well reduce 
economic efficiency. In Bremen, the CDU and SPD agreed not to alter the education 
system (i.e. the number of tracks, etc.) for ten years beginning in 2008. Potentially we 
can interpret this as a piece of anecdotal evidence that frequent changes in the education 
institutions are indeed perceived as a problem. 
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In principle, similar distributional conflicts can exist elsewhere. In some ways partisan 
cycles may even be more accentuated in nations with majoritarian political systems. 
However, education systems in the U.S. or elsewhere in Europe are significantly 
different from Germany in several aspects. For example, where educational finance is 
local and tracking is less prevalent, the distributional conflicts highlighted in this 
chapter may be virtually nonexistent. The distributional conflicts, however, may arise 
along other dimensions. For example, partisan politics may focus on the allocation of 
public resources across different levels of public education. Conflicts may then evolve 
along the lines sketched by Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) where a partially public 
education system involves redistributions from low-income individuals to wealthier 
individuals. Alternatively, conflicts may arise along the spatial distribution of education 
resources, which is particularly relevant to the U.S. (see e.g., Murray, Evans and 
Schwab, 1998). 
 
134 
5 HIGHER EDUCATION: DETERMINANTS OF GERMAN 
UNIVERSITIES’ COST EFFICIENCY63  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The efficiency of public resource use in higher education receives increasing attention, 
because the creation of human capital is commonly considered to be a key driver of 
economic growth. Given that the public sector largely finances higher education in 
OECD countries (see Chapter 2), today’s tight public budgets contribute to the pressure 
to spend existing financial means efficiently. Therefore, it is useful to identify the 
environments that contribute to an efficient use of resources. 
 
This chapter focuses on two major factors that may have an effect on the efficiency of 
spending in public universities: the institutional framework in which universities 
operate and their regional economic and innovative environments. Evidence reported by 
Aghion et al. (2008) suggests that university research performance and university 
efficiency are positively related to the degree of autonomy in the U.S. states. I will look 
at whether German universities operating in Länder with comparatively liberal legal 
frameworks are more cost efficient than universities operating under restrictive legal 
settings. The regional economic and innovative environment of universities may be of 
importance, too, as suggested by Chaves and Moro (2007). Universities in regions with 
a significant share of knowledge-intensive production/services may more easily attract 
private research funding, or conduct productivity-enhancing co-operation with private 
research units. Thus, the second half of this chapter analyses whether private research 
activities or a prosperous regional economic environment translates into lower public 
costs for higher education.   
 
Section 5.2 reviews the extant studies that analyse the determinants of university 
efficiency. Hypotheses are derived for the link between institutional settings and 
university efficiency and for the relationship between the regional economic 
environment of universities and university costs. Section 5.3 reports summary statistics 
                                                
63 The analysis concerning the link between university efficiency and Länder university regulation 
(Hypothesis 1 in Section 5.2 as well as Section 5.4.1) is an extension of Kempkes and Pohl (2008) that 
additionally controls for universities’ history. 
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while Section 5.4 describes the econometric models and discusses the results. Evidence 
from a sample of 67 German universities over the 1998-2003 period supports the result 
by Aghion et al. (2008) for the German Länder, suggesting that liberal university 
regulation indeed contributes to more efficient use of resources. Furthermore, evidence 
from 70 German universities over the 1998-2003 period indicates that high regional 
GDP per capita reduces university costs. Costs in public universities are also negatively 
correlated with regional patenting activity, but reverse causality cannot be ruled out. 
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5.2 Background: literature review and hypotheses on the determinants 
of university cost efficiency 
 
The majority of studies analysing university efficiency focus on the measurement of 
cost efficiency across universities. Recently, however, the literature has begun to 
investigate the factors contributing to efficient resource use. The following literature 
review discusses such studies. 
 
Worthington (2001) provides an overview of early studies investigating the 
determinants of university efficiency. Not surprisingly, parental socioeconomic 
background of a university’s student body is found to have a large effect on educational 
outcomes and on university efficiency. For example, students with highly educated 
parents may complete their degrees more rapidly. The share of foreign students does not 
seem to have an effect on university efficiency in English and Welsh universities 
(Stevens, 2005), but Doucouliagos and Abbott (2007) do find a positive effect on 
university cost efficiency for Australian universities. They interpret this finding as an 
effect from strong competition for overseas students among Australian universities 
(foreign students pay comparatively high fees).64 
 
Stevens (2005), who analyses the effects from characteristics of university staff on 
efficiency, finds that the proportion that is non-white, research-active or with 
professorial (or advanced lecturer) status exerts a positive effect on university 
efficiency. Conversely, Doucouliagos and Abbott (2007) present evidence for 
Australian universities which suggests that a higher proportion of senior academic staff 
has a negative effect on university efficiency. Their analysis also shows a positive effect 
on efficiency when a higher share of senior administrative staff is employed. 
 
These results should be interpreted with caution, because there may be reverse causality. 
Take, for example, the share of academic staff that is research active. It would appear 
reasonable to assume that there is a positive effect on efficiency, because more 
publications directly increase university outputs, thereby improving efficiency (given 
                                                
64 This result does not easily generalise to the German higher education system because a differentiation 
of fees according to student nationality is not in effect and is not publicly discussed. However, there may 
be an effect via student exchange programs. Universities could be interested in attracting foreign students, 
given that more of their own students in turn are admitted to foreign universities. 
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that research-active staff may be paid similar wages, or that some of the literature 
measures university inputs by the number of employees without considering wages). On 
the other hand, more efficient universities may simply choose to employ a higher share 
of research-active staff, or – alternatively – efficient universities may be more attractive 
for research-active staff. Thus, one may prefer interpreting these results in terms of 
correlations. 
 
With respect to institutional settings, Aghion et al. (2007 and 2008) and Aghion (2007) 
report evidence on the link between university autonomy and the efficiency of spending. 
To capture university autonomy, they construct an index containing information on 
whether universities can set their own wages and tuition fees, receive lump-sum 
transfers (contrary to line-item budgeting) and hire their staff autonomously, etc. (see 
Aghion et al., 2007, 7, Box 2). They find for the U.S. state level that university 
autonomy is associated with better research performance and more efficient use of 
funds. Based on these findings, the authors recommend increasing the level of 
university autonomy in Europe (e.g., develop strategic profiles, select students, 
determine fee levels, hire staff, determine wages, etc.). Compared to U.S. universities 
and other European countries, German universities are found to have virtually no wage-
setting and budget autonomy, whereas hiring autonomy is quite high (as of 2008, see 
Aghion et al., 2008, 36; see also footnote 65).   
 
German universities operate within a common institutional framework set by the federal 
government (Framework Act for Higher Education, “Hochschulrahmengesetz”). 
However, higher education is a major responsibility of the German Länder which can 
set the universities’ legal framework in detail. In particular, the federal government 
passed the Framework Act’s fourth amendment in 1998, which gives the German 
Länder more freedom to deregulate university legislation (Stifterverband für die 
Deutsche Wissenschaft, 2002).65 
                                                
65 There have been more reforms of the Framework Act for Higher Education following the fourth 
amendment. In particular, an assistant professor status (“Juniorprofessor”) was introduced in 2002 but 
declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court. In connection with the German Federalism 
Reform (Committee on the Modernisation of Federation-Länder Financial Relations) university 
regulation continues to be on the reform agenda. From 2007, issues concerning public services law are an 
exclusive competency of the German Länder. Moreover, the German Bundestag is currently planning to 
abolish federal framework legislation (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007 and Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research, 2008). 
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Thus, in my sample period (1998-2003), Länder governments already have the right to 
determine a number of issues, such as the allocation of university funds (if universities 
are allowed to carry over year-end balances, whether they receive lump-sum vs. line-
item budgets, and the like), hiring autonomy (whether universities must consult Länder 
governments before hiring professors), power of decision of university management as 
opposed to Länder intervention, and universities’ autonomy to implement new degree 
programmes (see Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, 2002). The variation 
across the Länder makes it possible to link differences in university efficiency to 
differences in Länder legal frameworks. 
 
The evaluation of Länder regulatory frameworks is, of course, a complex legal exercise 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. Thus, we make use of a study initiated by an 
influential think tank in the university landscape, the “Stifterverband für die Deutsche 
Wissenschaft”. In 2000, the Stifterverband created commission of experts to assess the 
university regulation laws enacted by the Länder after 1998. The assessment was 
realised with the explicit goal to evaluate the level of autonomy granted to the 
universities by their respective Länder governments. Several major characteristics of the 
regulatory frameworks were identified, e.g., legal structure of the university, Länder-
university cooperation, budget affairs, labour relations, management, foundation of new 
universities, establishment of new degree programmes, teaching evaluation, and 
research. The results are summarised by a classification of Länder university regulations 
reproduced in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Classification of Länder higher education laws by Stifterverband für die 
Deutsche Wissenschaft 
“best-law-group” Baden-Wuerttemberg 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hesse 
Lower Saxony 
intermediate group Bavaria 
Brandenburg 
Mecklenburg-Vorpomerania 
North Rhine Westphalia 
Saxony 
„worst-law-group“ Rhineland-Palatinate 
Saarland 
Saxony-Anhalt 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Thuringia 
Source: Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2002, 28) 
 
The classification divides 15 German Länder into three groups (Berlin is omitted, 
because its new university regulation had not been completed by 2002). The three 
classifications shown in Table 5.1 are based on the degree of self-governance and 
autonomy that is granted by the Länder to “their” universities. In particular, Länder 
university regulations that are classified as “best-law” are considered to be relatively 
liberal, thereby contributing to a comparatively high degree of university autonomy. 
Thus, the classification by Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2002) 
provides an indicator for the degree of autonomy under which German universities 
operate since 1998. In conclusion, given the evidence by Aghion et al. (2007 and 2008) 
which suggests a beneficial effect from autonomy on university efficiency, I use the 
classifications shown in Table 5.1 to develop the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Universities located in Länder that allow universities more autonomy are 
more cost efficient than universities operating under a more restrictive regulatory 
framework. 
 
Kuo and Ho (2008) investigate the impact of the University Operation Fund (UOF), a 
reform in 1996 that was intended to improve cost efficiency of Taiwanese public 
universities. Comparing university efficiency before and after the UOF they conclude 
that the reform had a negative effect on efficiency.  
140 
Given that one prominent category in German Länder higher education regulation is 
budget autonomy (see Aghion et al., 2007 and 2008; Stifterverband für die Deutsche 
Wissenschaft, 2002), it appears quite promising to analyse the effects of reforms to 
funding mechanisms, which have been implemented by some Länder towards the end of 
the sample period (2003). The goal of these reforms was to some extent to increase 
budget autonomy for the universities. In principle, one could use a similar setup as 
presented by Kuo and Ho (2008). However, as pointed out by Orr, Jaeger and 
Schwarzenberger (2007), “in many cases, performance-based funding only determines a 
marginal part of total budget allocations and discretionary, incremental funding 
dominates”. The effects of these funding reforms cannot be analysed, because 
implementation started only near the end of my sample period. In addition, the reforms 
are often relevant only for a very small portion of university budgets.  
 
With regard to the interaction between universities and their environment there is 
substantial literature on spill-over effects of higher education institutions on their 
regional environment (see e.g., Batria and Licht, 2004; Audretsch, Lehmann and 
Warning, 2005 or Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2007 for evidence from Germany; 
Abramovsky, Harrison and Simpson, 2007 for evidence from the UK).66 These studies 
show that the presence of universities in a region has a positive impact on the location 
decisions of private firms, especially private research laboratories and innovations. The 
evidence presented in Audretsch, Lehmann and Warning (2005) and Fritsch and 
Slavtchev (2007) suggests that the relationship is dependent on whether or not the 
university research fields match the innovative activity of private firms. Abramovsky, 
Harrison and Simpson (2007) indicate that the link between university research and 
private research investments appears to be particularly strong in pharmaceuticals and 
chemistry. They also find that for some disciplines it appears highly relevant for the 
location decision of private research laboratories that the relevant university 
departments produce high-quality research, while for other disciplines the presence of 
any university research departments seems to be sufficient. There is not much evidence 
on the underlying economic mechanisms, but Abramovsky, Harrison and Simpson 
(2007) suggest that the availability of trained students, informal networks, formal 
collaborations and university spin-outs, science parks, etc. may have significant effects 
in the transmission of spill-over effects. 
                                                
66 In some sense, this literature is related to empirical work analysing the relationship between public 
capital and private production (see e.g. Seitz, 1995). 
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However, the spill-over effects are not necessarily unilateral. Chaves and Moro (2007) 
study the interaction between universities and companies located in the same area. They 
show that (1) research output of universities is beneficial for private firms, and also that 
(2) institutions of higher education benefit from innovative companies located in the 
same region. The reason for this mutual dependence seems to be that firms use basic 
research results from universities to develop products for the market. Universities, in 
turn, need to know in which direction basic research should proceed, and private firms’ 
patents may represent an important indicator for their future research activities. 
Moreover, Kempkes and Pohl (2009) find that universities in wealthier regions are more 
efficient, likely due to a more favourable infrastructure (e.g., local research institutes, 
libraries, public transportation, cultural activities, etc.) and a high concentration of the 
types of private businesses that facilitate the acquisition of third-party funds. Again, I 
caution that causal effects run in both directions, i.e. from a high GDP per capita 
towards efficient universities and vice versa. 
 
In conclusion, there is considerable empirical support for a positive correlation of the 
presence of universities with (1) the location decision of private research activity, and 
(2) a strong regional economic background. The exact relationship and the direction of 
causality is, however, still quite unclear (theoretically as well as empirically). In 
particular, a strong innovative capacity of a region may foster university research and 
cost efficiency. It may, however, also be true that highly innovative and efficient 
universities attract private research activity, thereby improving the regional economic 
situation. Possibly there is indeed a mutual benefit by universities and their 
environment. Thus, the empirical results of such studies may be more adequately 
interpreted as correlations than in terms of causality (including some of the analyses in 
this chapter). 
 
From an empirical point of view, I suggest it is proper to consider regional GDP per 
capita as a proxy for the regional economic background, and for private research 
activity, the absolute number of patents issued in a region (not normalised by regional 
population), because in research activity, the sheer size of the regional research sector 
may be more important than research density. This leads to my second hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: The presence of universities positively correlates with GDP per capita 
and with private patenting activity (outside universities). There may be beneficial effects 
from regional GDP per capita and patenting activity on university efficiency/costs. But 
theoretical and empirical research provides support for causal effects in both 
directions. 
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5.3 Data and summary statistics 
 
The data set comprises 70 public German universities (higher education, type A, 
“Universitäten”). Universities of the armed forces, specialised universities and private 
universities are not included in the sample because these institutes have often different 
tasks and structures, which make a comparison quite difficult. Universities of applied 
sciences are not included in the sample because it is not possible to include a control for 
the quality of university outputs. Thus, a sample, which is restricted to the traditional 
German universities is preferred to have one common standard for graduating students, 
which is the degree awarded by traditional universities. As far as the classification of 
Länder university regulation is concerned (Stifterverband für die Deutsche 
Wissenschaft, 2002, see above), three Berlin universities have to be excluded from the 
sample because Berlin university regulation is not classified by Stifterverband für die 
Deutsche Wissenschaft (2002). Thus, for the econometric study presented in Section 
5.4.1, the sample contains 67 German public universities. For 2003, the 67 universities 
represent about 2/3 of all students in higher education (type A plus type B: including 
universities of applied sciences, art colleges, conservatoires and theological universities) 
and about 90% of the students enroled in German “Universitäten”. The sample period is 
1998-2003. Due to the modification of definitions (e.g., “Gesundheitswissenschaften” 
was counted as medicine starting in 2004) it is not possible to include pre-1998 and 
post-2003 years in the sample. The sample size contains therefore 420 (70x6) or 402 
(67x6) observations. 
 
The data set is collected from various sources. First, data on university costs, outputs 
and the number of students (total and according to subject) is from the Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany. Information on regional GDP per capita is from INKAR-
CD, which is edited by the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning. The 
number of patents is from the German Patent and Trade Mark Office. Note that regional 
GDP per capita and patenting activity is reported at the level of 
“Raumordnungsregionen”, which are almost equivalent to the NUTS-3 regions, but 
typically consolidate larger cities (“kreisfreie Städte”) and surrounding counties 
(“Landkreise”). The classification of Länder university regulation is from Stifterverband 
für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2002) and universities’ years of foundation are taken 
from the institutions’ web pages. Costs and wages (GDP per capita) are deflated using 
144 
the government consumption deflator (GDP deflator) from the 2006 Annual Report of 
the German Council of Economic Experts. 
 
Table 5.2 Summary statistics (70 German universities, 1998-2003) 
Variable Mean S.d. Min Max 
(a) University costs and outputs 
Costs/Students (C) 14 275 10 350 1 339 103 776
Third-party funds/Students (TPF) 2 277 1 626 95 11 799
Graduates/Students (GRA) 0.092 0.026 0.019 0.185
Wage (w) 35 311 3 974 16 277 55 804
(b) University faculty structure 
Share of students in… 
…social sciences (SOC) 0.574 0.219 0.000 1.000
…medicine (MED) 0.076 0.092 0.000 0.510
…sciences (SCI) 0.214 0.086 0.000 0.480
…engineering (ENG) 0.136 0.199 0.000 0.830
(c) Environmental variables 
Regional GDP per capita at the level  
of Raumordnungsregionen 24 710 6 517 14 153 44 462
Total number of patents in a region 525 706 10 3716
Number of patents in a region in 
…electricals 172 298 2 2115
…nuclear physics 1 3 0 29
…engineering  238 378 0 2449
…chemicals 76 117 0 726
…household goods 22 25 0 125
…nutrition 6 8 0 44
…mining 7 10 0 50
…munitions 2 4 0 39
EAST (Yes = 1, No = 0) 0.214 0.411 0.000 1.000
FOUND, University founded after  
WWII? (Yes = 1, No= 0) 0.457 0.499 0.000 1.000
BESTLAW (Yes = 1, No = 0) 0.388 0.488 0.000 1.000
MEDLAW (Yes = 1, No = 0) 0.448 0.498 0.000 1.000
WORSTLAW (Yes = 1, No = 0) 0.164 0.371 0.000 1.000
Note: Monetary variables are reported in 2000 Euros, with deflation across years using the deflator for 
government consumption/GDP deflator taken from the 2006 Report of the German Council of Economic 
Experts. Costs are total costs net of third-party funds. 
  
Table 5.2 reports summary statistics. There is a wide range in (annual) costs per student 
(103.000 Euros vs. 1.300 Euros). This is due to the fact that the structure of universities 
in the sample is still quite heterogeneous. For example, the university in the sample with 
highest (lowest) costs per student is a university with a very high share of students 
enroled in medical/veterinary studies (distance-learning-university). Of course, it would 
make more sense to calculate costs per student at the level of faculties or departments. 
Recall, however, that this analysis relies on universities as observations and not 
faculties or departments. Wages are calculated dividing personnel expenditures by total 
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employees (headcount not full time equivalents). This definition yields only a rough 
proxy of wages, but is common practise in the empirical analysis of university 
costs/efficiency (see e.g., Stevens, 2005). The wage proxy suggests an average wage for 
university employees of 35.000 Euros for the sample period, which is a reasonable 
proxy. About 60% of students study social science careers (SOC, including economics, 
languages, legal studies, etc.), about 15% are in engineering (ENG), about 20% of 
students are in science careers (SCI) and about 10% are in medicine or veterinary 
studies (MED). FOUND is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if a university 
is founded after WWII, which is true for about half of the sample. The share of 
universities located in Länder with university regulations classified as BESTLAW 
(WORSTLAW) is about 40% (15%). Around 45% of the universities are located in 
Länder with “intermediate” university regulation (MEDLAW).  
 
EAST is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a university is located in the East 
German Länder, zero otherwise. Patents are counted as the raw number of patents. Note 
that only patents outside the university are counted. This is due to the goal of the study, 
which aims at analysing the link between university research and research activity 
outside universities. Patents are highly concentrated across NUTS-3 regions and also 
across disciplines. While the lion’s share of patents is issued in engineering and 
electricals, patenting activity is quite rare in disciplines such as nuclear physics or 
nutrition. GDP per capita is about 24.000 Euros on average with considerable variation 
across the regions. 
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5.4 Empirical analysis 
 
Section 5.4.1 analyses the effect from Länder regulatory frameworks on university cost 
efficiency (Hypothesis 1) under the plausible assumption that Länder university 
regulations are exogenous from university costs and outputs. A university cost function 
is specified as a stochastic frontier model, which permits simultaneous estimation of 
university cost efficiency and the effects from university regulation on efficiency. 
Section 5.4.2 tests the effects from regional GDP per capita and from regional patenting 
activity outside universities on university costs (Hypothesis 2). As discussed in Section 
5.2 we must consider that both regional GDP per capita and regional patenting activity 
may be endogenous with respect to university costs and outputs. Thus, the analysis in 
Section 5.4.2 is restricted to the estimation of a standard cost function (no stochastic 
frontier), which permits the use of instrumental variable techniques. 
 
5.4.1 University efficiency and Länder regulatory frameworks 
5.4.1.1 Descriptive evidence 
Table 5.3 reports correlation coefficients of university costs and outputs with the faculty 
structure of universities (see Panel a), and with the classification of Länder university 
regulation as published by Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2002) (see 
Panel b). It is not surprising that the share of students enroled in medical studies is 
highly positively correlated with costs per student. The same holds for the share of 
students in science careers whereas a high share of students in social sciences is 
negatively correlated with costs per student. The acquisition of third-party funds is 
positively linked to the share of students in medicine, engineering and science careers 
whereas the share of students in social sciences is strongly negatively correlated with 
third-party funds per student. Differences in the correlations of graduates per student, 
i.e. the “processing time” for the teaching output, with faculty structure are less 
pronounced. 
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Table 5.3 Correlation coefficients of university cost and outputs with university faculty 
structure and Länder university regulation (70 German universities, 1998-2003) 
 Costs/Student (C) Third-party funds 
/Student (TPF) 
Graduates/Student 
(GRA) 
(a) University faculty structure 
% of students in… 
…social sciences (SOC) -0.3727* -0.7312* 0.0218 
…medicine (MED) 0.8096* 0.3765* 0.1809* 
…sciences (SCI) 0.3862* 0.5575* -0.004 
…engineering (ENG) -0.1278* 0.3914* -0.1058* 
(b) Länder university regulation 
BESTLAW  0.0511 0.1837* 0.1990* 
MEDLAW  -0.1264* -0.1114* -0.2026* 
WORSTLAW  0.1024* -0.0921 0.0102 
EAST 0.1586* 0.0123 -0.3264* 
FOUND -0.3353* -0.3614* -0.0169 
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
Table 5.3, Panel (b) shows that Länder university regulations which are classified as 
comparatively liberal (BESTLAW) are associated with universities that produce 
comparatively more output per student (third-party funds and graduates). At the same 
time, these universities are virtually uncorrelated with costs per student. By contrast, 
universities operating under comparatively strict university regulation (WORSTLAW) 
are positively correlated with costs per student and weakly negatively correlated with 
third-party funds per student (and not correlated at all with graduates per student). 
Länder university regulations that have been classified as medium-liberal (MEDLAW) 
are associated both with lower costs and less output per student. The correlations thus 
suggest some support for the U.S.-based findings by Aghion et al. (2007). Universities 
located in BESTLAW Länder appear to produce a relatively high quantity of outputs 
per student with average costs per student.  
 
The correlations confirm Warning (2005) who finds that the East German universities 
(EAST) are somewhat less efficient than those in the West German Länder. Moreover, 
Panel (b) of Table 5.3 shows that universities founded after WWII (FOUND) are 
negatively correlated both with costs and third-party funds per student. To ensure that 
effects from university regulation are not confounded with East/West differences or 
with university history, these variables appear in the econometric study described next. 
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5.4.1.2 Evidence from a stochastic frontier 
First, we test Hypothesis 1 via estimating the effect from the degree of autonomy 
permitted by Länder university regulation on university cost efficiency. The empirical 
approach presented here is an econometric perspective to efficiency analysis (in contrast 
to non-parametric efficiency analysis, see e.g., Warning, 2004). Following the usual 
procedure in the literature, we specify a cost function for universities, which is 
estimated using a stochastic frontier model (Battese and Coelli, 1995). 67 This model 
allows estimating university cost efficiency and the influence of environmental 
variables on university efficiency in a simultaneous estimation procedure. For a more 
detailed discussion of various methodological approaches to the estimation of the 
influence of environmental variables on university efficiency see the extensive overview 
in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
 
Since there is little empirical evidence on the specific functional form of university cost 
functions, a flexible functional form, a translog function which takes the following form 
is used: 
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The cost variable C denotes total university costs minus third-party funds. 68 Thus, it 
represents public costs. As described in Section 5.3, the cost-variable is normalised by 
the number of students (not graduates) because we do not focus on questions of size or 
scale economies. Index i represents the 67 public universities in the sample (excluding 
Berlin) and t denotes the years 1998-2003. α is a constant and t is a linear time trend, 
which is intended to capture (smooth) technological change over the sample period, as it 
is standard in the literature. We assume that universities produce j = 2 outputs (Qjit), 
                                                
67 The cost function approach has become quite popular in empirical analyses of universities (see e.g. 
Cohn, Rhine and Santos, 1989; de Groot, McMahon and Volkwein, 1991; Glass, McKillop and 
Hyndman, 1995). The main advantage is that it permits incorporating multiple outputs, which is of 
particular importance in higher education (research and teaching). 
68 Note that total costs do not include capital expenditures and pension payments for civil servants. 
Pension payments for civil servants are reported in “Allgemeine Finanzwirtschaft”, which is a general 
function for all public servants irrespective of the function in which they were employed. Thus, it is 
impossible to determine the pension payments for university employees.  
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teaching and research. The proxy for the research output is third-party funds and the 
proxy for the teaching output is the number of graduating students, both also normalised 
with the number of students, analogous to the cost variable. Given the period (up to 
2003), graduating students mainly earn Diplom degrees. There are also some Bachelor 
and Master degrees, but they are of marginal importance: ~ 1.5%.69  
 
Note that two major difficulties with the selection of outputs require a highly cautious 
interpretation of the results below. First, third-party funds that capture a specific type of 
research skew the research output to science, engineering and medicine research; the 
analysis would considerably improve by including a second proxy for research outputs, 
e.g., publications or citations. Second, different qualities in the production of research 
and teaching across the German universities are not considered; including an indicator 
of the quality of research and teaching would be important, but such data is unavailable 
at the university level. 
 
Wages are denoted by w. FACULTY is the control for the faculty structure of the 
university as introduced in Table 5.2, Panel (b). Recall that it consists of m=3 faculty 
groups, which represent the share of students enroled in 
• medical, veterinary and agrarian careers (MED) 
• science careers (SCI) 
• engineering studies (ENG)  
where the share of students in social sciences and languages is the reference share 
(SOC). Controlling for the faculty structure of universities is important, because the 
different disciplines have widely varying cost levels. 
The residual of the model consists of two error terms. vit denotes an i.i.d. N(0, σ2v) error 
term, which is also independent from the uit, a non-negative error term that is assumed 
to capture cost inefficiency in the production of teaching and research (allocative 
inefficiency plus technical inefficiency). It is assumed to be independently distributed 
and to follow a truncated normal distribution N(µit, σ2u). The mean µit of this error 
component is assumed to be determined by environmental variables (Zit) (see Battese 
                                                
69 It is a rather disputed issue in the efficiency analysis of universities whether third-party funds may be 
viewed as inputs in the production of teaching and research or whether they are more adequately 
considered a research output (see the overview in Worthington, 2001). I argue that one may interpret 
third-party funds as a revenue source, which is earned on the market for externally funded research. 
Universities compete for projects and can charge a price for their research, which makes acquired third-
party funds an adequate proxy for the quality (the price the university can charge for its projects) and the 
quantity (the amount or size of projects) of research activities. 
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and Coelli, 1995). The effect of Länder university regulation on university efficiency uit 
is modelled by introducing the classification of Länder university regulation as Z-
variables: 
 
(5.2) it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 itBESTLAW WORSTLAW EAST FOUNDµ = δ + δ + δ + δ + δ  
 
BESTLAW and WORSTLAW are dummy variables capturing the classification of 
Länder regulatory frameworks by Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (see 
Section 5.3). Note that the universities in Länder with medium-ranked university 
regulation are the reference group. EAST controls for East German universities, which 
is important given the evidence presented in Warning (2005). The error specification in 
Equation (5.2) additionally controls whether a university is founded before/after WWII 
(FOUND). Some universities in Germany were created in medieval age facing a long 
tradition whereas other universities have been established in the aftermath of World 
War II. The additional control is introduced to make sure that the Länder classification 
by Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2002) does not merely capture 
differences between young and old universities (e.g., universities in Baden-
Württemberg are “older” than universities in North-Rhine Westphalia on average).70 
 
The difference of the stochastic frontier approach compared to a standard econometric 
framework is that the estimated cost function describes the cost frontier, i.e. minimum 
costs of universities (and not averages), which allows us to estimate the efficiency of 
individual universities’ resource use. Universities typically operate with costs above the 
estimated cost function, which is captured by the (positive) uit. Due to the rather 
complex stochastic frontier specification of the error term, econometric research has not 
yet provided techniques to estimate robust standard errors in the simultaneous 
estimation of Equations (5.1) and (5.2), which suggests a cautious interpretation of the 
coefficients estimated for the cost function itself. The reason is that the stochastic 
frontiers focus on the measurement of inefficiency (one component of the error term), 
not on the estimation of the cost function coefficients. 
                                                
70 One may also include student cohort size of the region or Land surrounding the university in the cost 
function (the majority of students in German universities are natives of the Land where the university is 
located). If resource adjustment in response to student cohort size is sluggish (see the discussion in 
Chapter 3), a smaller cohort size will be associated with lower efficiency and larger cohorts will be 
associated with higher efficiency. However, note that this phenomenon is inherently based on the time-
series variation and my analysis in Chapter 5 relies predominantly on the variation across universities. 
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Given that university budgets are still mainly allocated as a function of the prior year’s 
budget (see Orr, Jaeger and Schwarzenberger, 2007) we may conclude that the true 
model is a dynamic cost function, which would require including a lagged cost variable 
in the set of exogenous variables. However, this is likely to create major econometric 
problems, because the institutional variables used to explain the variation in the 
inefficiency error term uit are dummy variables (BESTLAW, WORSTLAW, EAST, 
FOUND). In this case, the lagged cost variable would be correlated with the invariant 
part of the error term, which would introduce a source of endogeneity to the set of 
regressors. Thus, a static model is preferred for this study. 
 
Table 5.4 presents the results from the simultaneous estimation of Equations (5.1) and 
(5.2). The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood and the estimation is conducted 
using Frontier 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). 
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Table 5.4 SFA-results of the university cost function including environmental variables 
(67 German universities, 1998-2003) 
 Endogenous variable: Costs/Student (C) 
Exogenous variables  
Linear time trend -0.021 
 (0.008)** 
Third-party funds (TPF) 0.257 
 (0.889) 
Graduates (GRA) -2.470 
 (0.833)*** 
TPF2 0.076 
 (0.071) 
GRA2 -0.226 
 (0.724) 
TPF*GRA -0.272 
 (0.174)+ 
Wage (w) 7.973 
 (0.628)*** 
w2 -1.842 
 (0.455)*** 
TPF*w -0.160 
 (0.283) 
GRA*w 0.567 
 (0.522) 
MED 4.317 
 (0.491)*** 
SCI 0.548 
 (0.636) 
ENG -0.139 
 (0.075)* 
Constant -15.312 
 (0.903)*** 
Environmental variables (Z) 
Constant -0.076 
 (0.211) 
BESTLAW -0.373 
 (0.055)*** 
WORSTLAW 0.237 
 (0.134)* 
FOUND -0.136 
 (0.073)* 
EAST 0.271 
 (0.171)+ 
γ 0.064 
 (0.009)*** 
Log Likelihood -40.649 
Observations 402 
Note: Costs, third-party funds and graduates are normalised by the number of students; see text. ***, **, 
* and + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
The estimation results for the cost function suggest that there is cost-saving 
technological change over the sample period (about -2% per year). Moreover, it is quite 
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clear from the results that universities with an important share of students enroled in 
medical, veterinary and agrarian studies have higher cost levels. Taken at face value, the 
coefficient estimated for the share of students in medical and veterinary studies suggests 
that a university with about 10% of students in medicine has on average about 40% 
higher costs per student compared to a university with no medicine careers. According 
to the estimation results, a pure medical school should have costs per student that 
exceed costs per student of a pure social science university by about four times. In 
contrast, the share of students in science careers is not significantly different from zero 
in Table 5.4, suggesting that the cost levels of social science and science careers are not 
significantly different from each other. 
 
Moreover, Table 5.4 suggests that there are economies of scope in the production of 
teaching and research (see the coefficient of the interaction term between graduates per 
student and third-party funds per student, which is, however, only significant at the 20% 
level). 
 
Since we are attempting to determine whether a comparatively liberal university 
regulation contributes to more efficient spending of public resources in higher 
education, the estimation results for the Z-variables BESTLAW and WORSTLAW 
show that this is indeed the case. Universities located in Länder that allow relatively 
high autonomy are less inefficient than those in Länder with medium liberal university 
regulation as shown by the negative coefficient of BESTLAW. In contrast, universities 
operating under comparatively strict university regulation display higher inefficiency 
compared to universities operating under medium liberal university regulation (see the 
positive coefficient of WORSTLAW). Additionally, university history is of some 
importance. The dummy variable capturing whether a university was founded after 
WWII is significant at the 10% level, suggesting that younger universities are more 
efficient. Thus, the effect from Länder university regulation on cost efficiency is robust 
against controlling for university history. Moreover, the results confirm that East 
German universities are somewhat less efficient than the West German universities over 
the sample period. However, the East dummy is only significant at the 20% level, which 
suggests that some of the efficiency advantage of universities in West Germany is due 
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to their younger age on average.71 Finally, Table 5.4 reports the statistic γ, defined as 
the share of deviations from the estimated cost function that are due to inefficiencies. In 
Equation (5.3), σ2u is the standard deviation of the inefficiency error term while σ2v is 
the standard deviation of the “classical” error term (see also Coelli 1996): 
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The estimation result for this statistic suggests that about 6.4% of total deviations from 
the estimated cost function are explained by the model presented in Equation (5.2). 
Overall, this suggests that Länder university regulation has a significant effect on 
university efficiency, but the explanatory power is somewhat limited. 
 
5.4.2 The link between university costs and the private economic environment 
5.4.2.1 Descriptive evidence 
Table 5.5 reports correlation coefficients of university costs and outputs with GDP per 
capita and with patenting activity at the level of Raumordnungsregionen. Note that it is 
now possible to add the three Berlin universities to the sample. As expected, third-party 
funds per student are significantly and positively correlated with regional GDP per 
capita and with the number of patents in a region. This also holds for most subgroups of 
patents (according to the field of research). Unusually, I find no significant correlation 
of third-party funds per student with patents issued in chemicals, unlike Abramovsky, 
Harrison and Simpson (2007) who report a strong link between the location of private 
sector R&D laboratories and university chemistry departments in the UK. The 
correlations of costs per student with regional GDP per capita or with total patents 
issued in a region are weaker and often not significantly different from zero. The same 
holds for graduates per student. This is not too surprising, because the interpretation of 
positive or negative correlations of graduates per student (and costs per student) with 
GDP and patenting activity are not as obvious as for third-party funds. 
 
                                                
71 About 50% of the West German universities and 25% of the East German universities were founded 
after WWII. 
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Table 5.5 Correlation coefficients of university costs and outputs with universities’ 
private economic environment (70 German universities, 1998-2003) 
 
Costs/Student (C) 
 
Third-party funds 
/Student (TPF) 
Graduates 
/Student (GRA) 
Regional GDP per capita 0.048 0.2504* 0.1149* 
Total number of patents in a region  0.0584 0.3684* 0.0905 
Number of patents in a region in 
… electricals 0.1215* 0.3867* 0.1337* 
… nuclear physics 0.0555 0.1082* 0.1287* 
… engineering 0.0166 0.3784* 0.1091* 
… chemicals -0.029 -0.0622 -0.1644* 
… household goods 0.1124* 0.2742* 0.0695 
… nutrition -0.1066* 0.0007 0.0933 
… mining -0.0392 0.1334* -0.1346* 
… munitions 0.0886 0.1600* 0.1440* 
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
5.4.2.2 Econometric evidence on the effect from universities’ environment on costs 
As discussed in Section 5.2, we cannot easily assume a unilateral relationship between 
universities and their environment, and thus GDP per capita and patenting activity are 
considered potentially endogenous regressors. Since IV techniques within stochastic 
frontier frameworks are to the best of my knowledge not yet available, I employ more 
standard econometric approaches that may be used in the presence of potentially 
endogenous regressors. Note that using a more standard econometric framework implies 
that it is not possible to investigate the effect from university environment on university 
efficiency. Rather, the effect from the economic environment on the cost structure of 
universities is analysed using a 2SLS approach. The starting point for the analysis is the 
translog cost function in Equation (5.1):  
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Unlike the model in Equation (5.1), Equation (5.4) does not contain the one-sided 
“inefficiency” error term, uit. As in Chapters 3 and 4, standard errors are estimated 
robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and weak serial correlation using the 
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correction of the autocovariance matrix presented by Newey and West (1987), which is 
not possible in the stochastic frontier analysis due to the rather complex specification of 
the “inefficiency” error term, uit. The natural log of real GDP per capita is included to 
analyse effects from economic activity on the cost level of universities. Given the 
discussion above, GDP per capita is instrumented since it must be considered a 
potentially endogenous regressor. Lagged GDP per capita and the lagged number of 
patents in a region are used as instrumental variables (both as natural logs). This seems 
a plausible choice since an effect from contemporaneous university spending/third-party 
funds per student on last year’s GDP per capita seems rather implausible. Thus, these 
lagged values may be considered reasonable instrumental variables. 
 
Table 5.6, Column (1) presents the estimation results for Equation (5.4). The model 
presented in Column (2) is similar to Column (1), but controls for unobserved university 
heterogeneity by including university fixed effects, which make it unnecessary to 
control for EAST and FOUND. The main result from these two models is the effect 
from regional GDP per capita on university costs. Whereas the pooled OLS model 
(Column 1) suggests that there is virtually no effect from regional GDP per capita, the 
model including university fixed effects (Column 2) suggests a significant and cost-
reducing effect. The estimated coefficient implies that a 1% increase in regional GDP 
per capita translates into a 2% reduction in costs per student.  
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Table 5.6 IV Estimation results of the university cost function including GDP per capita 
(70 German universities, 1998-2003) 
 Endogenous variable: Costs/Students (C) 
Exogenous variables (1) OLS (2) University FE 
Linear time trend -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.003)** 
Third-party funds (TPF) 0.714 0.541 
 (0.703) (0.298)* 
Graduates (GRA) 0.885 1.225 
 (2.373) (0.757)+ 
TPF2 0.027 0.133 
 (0.077) (0.044)*** 
GRA2 0.109 0.317 
 (0.337) (0.150)** 
TPF*GRA -0.241 0.035 
 (0.087)*** (0.043) 
Wage (w) 0.722 1.979 
 (6.150) (2.168) 
w2 -0.240 -0.555 
 (1.522) (0.536) 
TPF*w -0.273 -0.067 
 (0.187)+ (0.076) 
GRA*w -0.116 -0.102 
 (0.541) (0.224) 
MED 4.237 2.021 
 (0.431)*** (0.732)*** 
SCI 0.591 0.495 
 (0.466) (0.451) 
ENG -0.140 0.272 
 (0.167) (0.423) 
EAST 0.218  
 (0.084)**  
FOUND -0.109  
 (0.064)*  
Constant 1.602  
 (12.635)  
ln(GDPpc), instrumented by 
− ln(GDPpct-1) 
− ln(patentst-1) 
0.001 
(0.130) 
-2.047 
(0.331)*** 
Anderson-statistic, 
IV-relevance test,  
H0: equation is underidentified 
39.760*** 39.984*** 
Hansen-J-statistic, Test of overidentifying 
restrictions, H0: IVs are valid 
0.954 0.001 
University FE No Yes 
Observations 350 350 
Adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.30 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
The Anderson statistic shows that the instrumental variables (lagged GDP per capita 
and lagged patents) are reasonably correlated with contemporaneous GDP per capita. 
Hansen’s J-Statistic indicates that the instrumental variables are valid instruments, i.e. 
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uncorrelated with the error term (see also Bauer, Fertig and Schmidt, 2009, 333). Thus, 
the results support Hypothesis 2: regional GDP per capita reduces university costs per 
student. The channel by which higher GDP per capita translates into lower costs per 
student is probably the easier acquisition of third-party funds (see Table 5.5). 
 
Regarding the cost function, there are some differences when comparing the SFA 
estimation results with the results from the OLS/FE estimations. There is a notable 
difference between the coefficients estimated for the number of graduates in the SFA 
and the OLS/FE models. Differences between these two approaches are, however, not 
too surprising, given that the focus in the stochastic frontier analysis is on measuring 
efficiency whereas that of the OLS/FE estimation is obtaining consistent, unbiased and 
efficient estimates of the cost function parameters.  
Moreover, the models differ in some important aspects. First, due to the standard OLS 
framework, EAST and FOUND are included in the cost function and not in the 
inefficiency term (see Equations 5.1 and 5.2). It implies that the OLS model assumes 
different cost levels between East and West Germany (as an integral element of 
university technology). In contrast, the SFA model assumes a common technology over 
East and West Germany, but identifies systematic differences in efficiency between East 
and West Germany. Second, SFA and OLS/FE differ in explanatory/environmental 
variables (BESTLAW, WORSTLAW, GDP per capita, university fixed effects). Third, 
standard errors in the OLS/FE estimations are corrected whereas this is not possible in 
the SFA framework. 
 
An alternative to including regional GDP per capita in Equation (5.4) is to include the 
number of patents issued in the region around the university. Table 5.7 reports the 
results for these models. Due to the endogeneity concern, the number of patents is 
instrumented. Lagged GDP per capita and the lagged number of patents are chosen as 
instruments. Again, Column (1) reports a pooled OLS model which controls for East 
German universities and for universities founded after WWII (FOUND). Column (2) 
shows the result for the university fixed effects specification. The errors are estimated 
robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using the correction of 
the autocovariance matrix as suggested by Newey and West (1987). 
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Table 5.7 IV Estimation results of the university cost function including patenting 
activity (70 German universities, 1998-2003) 
 Endogenous variable: Costs/Student (C) 
Exogenous variables (1) OLS (2) University FE 
Linear time trend -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.003)** 
Third-party funds (TPF) 0.726 0.684 
 (0.705) (0.354)* 
Graduates (GRA) 1.052 0.501 
 (2.340) (0.923) 
TPF2 0.040 0.150 
 (0.077) (0.050)*** 
GRA2 0.125 0.378 
 (0.327) (0.164)** 
TPF*GRA -0.241 -0.024 
 (0.085)*** (0.050) 
Wage (w) 1.643 4.917 
 (6.395) (2.432)** 
w2 -0.518 -1.194 
 (1.574) (0.610)* 
TPF*w -0.274 -0.150 
 (0.188)+ (0.096)+ 
GRA*w -0.156 0.141 
 (0.540) (0.264) 
MED 4.246 1.821 
 (0.433)*** (0.896)** 
SCI 0.500 0.198 
 (0.438) (0.557) 
ENG -0.137 -0.233 
 (0.169) (0.612) 
EAST 0.171  
 (0.079)**  
FOUND -0.128  
 (0.066)*  
Constant 0.273  
 (13.125)  
ln(patents),  
instrumented by  
− ln(patentsi, t-1) 
− ln(GDPpci, t-1) 
-0.025 
(0.029) 
-0.284 
(0.075)*** 
Anderson-statistic, 
IV-relevance test,  
H0: equation is underidentified 
56.865*** 40.665*** 
Hansen-J-statistic, Test of overidentifying 
restrictions, H0: IVs are valid 
0.294 7.929*** 
University FE? no yes 
Observations 350 350 
Adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.14 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
 
Regional patenting activity appears to have a cost-reducing effect in public universities. 
Again, for the pooled OLS model, this effect is not significantly different from zero, 
whereas the FE model suggests a significant effect. An increase of the number of 
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patents by 1% results in a 0.3% reduction of university costs per student. Thus, the 
effect appears to be considerably lower than the effect from GDP per capita, which is 
entirely plausible, given that the number of patents measures only a fragment of GDP 
per capita. GDP is a much broader variable containing the effects from innovative 
capacity plus other factors such as business activity.  
 
However, the Hansen-J-Statistic indicates that the endogeneity of patents is still a 
concern: The null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the 
error term is rejected, which casts doubt on the validity of the instrumental variables and 
suggests that the lagged GDP and lagged number of patents embody the same 
endogeneity problems as the contemporaneous number of patents. In other words, the 
IV estimations are insufficient to handle the reverse causality concerns for patenting 
activity. It makes sense that reverse causality is more relevant for the number of patents 
in a region than for GDP per capita (see the discussion above). The endogeneity concern 
needs more work, possibly using different instrumental variables. The results in Table 
5.7 should be viewed as multivariate correlations and cannot be interpreted as causal 
relationships. Future analysis should consider specifications that account for the 
importance of research clusters in specific fields of research (e.g., chemistry 
departments in the university collaborate with pharmaceutical firms), as suggested by 
Abramovsky, Harrison and Simpson (2007). 
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5.5 Conclusions 
 
Identifying the factors which benefit efficient resource use in German public 
universities is important, because (i) human capital is considered a central driver of 
economic growth, (ii) universities are of paramount importance for the creation of 
human capital, (iii) inefficiency in the production of higher education is a serious 
concern, given that there is no mechanism ensuring efficient resource use in Germany 
(such as market exit and entry), and (iv) today’s public budgets are tightly constrained. 
 
The first part of the empirical analysis in this chapter confirms that liberal university 
legal frameworks benefit efficient resource use in higher education. This finding is an 
extension of Kempkes and Pohl (2008), which additionally incorporates a control for 
university history. Controlling for university history is important, because the 
classification by Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2002) may also detect 
that some of the Länder with older universities are more experienced in academic 
management and regulation. The results presented here show that this concern does not 
affect the main results. One channel for transmission of liberal university regulation is 
that universities located in Länder with a comparatively liberal university framework 
acquire more third-party funds than universities located elsewhere. It appears 
straightforward to assume that Länder university regulation is exogenous of university 
costs, and thus we can conclude that there is some evidence that liberal university 
regulation indeed translates into more efficient resource use, of course keeping in mind 
the important limitations of the analysis. One important shortcoming is the absence of 
more detailed data on university outputs (no quality indicator for research and teaching 
outputs and the limited scope of proxies for research and teaching outputs). 
 
The second part of the empirical analysis gives econometric evidence for the link 
between university costs and the private economic environment of universities. The 
results show that universities located in regions with high GDP per capita operate on a 
lower cost level than universities located in less prosperous regions. The results are 
obtained from a model which includes university fixed effects and which considers that 
GDP per capita can be endogenous on university spending in a region. Thus, we may 
interpret this result such that there is indeed a (causal) effect from a high GDP per capita 
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on public costs per student. The channel of this effect appears to be the same as above: 
easier acquisition of third-party funds. 
 
Finally, I find evidence for a negative correlation of patents issued in a region with 
university costs per student. However, this correlation cannot be interpreted in terms of 
a causal effect. The IV estimation, which uses lagged patenting activity and lagged GDP 
per capita as instruments for contemporaneous patenting activity, does not solve the 
endogeneity problem. Thus, the negative correlation of university costs per student with 
regional patenting activity may well indicate that there is also an effect from the 
presence of a university on patenting activity outside universities.  
 
The econometric model presented here is probably too simple to capture the true 
relationship between patenting activity and university costs/outputs. More sophisticated 
models that account for research clusters are needed (e.g., there may be virtually no 
connection between a university with a focus on social sciences and private R&D labs 
in engineering). Moreover, the data basis of the analysis has to be broadened. Including 
indicators for the quality of research and teaching is important and the proxy for the 
research output of universities has to be extended. Third-party funds have a bias 
towards certain types of research and towards certain disciplines like engineering and 
medicine. These shortcomings are still too important to give policy advice. 
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this thesis I provide an analysis of the German system of public education at the level 
of primary schools, lower secondary schools and higher education. For each level, of 
course, different topics dominate the public debate and the research agenda in 
economics. 
 
The sharp drop in student numbers in primary schools in the East German Länder has 
led to demonstrations by teachers’ unions, parents, and pupils against resource 
adjustments. The topic is also of significant public finance interest, because East 
Germany is an ideal laboratory to study public policy in response to rapid demographic 
changes. My empirical analysis using data for the East German Länder from 1993 to 
2006 suggests that resource adjustments are significantly stronger than what has been 
experienced in demographically stable times. This is true especially for the periods in 
which student cohorts were actually decreasing. Resource adjustments loosened 
somewhat in times of stagnating and increasing student numbers. Concerning the 
nation’s future demographic changes, these findings suggest that one should not be too 
pessimistic about the capability of the public sector to handle demographic challenges. 
My reading of the results is that the public sector can cope with demographic changes as 
long as there is awareness of the challenges in the public. Thus, slow and smooth 
demographic changes may in the end be more difficult to handle than strong shifts, 
because only rapid or strong changes are accompanied by the level of public debate that 
can exert the necessary pressure on public authorities to manage the problems.  
 
In lower secondary schools, the practise of ability-tracking is a major issue. Ideological 
discussions about the practise of tracking have shaped the public debate in West 
Germany for decades, because the track choice in the transition from primary schools to 
lower secondary schools is critical for a student’s future career, social status and 
earnings. In Chapter 4, I provide empirical evidence supporting a political-economic 
explanation for the practise of tracking. Apparently, German political parties support 
ability-tracking if their members’ or electoral constituencies’ offspring are 
predominantly enroled in the higher educational track, and thus profit from ability-
tracking. There is also some evidence suggesting that political parties when in office 
allocate public resources primarily to the track in which their constituencies’ offspring 
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are overrepresented. Both findings suggest that partisan theory offers a political-
economic rationale of the German education system, which may aid in understanding 
Germany’s low intergenerational mobility (see e.g., Dustmann, 2004, 211; OECD, 
2007, 116). There may, however, also be other theoretical approaches that accord with 
the empirical evidence.  
 
There is a widespread perception that ideological discussions about education 
institutions are about to disappear and that German political parties’ education policies 
are converging in the aftermath of the publication of the PISA results. Anecdotal 
evidence for this argument is found in plans for reforms of the education system in 
Hamburg and Berlin. Beginning in 2010, both Länder will implement virtually identical 
education systems (students are tracked after the sixth grade, at the age of 12, into 
Gymnasium and Stadtteilschule). These reforms will be implemented by very different 
coalitions: the CDU-Green Party coalition in Hamburg and the SPD-Die Linke coalition 
in Berlin. However, the specific socioeconomic problems of German city states may 
also assume a major role.  
 
The Bologna process and the implementation of the Excellence Initiative appear to open 
up possibilities to re-organise the German system of higher education, such as the 
formation of research clusters between universities and research institutes, or mergers 
between universities and universities of applied sciences. Chapter 5 provides 
preliminary evidence suggesting that universities operate more efficiently under liberal 
university regulation than under a strict legal framework. Thus, the recent developments 
towards more liberal university regulation and the abolishment of the Federal 
Framework Act are a step in the right direction. Moreover, I provide evidence 
suggesting that (i) universities are operating on lower cost levels when located in 
prosperous regions, and (ii) there is a negative correlation of private patenting activity 
with public university costs. The latter finding most probably indicates a mutual benefit 
between universities and private R&D labs while the direction of causation remains 
unknown. From a pure efficiency perspective, these results may provide some support 
for the formation of research clusters. However, the analysis in Chapter 5, more than the 
preceding chapters, is limited by important shortcomings that mostly reflect data 
deficiencies and which make policy advice at this stage problematic. I suggest that 
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future research should exploit the much richer variation in terms of university 
autonomy, university management, research clusters, etc. among Europe’s universities. 
 
 
166 
REFERENCES 
 
Abramovsky, L., R. Harrison and H. Simpson (2007). University research and the 
location of business R&D. Economic Journal 117, C114-141. 
Aghion, P. (2007). Growth and the Financing and Governance of Eduation. Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the German Economic Association 2007 in 
Munich. 
Aghion, P. M. Dewatripont, C. Hoxby, A. Mas-Colell and A. Sapir (2007). Why reform 
Europe’s universities. BRUEGEL Policy Brief 2007/04. 
Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont, C. Hoxby, A. Mas-Colell and A. Sapir (2008). Higher 
aspirations: An agenda for reforming European universities. BRUEGEL 
Blueprint 5. 
Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 651-678. 
Alesina, A. and N. Roubini (1992). Political cycles in OECD economies. Review of 
Economic Studies 59, 663-688. 
Alesina, A. and J. Sachs (1988). Political parties and the business cycle in the U.S., 
1948-1984. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 20, 63-82. 
Alesina, A., N. Roubini and G.D. Cohen (1997). Political cycles and the 
macroeconomy. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
Alt, J.E. (1985). Political parties, world demand, and unemployment: Domestic and 
international sources of economic activity. American Political Science Review 
79, 1016-1040. 
Ammermüller, A. and J.-S. Pischke (2006). Peer effects in European primary schools: 
Evidence from PIRLS. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 06-027. 
Anderson, T.W. and C. Hsiao (1981). Estimation of dynamic models with error 
components. Journal of the American Statistical Association 76, 598-606. 
Arellano, M. (2003). Panel data econometrics. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte 
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of 
Economic Studies 58, 277-297. 
Audretsch, D.B., E.E. Lehmann and S. Warning (2005). University spillovers and new 
firm location. Research Policy 34, 1113-1122. 
Ausbildungsordnung Grundschule des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (AO-GS). 
Baker, D.P., R. Fabrega, C. Galindo and J. Mishook (2004). Instructional time and 
national achievement: cross-national evidence. Prospects 34, 311-334. 
Baltagi, B.H. (2005). Econometric analysis of panel data. Third Edition. Chichester, 
Wiley. 
Baretti, C., B. Huber and K. Lichtblau (2002). A tax on tax revenue: The incentive 
effects of equalizing transfers: Evidence from Germany. International Tax and 
Public Finance 9, 631-649. 
167 
Batria, R. and G. Licht (2004). Technologietransfer im Vergleich. Eine Fallstudie. 
Wissenschaftsmanagement 6 (Novermber/Dezember), 12-17. 
Battese, G. and T. Coelli (1995). A model for technical inefficiency effects in a 
stochastic frontier production function for panel data. Empirical Economics 20, 
325-332. 
Bauer, T.K., M. Fertig and C.M. Schmidt (2009). Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung. 
Berlin, Springer. 
Baum, B. and H. Seitz (2003). Demographischer Wandel und Bildungsausgaben: 
Empirische Evidenz für die westdeutschen Länder. Vierteljahreshefte zur 
Wirtschaftsforschung 72, 205-219. 
Baumert, J., K.S. Cortina and A. Leschinsky (2003). Grundlegende Entwicklungen und 
Strukturprobleme im allgemein bildenden Schulwesen. Cortina, K.S.; J. 
Baumert, A. Leschinksy, K.U. Mayer and L. Trommer (eds.). Das 
Bildungswesen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Reinbek, Rowohlt, 52-147.  
Baumert, J. and G. Schümer (2001). Schulformen als selektionsbedingte Lernmilieus. 
Baumert, J. et al. (eds.). PISA 2000: Basiskompetenzen von Schülerinnen und 
Schülern im internationalen Vergleich. Opladen, Leske and Budrich, 454-467. 
Beck, N. and J.N. Katz (2004). Time-series-cross-section issues: Dynamics. Mimeo, 
California Institute of Technology. 
Bellenberg, G. (2005). Wege durch die Schule – Zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
institutionalisierten Bildungswegen und individuellen Bildungsverläufen im 
deutschen Schulsystem. Bildungsforschung 2 (2), Online-Journal: 
http://bildungsforschung.org/bildungsforschung/Archiv/2005-02/schule (2009/02/26, 
14:00 h). 
Bergström, T.C, D.L. Rubinfeld and P. Shapiro (1982). Micro-based estimates of 
demand functions for local school expenditures. Econometrica 50, 1183-1205.  
Berlemann, M. and G. Markwardt (2007). Unemployment and inflation consequences 
of unexpected election results. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39, 1919-
1945. 
Berry, C. (2004). School inflation. Education Next 4, 56-62. 
Bilek, A. (2005). Local public choice of school spending: Some original results from 
the French data. Paper presented at the 2005 EPCS Meeting in Durham. 
Blankart, C.B. (2002). Öffentliche Finanzen in der Demokratie. Fourth edition. 
München, Vahlen. 
Blossfeld, H.-P. (1990). Changes in educational careers in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Sociology of Education 63, 165-177. 
Boix, C. (1997). Political parties and the supply side of the economy: The provision of 
physical and human capital in advanced economies, 1960-1990. American 
Journal of Political Science 41, 814-845. 
Boldrin, M. and A. Montes (2009). Assessing the efficiency of public education and 
pensions. Journal of Population Economics 22, 285-309. 
Bommes, M., I. Grünheid and M. Wilmers (2008). Migranten am START. 
Bildungskarrieren von begabten Zuwandererkindern. Zusammenfassung. 
Mimeo, Universität Osnabrück. 
168 
Borge, L.-E.and L.R. Naper (2006). Efficiency potential and efficiency variation in 
Norwegian lower secondary schools. FinanzArchiv 62, 221-249. 
Borge, L.E. and J. Rattsø (1995). Demographic shift, relative costs and the allocation of 
local public consumption in Norway. Regional Science and Urban Economics 
25, 705-726. 
Borge, L.-E. and R.J. Sørensen (2002). Aggregating spending preferences: An empirical 
analysis of party preferences in Norwegian local governments. Public Choice 
110, 225-243. 
Breitung, J. (2000). The local power of some unit root tests for panel data. Advances in 
Econometrics 15, 161-177. 
Bruno, G.S.F. (2005). Approximating the bias of the LSDV estimator for dynamic 
unbalanced panel data models. Economics Letters 87, 361-366. 
Burke, M.A. and T.R. Sass (2008). Classroom peer effects and student achievement. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 08-5. 
Busemeyer, M.R. (2006). Der Kampf um knappe Mittel: Die Bestimmungsfaktoren der 
öffentlichen, privaten und sektoralen Bildungsausgaben im OECD-Länder-
Vergleich. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 47, 393-418. 
Busemeyer, M.R. (2007). Determinants of public education spending in 21 OECD 
democracies, 1980-2001. Journal of European Public Policy 14, 582-610. 
Card, D. and A.B. Krueger (1992). Does school quality matter? Returns to education 
and the characteristics of public schools in the United States. Journal of Political 
Economy 100, 1-40. 
Card, D. and A.B. Krueger (1996). School resources and student outcomes: An 
overview of the literature and new evidence from North and South Carolina. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, 31-50. 
Castles, F.G. (1989). Explaining public education expenditures in OECD nations. 
European Journal of Political Research 17, 431-448. 
Chaves, C.V. and S. Moro (2007). Investigating the interaction and mutual dependence 
between science and technology. Research Policy 36, 1204-1220. 
Clotfelter, C.T., H.F. Ladd, H.F. and J.L. Vigdor (2007). Are teacher absences worth 
worrying about in the U.S.? NBER Working Paper No. 13648. 
Coates, D. (2003). Education production functions using instructional time as an input. 
Education Economics 11, 273-292. 
Coelli, T. (1996). A guide to Frontier Version 4.1: A computer program for stochastic 
frontier production and cost function estimation. CEPA Working Paper No 
96/07. 
Cohn, E., S.L.W. Rhine and M.C. Santos (1989). Institutions of higher education as 
multi-product firms: Economies of scale and scope. Review of Economics and 
Statistics 71, 284-290. 
Colburn, C.B. and J.B. Horowitz (2003). Local Politics and the demand for public 
education. Urban Studies 40, 797-807. 
Contini, D., A. Scagni and A. Riehl (2007). The role of family background on 
secondary school choices. Labor-Centre for Employment Studies Working Paper 
No. 72. 
169 
Cortina, K.S. and L. Trommer (2003). Bildungswege und Bildungsbiographien in der 
Sekundarstufe I. Cortina, K.S., J. Baumert, A. Leschinksy, K.U. Mayer and L. 
Trommer (eds.). Das Bildungswesen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Reinbek, Rowohlt, 342-391. 
Creedy, J. and R. Disney (1989). Can we afford to grow older? European Economic 
Review 33, 367-376. 
Cutler, D.M., D.W. Elmendorf and R.J. Zeckhauser (1993). Demographic composition 
and the public bundle. Public Finance 1993, 178-198. 
de Groot, H., W.W. McMahon and J.F. Volkwein (1991). The cost structure of 
American research universities. Review of Economics and Statistics 73, 424-431. 
de Haan, J. and J.-E. Sturm (1997). Political and economic determinants of OECD 
budget deficits and government expenditures: A reinvestigation. European 
Journal of Political Economy 13, 739-750. 
Denzau, A.T. (1975). An empirical survey of studies on public school spending. 
National Tax Journal 28, 241-249. 
Deutscher Bundestag (2007): Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Aufhebung des 
Hochschulrahmengesetzes, Drucksache 16/6122. Berlin. 
Disney, R. (2007). Population ageing and the size of the welfare state: Is there a puzzle 
to explain? European Journal of Political Economy 23, 542-553. 
Doucouliagos, C. and M. Abbott (2007): Competition and Efficiency: Overseas students 
and technical efficiency in Australian and New Zealand universities. Deakin 
University Working Paper No. SWP 2007/09. 
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York, Harper. 
Drukker, D.M. (2003). Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-data models. Stata 
Journal 3, 168-177. 
Dustmann, C. (2004). Parental background, secondary school track choice, and wages. 
Oxford Economic Papers 56, 209-230. 
Entorf, H. (1997). Random walks with drifts: Nonsense regression and spurious fixed 
effects estimation. Journal of Econometrics 80, 287-296. 
Epple, D. and R.E. Romano (1996a). Ends against the middle: Determining public 
service provision when there are private alternatives. Journal of Public 
Economics 62, 297-325. 
Epple, D. and R.E. Romano (1996b). Public provision of private goods. Journal of 
Political Economy 104, 57-84. 
Epple, D., E. Newlon and R.E. Romano (2002). Ability tracking, school competition, 
and the distribution of educational benefits. Journal of Public Economics 83, 1-
48. 
Eren, O. and D.L. Millimet (2007). Time to learn? The organizational structure of 
schools and student achievement. Empirical Economics 32, 301-332. 
Ermisch, J. and M. Francesconi (2001). Family matters: Impact of family background 
on educational attainments. Economica 68, 137-156. 
Falch, T. and J. Rattsø (1996). Sources of cost expansion: Primary education in Norway 
1946-1990. Education Economics 4, 161-185. 
170 
Falch, T. and J. Rattsø (1997). Political economic determinants of school spending in 
federal states: Theory and time series evidence. European Journal of Political 
Economy 13, 299-314. 
Falch, T. and J. Rattsø (1999). Local public choice of school spending: disaggregating 
the demand function for educational services. Economics of Education Review 
18, 361-373. 
Falk, A. and A. Ichino (2006). Clean evidence on peer effects. Journal of Labor 
Economics 24, 39-57. 
Federal Ministry for Education and Research (2007a). Education in Germany. Basic 
structure of the education system of the Federal Republic of Germany. Berlin. 
Federal Ministry for Education and Research (2007b). Die wirtschaftliche und soziale 
Lage der Studierenden in der Bundesrepublik 2006. Berlin. 
Federal Ministry for Education and Research (2008). Aufhebung des 
Hochschulrahmengesetzes. http://www.bmbf.bund.de/de/8680.php (2009/02/26, 
13:46 h). 
Fernandez, R. and R. Rogerson (1995). On the political economy of education 
subsidies. Review of Economic Studies 62, 249-262. 
Fernandez, R. and R. Rogerson (2001). The determinants of public education 
expenditures: Longer-run evidence from the States. Journal of Education 
Finance 27, 567-584. 
Foreman-Peck, J. and L. Foreman-Peck (2006). Should schools be smaller? The size-
performance relationship for Welsh schools. Economics of Education Review 25, 
157-171. 
Franzese, R.J. (2002). Electoral and partisan cycles in economic policies and outcomes. 
Annual Review of Political Science 5, 369-421. 
Franzese, R.J. and K.L. Jusko (2006). Political-economic cycles. Wittman, D. and B. 
Weingast (eds.): Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 545-564. 
Frey, B.S. and F. Schneider (1978a). An empirical study of politico-economic 
interactions in the United States. Review of Economics and Statistics 60, 174-
183. 
Frey, B.S. and F. Schneider (1978b). A politico-economic model of the United 
Kingdom. Economic Journal 88, 243-353. 
Fritsch, M. and V. Slavtchev (2007). What determines the efficiency of regional 
innovation systems? Jena Economic Research Papers No.6/2007. 
Fusarelli, L.D. (2002). The political economy of gubernatorial elections: Implications 
for education policy. Educational Policy 16, 139-160. 
Galli, E. and S.P.S. Rossi (2002). Political budget cycles: The case of the Western 
German Länder. Public Choice 110, 283-303 
German Council of Economic Experts (2006). Annual report 2006/07. Wiesbaden. 
German Council of Economic Experts (2007). Annual report 2007/08. Wiesbaden. 
171 
Glass, J.C., D.G. McKillop and N. Hyndman (1995). Efficiency in the provision of 
university teaching and research: An empirical analysis of UK universities. 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 10, 61-72. 
Gouveia, M. (1997). Majority rule and the public provision of a private good. Public 
Choice 93, 221-244. 
Gradstein, M. and M. Kaganovich (2004). Aging population and education finance. 
Journal of Public Economics 88, 2469-2485. 
Gradstein, M., M. Justman and V. Meier (2005). The political economy of education. 
Cambridge, MIT Press. 
Graf, J. and V. Neu (2002). Analyse der Bundestagswahl vom 22. September 2002. 
Arbeitspapier der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Nr. 91/2002. 
Granger, C.W.J. and P. Newbold (1974). Spurious regression in econometrics. Journal 
of Econometrics 2, 111-120. 
Greene, W.H. (2003). Econometric analysis. Fifth Edition. New Jersey, Pearson. 
Grob, U. and S.C. Wolter (2007). Demographic change and public education spending. 
A conflict between young and old? Education Economics 15, 277-292. 
Gruber, J. and D. Wise (2001). An international perspective on policies for an aging 
society. NBER Working Paper No. 8103. 
Hanushek, E.A. (1986). The economics of schooling: Production and efficiency in 
public schools. Journal of Economic Literature 24, 1141-1177. 
Hanushek, E.A. (1999). Some findings from an independent investigation of the 
Tennessee STAR experiment and from other investigations of class size effects. 
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 21 (2) Special Issue, 143-163. 
Hanushek, E.A. (2002). Publicly provided education. Auerbach, Alan J. and Martin 
Feldstein (ed.). Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam, 
Elsevier, 2045-2141. 
Hanushek, E.A. (2003). The failure of input-based schooling policies. Economic 
Journal 113, F64-F98. 
Hanushek, E.A., J.F. Kain, J.M. Markman and S.G. Rivkin (2003). Does peer ability 
affect student achievement? Journal of Applied Econometrics 18, 527-544. 
Hanushek, E.A. and S.G. Rivkin (1997). Understanding the twentieth-century growth in 
U.S. school spending. Journal of Human Resources 32, 35-68. 
Hanushek, E.A. and L. Wößmann (2006). Does educational tracking affect performance 
and inequality? Differences-in-differences evidence across countries. Economic 
Journal 116, C63-C76. 
Harris, A.R., W.N. Evans and R.M. Schwab (2001). Education spending in an aging 
America. Journal of Public Economics 81, 449-472. 
Hecock, R.D (2006). Electoral competition, globalization, and subnational education 
spending in Mexico, 1999-2004. American Journal of Political Science 50, 950-
961. 
Heinesen, E. (2004). Determinants of local public school expenditure: a dynamic panel 
data model. Regional Science and Urban Economics 34, 429-453. 
172 
Heinrich, R., M. Lübker and H. Biehl (2002). Parteimitglieder im Vergleich: 
Partizipation und Repräsentation. Potsdam. 
Hibbs, D.A. (1977). Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political 
Science Review 71, 1467-1487. 
Hibbs, D.A. (1987a). The American political economy: Macroeconomics and electoral 
politics in the United States. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
Hibbs, D.A. (1987b). The political economy of industrial democracies. Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press. 
Hibbs, D.A. (1992). Partisan theory after fifteen years. European Journal of Political 
Economy 8, 361-373. 
Hoxby, C.M. (2000). The effects of class size on student achievement: New evidence 
from population variation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 1239-1285. 
Jochimsen, B. and R. Nuscheler (2007). The political economy of German Länder 
deficits. WZB Working Paper SB II 2007-06. 
Jones, J.T., E.F. Toma and R.W. Zimmer (2008). School attendance and district and 
school size. Economics of Education Review 27, 140-148. 
Judson, R.A. and A.L. Owen (1999). Estimating dynamic panel data models: A guide 
for macroeconomists. Economics Letters 65, 9-15. 
Kemnitz, A. and R.K. von Weizsäcker (2003). Bildungsreform in der Demokratie. 
Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 72, 188-204. 
Kempkes, G. and C. Pohl (2008). Do institutions matter for university cost efficiency? 
Evidence from Germany. CESifo Economic Studies 54, 177-203.  
Kempkes, G. and C. Pohl (2009). The efficiency of German universities – Some 
evidence from nonparametric and parametric methods. Applied Economics, 
forthcoming. 
Kennedy, P. (2003). A guide to econometrics. Fifth Edition. Malden, Blackwell. 
Kiesling, H.J. (1984). Assignment practices and the relationship instructional time to the 
reading performance of elementary school children. Economics of Education 
Review 3, 341-350. 
Kiviet, J.F. (1995). On bias, inconsistency and efficiency of various estimators in 
dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 68, 53-78. 
Köller, O. (2003). Gesamtschule – Erweiterung statt Alternative. Cortina, K.S., J. 
Baumert, A. Leschinksy, K.U. Mayer, L. Trommer (eds.). Das Bildungswesen in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Reinbek, Rowohlt, 458-486. 
Krueger, A.B. (2003). Economic considerations and class size. Economic Journal 113, 
F34-F63. 
Kumbhakar, S.C. and C.A.K. Lovell (2000). Stochastic frontier analysis. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kuo, J.-S. and Y.-C. Ho (2008). The cost efficiency impact of the university operation 
fund on public universities in Taiwan. Economics of Education Review 27, 603-
612. 
Kuziemko, I. (2006). Using shocks to school enrollment to estimate the effect of school 
size on student achievement. Economics of Education Review 25, 63-75. 
173 
Ladd, H.F. (1975). Local education expenditures, fiscal capacity, and the composition 
of the property tax base. National Tax Journal 28, 145-158. 
Ladd, H.F. and S.E. Murray (2001). Intergenerational conflict reconsidered: county 
demographic structure and the demand for public education. Economics of 
Education Review 20, 343-357. 
Leschinsky, A. (2003). Der institutionelle Rahmen des Bildungswesens. Cortina, K.S., 
J. Baumert, A. Leschinksy, K.U. Mayer, L. Trommer (eds.). Das Bildungswesen 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Reinbek, Rowohlt, 148-213. 
Leschinsky, A. and K.S. Cortina (2003). Zur sozialen Einbettung bildungspolitischer 
Trends in der Bundesrepublik. Cortina, K.S., J. Baumert, A. Leschinksy, K.U. 
Mayer L. Trommer (eds.). Das Bildungswesen in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. Reinbek, Rowohlt, 20-51. 
Lovell, M.C. (1978). Spending for education: The exercise of public choice. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 60, 487-495. 
Marcotte, D.E. and S.W. Hemelt (2007). Unscheduled school closings and student 
performance. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2923. 
Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung (2002). PISA 2000: Die Studie im 
Überblick. Grundlagen, Methoden, Ergebnisse. Berlin. 
McEwan, P.J. (2003). Peer effects on student achievement: Evidence from Chile. 
Economics of Education Review 22, 131-141. 
Meier, V. and G. Schütz (2007). The economics of tracking and non-tracking. Ifo 
Working Paper No. 50. 
Mertens, M. (2009). Die SPD – Wählerschaft und Mitglieder. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung. 
http://www.bpb.de/themen/WQT7IW,0,Die_SPD_W%E4hlerschaft_und_Mitglieder.ht
ml (2009/02/20, 16:24 h). 
Miller, R.T. R.J. Murnane and J.B. Willett (2007). Do teacher absences impact student 
achievement? Longitudinal evidence from one urban school district. NBER 
Working Paper No. 13356. 
Millot, B. and J. Lane (2002). The efficient use of time in education. Education 
Economics 10, 209-228. 
Mueller, D.C. (2003). Public choice. Third edition. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Murray, S.E, W.M. Evans and R.M. Schwab (1998). Education finance reform and the 
distribution of education resources. American Economic Review 88, 789-812. 
Neu, V. (2006). Analyse der Bundestagswahl 2005. Arbeitspapier der Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung Nr. 157/2006. 
Newey, W.K. and K.D. West (1987). A simple, positive semi-definite heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. Econometrica 55, 703-708. 
Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica 49, 
1417-1426. 
Nordhaus, W. (1975). The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42, 
169-190. 
174 
Oberndorfer, U. and V. Steiner (2006). Intergenerational conflict, partisan politics, and 
public higher education spending: Evidence from the German states. IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 2417. 
OECD (2004). Education at a glance. Paris. 
OECD (2005). Education at a glance. Paris. 
OECD (2007). Education at a glance. Paris. 
OECD (2008a). Education at a Glance. Paris. 
OECD (2008b). Glossary of statistical terms. Tertiary type A education (ISCED 5A). 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5440 (2009/02/12, 15:31 h) 
OECD (2008c). Glossary of statistical terms. Tertiary type B education (ISCED 5B). 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5441 (2009/02/12, 15:31 h) 
Orr, D., M. Jaeger and A. Schwarzenberger (2007): Performance-based funding as an 
instrument of competition in German higher education, Journal of Higher 
Education Policy and Management 29, 3-23. 
Pindyck, R.S. and D.L. Rubinfeld (1998). Econometric models and economic forecasts. 
Fourth edition. Boston, MA, McGraw-Hill. 
Poterba, J.M. (1997). Demographic structure and the political economy of public 
education. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 16, 48-66. 
Poterba, J.M. (1998). Demographic change, intergenerational linkages, and public 
education. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 88, 315-320. 
Potrafke, N. (2006). Parties matter in allocating expenditures: Evidence from Germany. 
DIW Discussion Paper No. 652. 
Reimers, F. (1993). Time and opportunity to learn in Pakistan’s schools: Some lessons 
on the link between research and policy. Comparative Education 29, 201-212. 
Rivkin, S.G., E.A. Hanushek and J.F. Kain (2005). Teachers, schools and academic 
achievement. Econometrica 73, 417-458. 
Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. Review of 
Economic Studies 55, 1-16. 
Roubini, N. and J. Sachs (1989). Government spending and budget deficits in the 
industrial countries. Economic Policy 4, 99-132. 
Rubinfeld, D.L. and P. Shapiro (1989). Micro-estimation of the demand for schooling. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics 19, 381-398. 
Sächsischer Landtag (2000). Drucksache 3/0982, 3. Wahlperiode. Dresden. 
Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Kultus (2005). Schülerrückgang für 
Qualitätsoffensive nutzen. Press release April 16, 2005. Dresden. 
Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Kultus (2007a). Immer weniger große Klassen an 
Sachsens Schulen. Press release January 07, 2007. Dresden 
Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Kultus (2007b). Ländervergleich: Kleine 
Klassengrößen in Sachsen. Press release September 30, 2007. Dresden. 
Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Kultus (2007c). Sachsen: Mehr Lehrer, weniger 
Schüler. Press release October 9, 2007. Dresden. 
175 
Saeki, M. (2005). Systematic, political, and socioeconomic influences on educational 
spending in the American states. Review of Policy Research 22, 245-256. 
Schimpl-Neimanns, B. (2000). Soziale Herkunft und Bildungsbeteiligung. Empirische 
Analysen zu herkunftsspezifischen Bildungsungleichheiten zwischen 1950 und 
1989. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 52, 636-669. 
Schmidt, M.G. (1996). When parties matter: A review of the possibilities and limits of 
partisan influence on public policy. European Journal of Political Research 30, 
155-183. 
Schmidt, M.G.; M.R. Busemeyer, R. Nikolai and F. Wolf (2006). Bildungsausgaben im 
intra- und internationalen Vergleich: Bestimmungsfaktoren öffentlicher 
Bildungsausgaben in OECD-Staaten. Mimeo, Universität Heidelberg. 
Schnabel, K.U., C. Alfeld, J.S. Eccles, O. Köller, and J. Baumert (2002). Parental 
influence on students’ educational choices in the United States and Germany: 
Different ramifications – Same effects? Journal of Vocational Behavior 60, 178-
198. 
Schnepf, S.V. (2002). A sorting hat that fails? The transition from primary to secondary 
school in Germany. UNICEF Innocenti Working Paper No. 92. 
Schulgesetz für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Schulg). 
Schultz, T.P. (1988). Expansion of public school expenditures and enrollments: 
intercountry evidence on the effects of income, prices, and population growth. 
Economics of Education Review 7, 167-183. 
Seitz, H. (1995). Public capital and the demand for private inputs. Journal of Public 
Economics 54, 287-307. 
Seitz, H. (2000). Fiscal policy, deficits and politics of subnational governments: The 
case of the German Länder. Public Choice 102, 183-218. 
Seitz, H., S. Eichler, B. Grundig, H. Lehmann, C. Pohl, J. Ragnitz, L. Schneider and M. 
Thum (2007). Die demographische Entwicklung in Ostdeutschland. Ifo Dresden 
Studien No. 41. 
Sigelman, L. (2006). The American Political Science Review citation classics. 
American Political Science Review 100, 667-687. 
Solga, H. and S. Wagner (2000). Beiwerk der Bildungsexpansion: Die soziale 
Entmischung der Hauptschule. Max-Planck-Institut for Human Development 
Independent Research Group Working Paper No. 1/2000. 
Spiewak, M. (2008). Friede in Sicht! Im dreißigjährigen Schulkrieg zeichnen sich 
Lösungen ab. Die Zeit 39, 39. 
Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers (2002). Schule in 
Deutschland. Zahlen, Fakten, Analysen. Bonn.  
Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers (2005). Vorausberechnung 
der Schüler- und Absolventenzahlen 2003 bis 2020. Bonn. 
Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers (2006a). Übergang von 
der Grundschule in Schulen des Sekundarbereichs I. Bonn. 
Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers (2006b). Vereinbarung 
über die Schularten und Bildungsgänge im Sekundarbereich I. Beschluss der 
Kultusministerkonferenz vom 3.12.1993 in der Fassung vom 2.6.2006. Bonn. 
176 
Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers (2006c). 
Definitionenkatalog zur Schulstatistik. Beschluss der Kommission für Statistik 
vom 28.09.2006. Bonn. 
Standing Conference of German Länder Education Ministers (2007). Schüler, Klassen, 
Lehrer und Absolventen der Schulen. Bonn 
Stevens, P.A. (2005): A Stochastic Frontier Analysis of English and Welsh Universities. 
Education Economics 13, 355-374. 
Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2002): Qualität durch Wettbewerb und 
Autonomie. Landeshochschulgesetze im Vergleich. Essen. 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1974). The demand for education in public and private school systems. 
Journal of Public Economics 3, 349-385. 
Stern, J. (2000). Programme versus Pragmatik. Parteien und ihre Programme als 
Einfluß- und Gestaltungsgröße auf bildungspolitische Entscheidungsprozesse. 
Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang. 
Tepe, M. (2007). Political-economic cycles. The case of public education in Germany. 
Mimeo, Pfadkolleg Berlin. 
Tufte, E.R. (1978). Political control of the economy. Princeton, Princeton University 
Press. 
Verbon, H.A.A. (1990). Transfers to the old, government debt and demographic change. 
Journal of Population Economics 3, 89-104. 
von Weizsäcker, R.K. (1995). Public pension reform, demographics, and inequality. 
Journal of Population Economics 8, 205-221. 
Warning, S. (2004). Performance differences in German higher education: Empirical 
analysis of strategic group. Review of Industrial Organization 24, 393-408. 
Warning, S. (2005). Effizienz deutscher Hochschulen: Gibt es regionale Unterschiede? 
Bellmann, L. and D. Sadowski (eds.). Bildungsökonomische Analyse mit 
Mikrodaten. Nürnberg, 65-81. 
Weiß, M. (1997). Mehr Ressourcen gleich mehr Qualität? Böttcher, W. H. Weishaupt 
and M. Weiß (eds.). Wege zu einer neuen Bildungsökonomie. Weinheim, 
Juventa, 161-170. 
Weiß, M. and H. Weishaupt (1999). The German school system after reunification: A 
descriptive overview of recent trends. International Journal of Educational 
Reform 8, 113-119. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2003). Introductory econometrics. Second edition. Mason, OH, 
South-Western. 
Worthington, A.C. (2001). An Empirical Survey of Frontier Efficiency Measurement 
Techniques in Education. Education Economics 9, 245-268. 
Wößmann, L. (2004). How equal are educational opportunities? Family background and 
student achievement in Europe and the U.S.. CESifo Working Paper No. 1162. 
Wößmann, L. (2005). Educational production in Europe. Economic Policy 20, 445-504. 
177 
Wößmann, L. and M. West (2006). Class size effects in school systems around the 
world: Evidence from between-grade variation in TIMSS. European Economic 
Review 50, 695-736. 
Zimmermann, K.F. (1991). Ageing and the labor market. Journal of Population 
Economics 4, 177-200. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
APPENDIX 
 
A.2.4 Electorates of the political parties with respect to profession in 2002 federal 
elections 
 SPD CDU/CSU Green Party FDP PDS 
Blue-collar worker 42% 37%   5%- 6% 5% 
White-collar worker 39% 35%  12% 8%   3%- 
Civil servants 37%- 36%  15% 8%   3% 
Farmer/Self-employed 21% 47%  13% 15% 2% 
Unemployed 41% 28%  9%   7%   10% 
Pensioner 41% 43%  4% 6%   5% 
In training 39%  28%  15% 10%  4% 
ELECTION 38.5% 38.5% 8.6% 7.4% 4% 
Source: Graf and Neu (2002) 
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A.3.4.2 Wage spending as a share of total education spending at the Länder level 
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Data Source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
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A 3.4.3.2 (a) Regression results for the East German Länder (1993-2006) 
 (1) ∆ln(Tt/T) (2) ∆ln(St/Cl) (3) ∆ln(Tt/Cl) 
∆ ln(St) -0.258 -0.063 -0.190 
 (0.416) (0.154) (0.393) 
∆ ln(PR) -0.760 -0.047 -0.140 
 (0.349)** (0.083) (0.265) 
∆ ln(PD) 0.861 0.870 -0.084 
 (1.429) (0.366)** (1.051) 
∆ UR 1.885 -0.044 -0.154 
 (1.089)* (0.331) (0.620) 
∆ FS 7.947 1.452 1.346 
 (6.036)+ (1.170) (4.262) 
∆ o60 -0.862 1.358 1.618 
 (5.649) (1.749) (4.405) 
Constant 0.022 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.032) (0.010) (0.024) 
Observations 65 65 65 
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes 
F (Year FE) 1.33 2.56** 0.6 
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.84 -0.17 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987).  ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. Joint significance of the year 
fixed effects is tested using an F (12, 46) test. 
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A.3.4.3.2 (b) Regression results for the West German Länder (1993-2006) 
 ∆ln(Tt/T) ∆ln(St/Cl) ∆ln(Tt/Cl) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆ ln(St) 0.001 0.390 0.350 0.184 -0.190 -0.113 
 (0.118) (0.315) (0.058)*** (0.324) (0.135)+ (0.449) 
∆ ln(PR) 0.026 0.053 -0.021 -0.025 0.034 0.036 
 (0.050) (0.069) (0.032) (0.038) (0.051) (0.052) 
∆ ln(PD) 0.529 -0.157 -0.978 -0.735 -0.068 0.135 
 (0.510) (1.088) (0.719)+ (0.710) (0.744) (1.133) 
∆ UR 0.295 -0.252 -0.003 0.305 -0.365 -0.465 
 (0.446) (0.743) (0.122) (0.336) (0.427) (0.859) 
∆ FS -1.238 -1.154 -0.312 -0.569 -1.628 -1.452 
 (0.632)* (1.275) (0.433) (0.650) (0.803)** (1.133) 
∆ o60 1.655 -0.978 -0.975 -0.566 -1.630 -0.021 
 (1.034)+ (1.897) (0.724)+ (1.523) (1.125)+ (2.562) 
Constant -0.005 -0.009 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.012) (0.006)** (0.015) 
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 
Year FE? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
F (Year FE) - 1.58+ - 0.67 - 0.75 
Adjusted R-
squared 
-0.00 -0.06 0.38 0.34 0.20 0.16 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987).  ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. Joint significance of the year 
fixed effects is tested using an F (12, 85) test. 
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A.4.2 Additional information on partisan theory and related empirical evidence 
Partisan theory: a summary 
Generally, the essence of partisan theory is the assumption that a political party’s 
policies are shaped by ideology and that different parties when in office pursue quite 
different goals and policies (Hibbs, 1977; Tufte, 1978 and Alesina, 1987). In economics 
and political science, this assumption is not as commonplace as one might suspect. Very 
prominent strands of the literature on voting and electoral cycles assume that parties are 
only engaged in maximising votes and winning elections, thereby leaving little or no 
room for party ideology (Median voter theorem, Downs, 1957 or opportunistic political 
cycles (see e.g., Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988).  
 
As opposed to these “opportunistic” models, partisan theory highlights the ideological 
motivation of politicians and their parties. As Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997, 45) 
state “opportunistic policymakers choose policies solely to win elections, [whereas] 
partisan policymakers want to win in order to implement their desired policies”. Thus, 
different parties are assumed to represent specific clienteles in the electorates, and when 
in office pursue mainly the interests of their core constituencies. Most commonly it is 
assumed that left-wing parties pursue policies benefiting lower-middle class 
households, such as lowering unemployment, increasing growth and following less 
strict inflation policies. In contrast, right-wing governments are usually assumed to 
focus on containing inflation while being less concerned about unemployment.  
 
Partisan theory dates back to Hibbs (1977) and Tufte (1978) the former being among 
the most heavily cited in political science (Sigelman, 2006). Alesina (1987) formalises 
and modifies Hibbs (1977) such that voters and workers, etc., form expectations 
rationally (rational partisan theory), which limits the governing parties’ possibilities to 
exploit the trade-off between inflation and unemployment stated by the short-run 
Phillips-curve. Nevertheless, most qualitative predictions of Hibbs’s model hold also in 
Alesina’s framework. 
 
The following presentation sketches the basic assumptions and predictions of partisan 
theory. It is based on Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997, chapters 1 and 3), who present 
traditional and rational partisan theory in a common framework and notation.72 Both the 
                                                
72 See also Blankart (2002) or Mueller (2003). 
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traditional and the rational partisan hypotheses are based on the assumption that the 
governing parties can exploit a trade-off between inflation and unemployment as stated 
by the Phillips-curve (at least in the short run in the case of rational partisan theory; see 
below). Both frameworks further assume that the timing of elections is exogenously 
fixed and there are only two parties running for government. Moreover, both theories 
share the core assumption that the two competing parties represent different ideologies. 
Based on the preferences of their constituencies and members, right-wing parties choose 
a combination of relatively lower inflation and higher unemployment compared to left-
wing parties.  
 
The two models differ in their assumption concerning voters’ formation of expectations. 
Hibbs’s (1977) model implicitly assumes voters to form adaptive or even static 
expectations. This allows the government to exploit a stable Phillips-curve without 
causing voters’ (and workers’) expectations to shift the Phillips-curve to the right. Left- 
or right-wing governments can therefore permanently choose combinations of higher 
growth/lower unemployment and higher inflation or vice versa. Alesina (1987) 
incorporates rational expectations in combination with wage or price rigidities to 
Hibbs’s (1977) model. Due to rational expectations, voters anticipate public policies’ 
intention to exploit the inflation-unemployment trade-off, e.g., in the case of left-wing 
governments pursuing expansionary policies, wage-contracts and prices will be adjusted 
to the new inflation rate. This causes the expectations-augmented Phillips-curve to shift 
to the right. 
 
However, elections introduce an element of uncertainty to the economy, since the 
election outcome and thus future macroeconomic policies are generally uncertain: 
therefore, wage contracts and prices are based on the expected election outcome (a 
weighted average of the anticipated policies of right-wing and left-wing parties 
weighted by the winning probabilities). As a consequence, prices and wage contracts 
which are determined in long-term contracts usually lasting for half the electoral period 
cannot precisely anticipate the pursued macro policy (unless the election outcome was 
known with certainty), and must be adjusted to the winning party’s 
inflation/unemployment policy. This, however, takes some time, which allows the 
government to exploit the Phillips-curve trade-off temporarily, usually for about half of 
the electoral period. After that, voters know which party will be in office and their 
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expectations have adjusted to the – then known – economic policy, i.e. rational 
expectations (by adjusted prices and work-contracts) cause a shift of the short-run, 
expectations-augmented Phillips-curve to the right in post-election years. Consequently 
real effects in growth and unemployment cease. The shift to the right of the short-run 
Phillips-curve, however, causes inflation to be permanently higher than under right-
wing governments. Obviously, rational expectations limit the scope for partisan policies 
in the model.  
 
Thus, in summary, Hibbs (1977) predicts permanent differences in inflation and 
growth/unemployment under right-wing and left-wing governments. Alesina (1987) in 
turn suggests only temporary unemployment/growth differences between right- and left-
wing parties while differences in inflation should be permanent as in Hibbs (1977). 
Furthermore, both models predict booms and recessions to be more pronounced when 
differences in ideologies are large. Alesina’s model additionally implies that the 
magnitudes of post-electoral booms/recessions are positively correlated with the degree 
of surprise in the election result. Thus, political polarisation and electoral surprise imply 
that the electoral outcome is relatively far from expectations. Conversely, if the election 
outcome is known with certainty, then under rational partisan theory there is no room 
for a boom/recession. 
 
Some empirical evidence 
In empirical tests, party ideology has been tested in its impact on macroeconomic 
outcomes. However, one can also test for the use of policy instruments such as 
monetary or fiscal policy, which is more closely related to the discussion in Chapter 4. 
Few studies have focussed on investigating the ideological differences between political 
parties in education policy. 
 
(a) Macroeconomic outcomes 
Party ideology has been widely shown to have effects on growth, unemployment and 
inflation. This holds for the U.S. and several other OECD countries as well as for panels 
of OECD countries (Hibbs 1977; Tufte 1978; Frey and Schneider, 1978a and 1978b; 
Alt, 1985; Hibbs 1987a, 1987b; Alesina and Sachs, 1988; Alesina and Roubini, 1992; 
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997 as well as Franzese and Jusko, 2006 and Berlemann 
and Markwardt, 2007 as well as the literature cited therein). 
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There is, however, some degree of dissent about whether the data support traditional 
partisan hypotheses, i.e. sustained differences in macroeconomic outcomes under left- 
and right-wing governments, or rational partisan theory, i.e. sustained differences only 
in inflation, whereas differences in growth and unemployment are restricted to the first 
half of the electoral period. Moreover, the magnitude of booms (left-wing party) or 
recessions (right-wing party) should, under rational expectations, positively correlate 
with the degree of electoral surprise. 
 
Post-electoral booms and recessions – at least in the U.S. – appear to be restricted to the 
beginning of the electoral period and tend to cease towards the end (Alesina, Roubini 
and Cohen, 1997; Hibbs, 1992; Franzese and Jusko, 2006). Scholars disagree whether 
this is sufficient evidence to support rational partisan hypotheses; in particular, it is 
argued that existing studies do not test the heart of rational partisan theory, i.e. the effect 
of electoral surprise on real macroeconomic outcomes (Hibbs, 1992; Franzese and 
Jusko, 2006). A recent empirical study overcomes this shortcoming by including polling 
data on a large sample of OECD countries as a measure of electoral surprise. They find 
support for rational partisan theory (Berlemann and Markwardt, 2007). 
 
(b) Fiscal policy 
There is a broad empirical literature testing partisan hypotheses within the context of 
fiscal policy (e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 1989; de Haan and Sturm, 1997; Alesina, 
Roubini and Cohen, 1997, chapter 7.5 for OECD countries; Alesina, Roubini and 
Cohen, 1997, chapter 4.8 for the U.S.; Seitz, 2000 for Germany).73 
 
Generally, these studies can be understood as empirical tests on one of the instruments 
by which governments may try to achieve their macroeconomic policy goals. However, 
these tests can also be interpreted more generally, i.e. parties try to benefit their core 
constituencies directly via public spending (Franzese and Jusko, 2006). For example, a 
                                                
73 In particular, scholars argue that left-wing governments may be more willing to accept public deficits. 
However, whereas the literature on the political economy of public debt has proliferated (see Alesina, 
Roubini and Cohen, 1997, chapter 9.2 for a good overview), partisan hypothesis with respect to public 
deficits has been questioned on theoretical grounds (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997, chapters 4 and 7, 
103, 202 and 230). Moreover, empirical support for partisan-related hypotheses in public deficits has been 
rather inconclusive (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997, chapters 4, 7 and 9.3; 
Jochimsen and Nuscheler, 2007).  
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left-wing party may engage in expanding public systems of unemployment benefits 
relying on a progressive tax system. 
 
However, while Hibbs (1977, 1987a) and Tufte (1978) present convincing descriptive 
evidence on the distributional impact of unemployment/inflation that shows the 
beneficiaries of this policy, some of the studies hypothesising that leftist governments 
tend to advocate higher public expenditures do not (see also Alesina, Roubini and 
Cohen, 1997). Moreover, the distributional effects of marginal increases in public 
spending (and taxation) are not clear-cut for many subcomponents of public 
spending/taxation. This holds even less for a broad cross-section of countries when not 
accounting for differences in political and fiscal institutions (see Schmidt, 1996 and 
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997, 247).  
 
It is therefore more promising to focus on subcomponents of public spending for which 
a theoretical prediction on the influence of party ideology is clear. This is also part of 
the concept of “context-conditionality” by Franzese (2002, 44): “In partisan cycles, as 
in electoral cycles, the incentives for, capacity for, and effects of ‘partisaneering’ 
should vary predictably from policy to policy and across contexts characterized by 
differing international and domestic political-economic institutions, structure, and 
strategic situation.” 
 
(c) Public policies in education 
The following review offers an extensive overview of studies reporting evidence on 
partisan hypotheses in public education spending. Since the education systems across 
countries are quite heterogeneous, the evidence is grouped accordingly. 
 
Castles (1989) investigates the effect of right-wing governments on public education 
spending based on a panel of 18 OECD countries over the years 1960 and 1980 and 
finds a significant negative effect. Castles’s findings align with the results by Boix 
(1997), whose estimates suggest a positive effect of leftist governments on education 
spending for a sample of 20 OECD countries over the 1960-1990 period. Busemeyer 
(2006 and 2007) exploits a panel data set on 21 OECD countries for the 1980-2001 
period and roughly confirms earlier findings. However, in some of his specifications, 
the positive effect of Social Democratic government participation no longer 
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significantly differs from zero. He finds some evidence that partisan influence on public 
education spending may have become weaker in the 1990s compared to earlier periods. 
Thus, cross-country analyses for OECD countries tend to confirm the hypothesis that 
left- (right-) wing governments prefer higher (lower) spending on public education. 
 
For the U.S., Fusarelli (2002) reports case-study evidence from the states Florida, New 
York and Texas. In each state, a Democratic government was followed by a Republican 
government. No change in educational policy could be observed, which is attributed to 
increased accountability of educational policy due to reports/tests on the performance of 
the American educational system, pressure from globalisation and straitened public 
budgets at the state level. Based on a cross-section of the U.S. states in 2000, Saeki 
(2005) finds that the number of Democratic-majority chambers in the state legislature 
between 1994 and 1999 has had a positive impact on the share of state budgets allocated 
to primary and secondary education. But his estimates also suggest that education 
spending per pupil is not affected by Democratic majorities. Thus, the state-level 
evidence for the U.S. is mixed. Whereas Democratic governments seem to give priority 
to education compared to other government spending, spending per student is 
apparently not higher in states with Democratic incumbents. However, one must bear in 
mind that in the U.S. education from primary to high schools are generally the 
responsibility of local school districts such that the state level is not the appropriate 
level of government for analysing this question. Based on a cross-section of cities and 
counties in Virginia, Colburn and Horowitz (2003) find that electorates voting for the 
Democratic Party in the 1992 presidential election are associated with higher public 
education expenditures. However, one may argue that voting behaviour in a presidential 
election may not be the most appropriate variable to capture party affiliation in this 
question. 
 
Hecock (2006) investigates partisan influence on public expenditures in primary 
education in 29 Mexican states over the 1999-2004 period. Based on a pooled PCSE 
regression, he finds weak evidence that spending is higher in times/states with left-wing 
governments than under a right political party.  
 
Evidence by Bilek (2005) suggests that in a 2001 cross-section of French local 
communities the ideological orientation of the local government has no significant 
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effect on education spending. Moreover, a socialist-oriented electorate is associated 
with lower education expenditures.  
 
Heinesen (2004) finds for a panel of Danish municipalities (1984-1996) that a higher 
share of Socialists in the council is associated with higher public spending per pupil in 
primary education. 
 
Falch and Rattsø (1997) find that a stable government and low party fragmentation in 
the Norwegian Parliament (1880-1990) is associated with lower aggregate teacher 
employment, while a socialist government increases teacher wages and employment. 
Evidence for high school spending at the level of Norwegian counties over the 1976-
1993 period presented in Falch and Rattsø (1999) suggests that a high share of socialists 
in the council is associated with higher teacher/student-ratio and higher non-wage 
spending per teacher in high schools. However, this effect is conditional on the county 
level of per capita revenue, which suggests that partisan influence is somehow limited 
when public resources are scarce. Moreover, higher resource-use in high schools also 
seems to reflect socialists’ priority for vocational training. Borge and Naper (2006) 
analyse a sample of lower secondary schools in Norwegian municipalities and find that 
higher party fragmentation and a high share of socialists in the local council are 
associated with higher resource-use and less efficient schools. For Norwegian primary 
education, Borge and Sørensen (2002) present evidence from survey data that does not 
suggest significant disagreement concerning spending levels (see also Falch and Rattsø, 
1996). There is, however, some evidence that socialist politicians have somewhat higher 
preferences for public spending on kindergarten services. Overall, socialist participation 
in Norwegian government(s) seems to be associated with higher resources use in all 
levels of education with the exception of primary schooling. Moreover, socialists give 
priority to vocational training. 
 
For Germany, Galli and Rossi (2002) investigate partisan effects on public expenditures 
for 11 West German Länder over the 1974-1994 period and do not find significant 
evidence in support of partisan theory. This finding is confirmed by Potrafke (2006) for 
the 1974-2004 period (expenditure data, 10 West German Länder) and by Tepe (2007) 
for the 1992-2004 period (teacher employment data, 16 German Länder). Schmidt et al. 
(2006) do find a negative effect of Social Democratic Länder governments on public 
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education spending in a pooled (PCSE) estimation. When they include Länder fixed 
effects, the coefficient effect becomes insignificant and thus, it could also capture 
unobserved Länder heterogeneity. For university expenditures the negative effect of 
SPD governments is also robust to the inclusion of Länder dummies. Coalition 
governments under participation of the liberal party, FDP, are associated with higher 
university expenditures. Oberndorfer and Steiner (2006) confirm the negative effect of 
Social Democratic Länder governments on public university spending based on a panel 
for 10 West German Länder over the 1985-2002 period. However, at the federal level, 
Social Democrats seem to have preferences for higher spending on financial support to 
students (see Potrafke, 2006). In summary, differences between political parties seem to 
be rather small or nonexistent when analysing overall education spending. For higher 
education spending there is some evidence pointing to higher spending preferences of 
liberal and conservative parties while at the federal level Social Democrats seem to 
prioritise financial support to students.  
 
In conclusion, existing evidence tends to confirm the general partisan hypothesis that 
leftist governments prefer higher public spending also in the context of public 
education, although there are quite important differences in the results across countries. 
Moreover, some of the evidence points to limitations of such generally formulated 
partisan hypotheses. First, partisan influence may be contingent on sufficiently 
favourable fiscal conditions; specifically the rule of party ideology may not be feasible 
in times of tight public budgets or in welfare states in the globalised economy (Falch 
and Rattso, 1999 and Fusarelli, 2002). Second, the influence of party ideology may not 
be fair with respect to the overall level of public education spending, but also regarding 
specific educational tracks or levels which most benefit the party’s electorate. This 
pattern might be the reason for the evidence found for Germany (higher education 
spending; financial support for students). 
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A.4.4.2 Panel unit root tests on the share of students enroled in comprehensive and joint 
schooling (first differences) 
 
(a) Panel unit root tests on ∆(StCOMPREHENSIVE/StTOTAL) 
Test Statistic I p-value Unit root? Statistic II p-value Unit root? 
(1) Levin, Lin and Chu -3.411 0.000 no -2.911 0.002 no 
(2) Breitung - -  -4.073 0.000 no 
(3) Im, Pesaran and Shin -6.636 0.000 no -5.857 0.000 no 
(4) ADF – Fisher 85.160 0.000 no 73.190 0.000 no 
(5) PP – Fisher 65.234 0.000 no 55.843 0.000 no 
(6) Hadri 3.816 0.000 yes 3.765 0.000 yes 
Note: Unit root/No unit root is based on p<0.05. Statistic I includes individual Länder effects; statistic II 
includes individual Länder effects and individual linear time trends. Tests (1) – (5) are based on the null 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. Test (6) is based on the null hypothesis of no unit root. Tests 
(1), (2) and (6) assume a common unit root process for all 10 Länder time series; tests (3) – (5) allow for 
the possibility of individual unit roots in the 10 Länder time series. Lag length is selected based on 
Schwartz Information Criterion. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
 
(b) Panel unit root tests on ∆(StJOINT/StTOTAL)  
Test Statistic I p-value Unit root? Statistic II p-value Unit root? 
Levin, Lin and Chu -2.836 0.002 no -1.269 0.102 yes 
Breitung - -  -1.110 0.134 yes 
Im, Pesaran and Shin -5.455 0.000 no -5.047 0.000 no 
ADF – Fisher 75.158 0.000 no 71.195 0.000 no 
PP – Fisher 72.085 0.000 no 65.541 0.000 no 
Hadri 2.557 0.005 yes 4.663 0.000 yes 
Note: Unit root/No unit root is based on p<0.05. Statistic I includes individual Länder effects; statistic II 
includes individual Länder effects and individual linear time trends. Tests (1) – (5) are based on the null 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. Test (6) is based on the null hypothesis of no unit root. Tests 
(1), (2) and (6) assume a common unit root process for all 10 Länder time series; tests (3) – (5) allow for 
the possibility of individual unit roots in the 10 Länder time series. Lag length is selected based on 
Schwartz Information Criterion. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
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A.4.5.2 Panel unit root tests on relative teacher/student-ratios (first differences) 
(a) ((T/St)GYM/(T/St)TOTAL) 
Test Statistic I p-value Unit root? Statistic II p-value Unit root? 
Levin, Lin and Chu -10.523 0.000 no -8.713 0.000 no 
Breitung - -  -7.339 0.000 no 
Im, Pesaran and Shin -9.555 0.000 no -8.209 0.000 no 
ADF – Fisher 118.480 0.000 no 94.478 0.000 no 
PP – Fisher 131.835 0.000 no 126.965 0.000 no 
Hadri 0.263 0.396 no 2.885 0.002 yes 
Note: Unit root/No unit root is based on p<0.05. Statistic I includes individual Länder effects; statistic II 
includes individual Länder effects and individual linear time trends. Tests (1) – (5) are based on the null 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. Test (6) is based on the null hypothesis of no unit root. Tests 
(1), (2) and (6) assume a common unit root process for all 10 Länder time series; tests (3) – (5) allow for 
the possibility of individual unit roots in the 10 Länder time series. Lag length is selected based on 
Schwarz Information Criterion. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
(b) ((T/St)HAUPT/(T/St)TOTAL) 
Test Statistic I p-value Unit root? Statistic II p-value Unit root? 
Levin, Lin and Chu -5.346 0.000 no -4.044 0.000 no 
Breitung - -  -1.969 0.025 no 
Im, Pesaran and Shin -7.174 0.000 no -6.702 0.000 no 
ADF – Fisher 91.356 0.000 no 79.380 0.000 no 
PP – Fisher 111.555 0.000 no 438.868 0.000 no 
Hadri 0.654 0.257 no 1.999 0.023 yes 
Note: Unit root/No unit root is based on p<0.05. Statistic I includes individual Länder effects; statistic II 
includes individual Länder effects and individual linear time trends. Tests (1) – (5) are based on the null 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. Test (6) is based on the null hypothesis of no unit root. Tests 
(1), (2) and (6) assume a common unit root process for all 10 Länder time series; tests (3) – (5) allow for 
the possibility of individual unit roots in the 10 Länder time series. Lag length is selected based on 
Schwarz Information Criterion. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
(c) ((T/St)JOINT/(T/St)TOTAL) 
Test Statistic I p-value Unit root? Statistic II p-value Unit root? 
Levin, Lin and Chu -10.205 0.000 no -10.243 0.000 no 
Breitung - -  -6.129 0.000 no 
Im, Pesaran and Shin -10.629 0.000 no -10.336 0.000 no 
ADF – Fisher 135.580 0.000 no 119.171 0.000 no 
PP – Fisher 173.397 0.000 no 186.984 0.000 no 
Hadri 0.716 0.237 no 5.141 0.000 yes 
Note: Unit root/No unit root is based on p<0.05. Statistic I includes individual Länder effects; statistic II 
includes individual Länder effects and individual linear time trends. Tests (1) – (5) are based on the null 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. Test (6) is based on the null hypothesis of no unit root. Tests 
(1), (2) and (6) assume a common unit root process for all 10 Länder time series; tests (3) – (5) allow for 
the possibility of individual unit roots in the 10 Länder time series. Lag length is selected based on 
Schwarz Information Criterion. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
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 A.4.5.4.2 Political parties’ influence on resource allocation across tracks (10 West 
German Länder, 1981-2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆(TStGYM/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStHAUPT/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStJOINT/TStTOTAL) 
SPD-FDP -0.000 0.008 -0.010 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) 
SPD-Green Party 0.007 0.010 -0.016 
 (0.004)* (0.010) (0.007)** 
SPD-FDP-Green P. 0.024 -0.024 0.012 
 (0.010)** (0.017)+ (0.015) 
SPD-Statt Party 0.004 0.026 -0.017 
 (0.007) (0.009)*** (0.017) 
CDU 0.009 -0.012 -0.025 
 (0.004)** (0.010) (0.008)*** 
CDU-FDP 0.001 0.001 -0.015 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)* 
CDU-FDP-Statt P. -0.004 0.047 -0.050 
 (0.008) (0.016)*** (0.011)*** 
Grand Coalition 0.002 0.002 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
∆(StGYM/StTOTAL) -0.440   
 (0.087)***   
∆(StHAUPT/StTOTAL)  -0.334  
  (0.369)  
∆(StJOINT/StTOTAL)   -0.875 
   (0.058)*** 
∆ ln (PR) -0.001 0.079 -0.026 
 (0.032) (0.058)+ (0.045) 
∆ ln (PD) 0.523 0.363 -0.450 
 (0.414) (0.431) (0.597) 
∆ UR 0.354 -0.426 0.375 
 (0.268)+ (0.616) (0.545) 
∆ o60 2.597 -2.080 -3.841 
 (1.933)+ (3.184) (3.022) 
Länder FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.07 0.29 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987).  ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
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A.4.5.4.3 The effect of education ministers’ party affiliation on resource allocation 
across tracks (10 West German Länder, 1981-2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆(TStGYM/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStHAUPT/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStJOINT/TStTOTAL) 
Education Minister 
CDU 
0.004 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.007)+ 
Education Minister 
FDP 
-0.006 0.037 -0.041 
 (0.008) (0.013)*** (0.011)*** 
∆(StGYM/StTOTAL) -0.480   
 (0.082)***   
∆(StHAUPT/StTOTAL)  -0.265  
  (0.388)  
∆(StJOINT/StTOTAL)   -0.881 
   (0.061)*** 
∆ ln (PR) 0.012 0.065 -0.038 
 (0.026) (0.057) (0.042) 
∆ ln (PD) 0.511 0.532 -0.596 
 (0.423) (0.404)+ (0.675) 
∆ UR 0.352 -0.369 0.330 
 (0.275) (0.615) (0.558) 
∆ o60 2.118 -0.830 -1.492 
 (1.838) (2.711) (2.789) 
Länder FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.07 0.28 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987).  ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
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A.4.5.4.4 A separation of exogenous and potentially endogenous political variation: 
Political parties’ influence on resource allocations across tracks (10 West German 
Länder, 1981-2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆(TStGYM/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStHAUPT/TStTOTAL) ∆(TStJOINT/TStTOTAL) 
CDU*NONELECT 0.009 -0.010 -0.020 
 (0.004)** (0.009) (0.007)*** 
FDP*NONELECT 0.007 -0.010 -0.031 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.011)*** 
Green P*NONELECT 0.015 -0.010 -0.041 
 (0.008)* (0.013) (0.013)*** 
SPD*ELECT 0.003 0.001 -0.010 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
CDU*ELECT 0.002 -0.010 -0.024 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)** 
FDP*ELECT -0.010 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) 
Green P.*ELECT 0.014 -0.010 -0.030 
 (0.008)* (0.013) (0.014)** 
Other 0.004 0.019 -0.047 
 (0.010) (0.013)+ (0.019)** 
COALSIZE -0.007 0.016 0.028 
 (0.006) (0.010)+ (0.011)*** 
∆(StGYM/StTOTAL) -0.479   
 (0.084)***   
∆(StHAUPT/StTOTAL)  -0.333  
  (0.384)  
∆(StJOINT/StTOTAL)   -0.906 
   (0.054)*** 
∆ ln (PR) 0.013 0.063 -0.018 
 (0.031) (0.058) (0.048) 
∆ ln (PD) 0.505 0.542 -0.857 
 (0.432) (0.451) (0.698) 
∆ UR 0.324 -0.411 0.297 
 (0.270) (0.611) (0.545) 
∆ o60 2.261 -1.941 -2.927 
 (1.892) (3.037) (2.965) 
Länder FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.05 0.30 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey and West, 1987).  ***, **, * and + 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and at the 20% level, respectively. 
